Nichols v. Commissioner, Dkt. No. 1384-05L.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | Dkt. No. 1384-05L. |
| Citation | 93 T.C.M. 657 |
| Parties | Richard Nichols and Lisa Nichols v. Commissioner. |
| Court | U.S. Tax Court |
David B. Shiner, for petitioners.
Gregory J. Stull, for respondent.
In 2001, Richard Nichols and his wife Lisa reached a compromise with the IRS on their 1994 tax liability. The Nicholses agreed that the IRS could immediately assess and collect an agreed amount, but they reserved the right to sue for a refund. The Nicholses then learned that they had net operating losses from later years. They asked the Commissioner to let them use these losses to reduce their 1994 tax liability; they also asked for a partial abatement of interest. The Commissioner took the position that a deal's a deal, and moved to collect the unpaid 1994 tax.
There are only two issues for us to decide: (1) may the Nicholses use the net operating losses to fend off the Commissioner's collection effort?; and (2) are they entitled to an abatement of interest? The Commissioner has moved for summary judgment on both.
This case began with the Commissioner's audit of the Nicholses' 1994 tax return. The audit was prolonged, but in May 2001 the parties finally negotiated a compromise and executed a standard IRS Form 870, entitled "Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment." As the name states, a taxpayer who signs this form waives any restrictions on assessment of a disputed tax by the Commissioner. Waiving restrictions on assessment may seem a minor detail—assessment is little more than a recording of a tax liability in the IRS's records, sec. 6203,1 but it is an important milestone in tax procedure because, once the IRS assesses a liability, it can then begin to try to collect.
Signing a Form 870 and agreeing to immediate assessment and collection of a specific deficiency is not the same as agreeing that the deficiency agreed to is accurate. A taxpayer who signs the form may later claim a refund after paying. But he gives up the right to come to Tax Court: "If you later file a claim and the Service disallows it, you may file suit for refund in a district court or in the United States Claims Court, but you may not file a petition with the United States Tax Court." Just to make sure that point is clear, the form also states—directly above the signature line—"I understand that by signing this waiver, I will not be able to contest these years in the United States Tax Court, unless additional deficiencies are determined for these years."
The Commissioner assessed the tax as agreed, but the Nicholses never paid because they learned later in 2001 that one of their businesses had produced net operating losses (NOLs) for the tax years 1995 and 1997. This spurred them to file an amended 1994 tax return (Form 1040X) in December 2002, claiming these NOLs as deductions that they could carry back to the 1994 tax year. The IRS treated their 1040X as a refund claim and rejected it as untimely.2 The filing and rejection of a Form 1040X is often the prelude to a refund action, but the Nicholses never filed one. With no voluntary payment in sight, the Commissioner sent a collection due process (CDP) notice in February 2003, which warned the Nicholses that he intended to levy their property to collect the still unpaid 1994 taxes. The Nicholses did not request a CDP hearing after getting the notice, but instead sent a letter in March requesting reconsideration of the IRS's decision to deny them the benefit of the NOLs that they had claimed on their 1040X.3
In April 2003, the IRS sent the Nicholses a CDP notice of the filing of a federal tax lien. This time, the Nicholses did request a CDP hearing, arguing that the filing of a lien was premature as there were still "significant issues that remain unresolved." Foremost among these open issues was their March 2003 request to the IRS that it reconsider its decision denying them the NOL carrybacks. Their CDP request also mentioned that they planned to seek an abatement of interest, though they didn't actually ask for one in their CDP request.4
The Nicholses finally requested interest abatement on October 31, 2003, in a letter sent to an IRS agent not involved in the CDP process. In that letter, they asked for an abatement of 75% of the accrued interest because of "numerous lengthy spans of time during which the files just sat on the respective personnel's desks." They also claimed that the initial audit took six years to complete and that this was an unreasonable amount of time. The letter didn't offer any other reasons for the interest abatement, nor did it explain why they decided to ask for an abatement of only 75 percent of the interest charged. The first IRS agent to consider the matter denied the request quickly, but the Nicholses asked the IRS Appeals Office to review that denial, arguing that the acts complained of were "managerial" under section 301.6404-2 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations. The Appeals Office has not yet held a conference to consider their request.
Although the Nicholses had not listed either the NOL carryback or the interest abatement issues as reasons to release the lien, the Appeals officer who held the CDP hearing considered the NOL carryback issue and noted in the record that the Nicholses were pursuing interest abatement. In June 2004, that officer tentatively agreed with the Nicholses to allow all the NOLs. In a letter confirming their understanding of this agreement, the Nicholses also asked him to abate all interest and penalties "to expedite the closure of the 1994 tax year." All this fell through, though, when the Appeals team manager looked at the arrangement and nixed both the tentative settlement and the Nicholses' plea for interest abatement.
In October 2004, the Appeals officer faxed a draft version of the notice of determination to the Nicholses at their request. This draft included the NOLs as a separate issue "raised by the taxpayer" and concluded that the 1994 Form 1040X needed to be directed to a different division within the IRS if it was to lead to a reconsideration of the 1994 tax liability. The final notice of determination, issued on December 22, 2004, no longer included the NOLs as a separate issue, noting them only as part of a collection alternative offered by the Nicholses—one which "may be considered by other functions within the Service." (This may refer to the IRS's audit reconsideration group.) The Nicholses filed a timely petition to review this final notice of determination, and the Commissioner has now moved for summary judgment. The Nicholses were Illinois residents when they filed their petition, and we put the case on a Chicago trial calendar.
Summary judgment is appropriate where it is shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b); Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner [Dec. 44,689], 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). If there are any factual inferences to be made, we make them in favor of the party opposing summary judgment—in this case, the Nicholses. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The Nicholses may not, however, rest on their pleadings but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 121(d); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner [Dec. 42,486], 85 T.C. 812, 820-21 (1985).
The first issue is whether the Nicholses can apply their NOLs to reduce the tax liability that they agreed the Commissioner could assess when they signed the Form 870. If this case was one under section 6213(a) to redetermine a deficiency, the answer would be easy: The Supreme Court itself has ruled that a waiver of assessment, signed before the Commissioner sends a notice of deficiency, is fully effective and allows the Commissioner to begin collection immediately after assessment. See United States v. Price [60-1 USTC ¶ 9205], 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). Courts uniformly understand that signing a Form 870 means giving up the right to come to Tax Court with a deficiency suit. See Smith v. United States [2003-1 USTC ¶ 50,396], 328 F.3d 760, 766-767 (5th Cir. 2003); Phila. & Reading Corp. v. United States [91-2 USTC ¶ 50,448], 944 F.2d 1063, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991); Kalil v. Enochs [61-2 USTC ¶ 9716], 295 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1961) (); Webster v. Commissioner [Dec. 48,503(M)], T.C. Memo. 1992-538.
The Nicholses claim that they are not trying to rewrite the deal they made but only apply additional deductions to the agreed upon deficiency. To support their argument, they rely on Urbano v. Commissioner [Dec. 55,656], 122 T.C. 384, 392 (2004), where we held that the parties' agreement that a particular amount could be assessed did not bar us from reviewing that amount when the reason for review was not part of the original agreement and was unknown by either party at the time the agreement was signed. The Nicholses claim that their situation is just like the one in Urbano because their NOLs weren't included in the Form 870 and neither party knew of their availability when they signed the form.
The problem with this argument is that Urbano featured a different IRS form, Form 4549-CG. Id. at 387. The consent-to-assessment language on a Form 4549-CG states: This waiver, which extends only to "the findings in this report," is plainly more limited than the waiver on a Form 870. And in Urbano, we heard the taxpayers' challenge to the amount of interest that they owed because the "findings" reported on the Form 4549-CG did not include a finding on that issue. Id. at 392. A Form 870 has a different purpose—it memorializes an...
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