Nichols v. Dubuque & D.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1886 |
| Citation | 28 N.W. 44,68 Iowa 732 |
| Parties | NICHOLS v. DUBUQUE & D. R. CO. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Butler district court.
Action for a personal injury. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.J. M. Heminway and Gibson & Dawson, for appellant, Dubuque & D. R. Co.
No appearance for appellee, Lucinda Nichols.
The plaintiff, Lucinda Nichols, took passage on the defendant's road at Waverly, and under a ticket which entitled her to be carried to Dumont, her point of destination. On arrival at that point the cars stopped, and the plaintiff proceeded to alight. While in the act of alighting, according to her testimony, the cars started, and she fell and received the injury of which she complains. The evidence showed that she had numerous bundles with her, and that she was delayed a little by them in alighting, and returned once into the car after she had delivered a part of her bundles to her husband, who met her upon the platform of the car.
1. Upon the trial the plaintiff's husband was examined as a witness, and was asked how the platform at Dumont compared in height with the platform at Allison, another station on the road, and was allowed to answer, against the objection of the defendant, that it was considerably higher. The admission of this evidence is assigned as error. If the platform was higher than it should have been, and the height contributed to the difficulty of alighting safely, under the circumstances shown, it may be that the plaintiff would have been entitled to show such fact as bearing upon the question of her freedom from contributory negligence; but we are not able to see how the mere fact that the platform was higher than the one at Allison was material. In our opinion, the evidence should not have been admitted.
2. One Helgerson was introduced as a witness by the defendant, and, after testifying that he was a railroad agent, and was on the same train with the plaintiff, engaged in paying off the employes of the company, he was asked to state if he knew from observation, experience, and information derived from other sources the usual length of time which a passenger train stops at a station the size of Dumont. This question was disallowed, and the defendant assigns the ruling as error. The defendant contended that the train stopped the usual time, and that the conductor gave the signal to start when the plaintiff was not in sight, and when he had no reason to suppose that she had yet to alight. If there was a customary time during which trains in general, including the one in question, stop at such a station, we think it was competent for the defendant to show it as the foundation for showing that the stoppage of this train previous to the accident was of the customary duration; but the question asked does not appear to us to be quite broad enough, and we think it was properly disallowed.
3. The defendant asked an instruction in these words: “If you find the train had started before the plaintiff alighted, and she, attempting to get off after the train had started, was injured, then you will find for the defendant.” The court refused the instruction, and the defendant assigns the refusal as error. The evidence tends strongly to show that the plaintiff had descended one step from the platform of the car, and was about to descend another step, when the train started. If such was the fact, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence if she did not arrest her progress instantaneously upon the starting of the train. The starting was probably unexpected to her, and if so, she would naturally make some forward movement after the train started; yet if sh...
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