International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 321 (AFL-CIO) v. Water Works Bd. of City of Birmingham

• Decision Date: 09 April 1964
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 13,AFL-CIO
• Citation: 276 Ala. 462,163 So.2d 619
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 321 () v. WATER WORKS BOARD OF the CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 619

163 So.2d 619

276 Ala. 462

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 321 (AFL-CIO) v. WATER WORKS BOARD OF the CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

6 Div. 13.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 9, 1964.

Cooper, Mitch & Crawford and Stanford J. Skinner, Birmingham, for appellant.

Drayton T. Scott, Wm. F. Gardner and Cabaniss & Johnston, Birmingham, for appellee.

Henry T. Wilson, Washington, D. C., for American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae.

SIMPSON, Justice.

The question presented by this appeal is res integra in this jurisdiction, viz.: Can a public agency in Alabama bargain with and enter into an enforceable collective agreement with a labor organization concerning the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of its employees in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authorization to do so? Appellant has represented the employees of appellee for some thirty years, during which period a series of twelve collective contracts were executed between the parties. (There is no question of union membership, per se, involved on this appeal.)

The lower court, in a declaratory judgment action, ruled, inter alia, that such a contract was ultra vires and unenforcible and therefore the relief sought by appellant (union) was denied.

This Court has been favored with excellent and exhaustive briefs from both appellant and appellee and also from amicus curiae which present every conceivable facet of arguments, citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions where the question has arisen.

Concededly, appellee, as the Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham, is a public agency and its employees are public employees. Water Works Board of City of Birmingham v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203, 78 So.2d 267; Jackson v. Hubbard, 256 Ala. 114, 53 So.2d 723. See also State ex rel. Richardson v. Morrow, Ala., 162 So.2d 480.

It appears from the cases cited to us in brief, and our research also reveals, that the strongest current of opinion from the highest courts of states where the question has been presented has ruled that a public agency has no legal authority to bargain or contract with a labor union in the absence of express statutory authority. Appellant argues to the contrary and asks us to adopt a rule that would permit such contracts or agreements where there is no statutory prohibition against collective bargaining.

The Supreme Court of Florida in Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194, 165 A.L.R. 967 (where the Union sought a declaratory judgment that the city might bargain with it) held, and we think correctly so, that the City was under no obligation to bargain with the Union and stated:

'The City of Miami is a governmental entity created by the state. It derives its powers and jurisdiction from the sovereign authority. It is limited to the exercise of such powers as are expressly granted to it by the state, or as are necessarily and fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. * * * It is a public institution designed to promote the common interests of the inhabitants in their organized capacity as a local government. Its objects are governmental, not commercial. * * * It has no authority to enter into negotiations with the labor union, or any other organized group, concerning hours, wages, or conditions of employment * * *.'

The Florida Court of Appeals (1963) in the case of Dade County v. Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, 157 So.2d 176, held in part:

"Unless clearly authorized to do so by the enactment of legislation, the plaintiffs would not be authorized and are not now authorized to enter into collective bargaining agreements, within the labor relations meaning of the term, with the defendants. * * *

"The courts have said that as a general rule collective bargaining has no place in government service. The employer is the whole people. This is a government of law, not men. For the courts to hold otherwise than as I have just explained would be to sanction control of governmental functions not by laws but by men. Such policy, if followed to its logical conclusion, would inevitably lead to chaos."

The Supreme Court of Colorado in Fellows v. LaTronica, Colo., 377 P.2d 547, held that an action to compel the city to arbitrate a claim for vacation pay for city firemen under a collective agreement should be dismissed because the City had no authority to enter into such a contract with the union in the first instance.

The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745, 162 A.L.R. 1101 (affirming the lower court) in an action by a taxpayer to enjoin enforcement of and to have declared invalid a collective agreement between the City and Union, held that the City did not have the power to 'delegate its governing power to any agency' and that such a contract was void.

See also Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539; City of Alcoa v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476; Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Vick, 43 Tenn.App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792; International Longshoremen's Assn., etc. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733, cert. den., 370 U.S. 922, 82 S.Ct. 1561, 8 L.Ed.2d 503, all of which are in accord.

The rule stated by the annotator in 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 at page 1170 seems to be the rule of the majority, and supported by well reasoned cases:

'Public employers cannot abdicate or bargain away their continuing legislative discretion and are therefore not authorized to enter into collective bargaining agreements with public employee labor...