Nichols v. Eaton
| Decision Date | 03 February 1900 |
| Citation | 81 N.W. 792,110 Iowa 509 |
| Parties | G. NICHOLS v. CHARLES WOODHULL EATON and the DES MOINES LIFE ASSOCIATION, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. T. F. STEVENSON, Judge.
ACTION for libel. Defendant Eaton denied generally, and also pleaded that the alleged libel was privileged. The other defendant denied the allegations of the petition not expressly admitted; admitted its corporate capacity, and that defendant Eaton was its medical director. It avers that the alleged libelous publication was in a letter written by an employe to its duly-authorized agent in the town where plaintiff lived that said letter was written in good faith, and without intention to injure the plaintiff, and without malice; and that the publication was made in the discharge of a duty it owed to its agent. On the trial the action was dismissed as to defendant Eaton, and a verdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff, as against the association, for the sum of two thousand three hundred dollars. The association appeals.
Reversed.
A. H Evans, Carr & Parker, and Geo. R. Sanderson, for appellant.
Guernsey & Granger for appellee.
OPINION
Appellant is a life insurance association incorporated under the laws of Iowa, with its principal place of business at Des Moines. Defendant Eaton was its medical director, and one Dohaney was its clerk and bookkeeper. W. T. Botts was soliciting agent for the association at the town of Higbee, Mo., and plaintiff was its medical examiner at that place. The application of one A. P. Milnes for insurance was prepared by plaintiff, signed by the applicant, and turned over to the soliciting agent, Botts, after plaintiff had examined Milnes. The application was then forwarded to the defendant company. After being received by the association, it was given to the medical director, Eaton, who made some minutes thereon, and passed it to Mr. Dohaney, to prepare and forward an answer. Dohaney prepared, addressed, and mailed the following to Botts, the soliciting agent:
The court, after stating defendant's claim that the letter was privileged, instructed as follows: And, as to this claim of the said defendant, you are instructed that the said letter or communication, made and published in the manner and under the circumstances under which the same was made and published, was not a privileged communication, and the circumstances under which the same was made and published did not justify the defendant in so making and publishing the same." It further instructed that the letter was libelous per se, and that the only matter for the jury to consider was the amount of damages. Claim is made that the instructions are erroneous, for the reason that the letter was conditionally privileged; that is to say, that the occasion was such as to rebut the presumption of malice arising from the publication, and to cast the burden on plaintiff of proving malice in fact. On the other hand, it is contended that the occasion was not privileged, and that, if privileged, the communication was in excess of the privilege. Privileged communications or publications are of two kinds: First, absolute; second, conditional or qualified. When the communication is absolutely privileged, no action will lie for its publication, no matter what the circumstances under which it was published. When qualified, however, the plaintiff may recover, if he shows that it was actuated by malice In determining whether or not the communication was qualifiedly privileged, regard must be had of the occasion, and of the relationship of the parties. One may make a publication to his servant or agent, without liability, which, if made to a stranger, would be actionable. In the protection of his own interests, one may make a communication to his agent or servant without subjecting himself to liability, unless he exceeds the privilege, and does more than his duty or interest demands. Again, when one has an interest in the subject-matter of a communication, and the person to whom it is made has a corresponding interest, every communication honestly made in order to protect such common interest is privileged, by reason of the occasion. Generally this interest must be a pecuniary one, but it may arise out of the relationship or status of the parties. The statement must be such as the occasion warrants, and must be made in good faith to protect the interests of the publisher and the person to whom it is addressed. A communication by a principal to his agent touching the business of the agency is not actionable, without proof that the principal was actuated by malice towards the person to whom the communication relates. Now, the evidence in this case does not show very clearly whether the Milnes application was forwarded to the association by plaintiff or by the soliciting agent. From the fact that the letter regarding the application was sent to Botts, it would appear that he had sent the application. But, he this as it may, Botts, as soliciting agent, was entitled to know who was the accredited medical examiner of the association at the town where he was taking applications. The company also had the right to inform its soliciting agent of the discharge of its medical examiner in the locality where the soliciting agent was operating. The occasion was undoubtedly privileged, and it was the duty of the court to so instruct the jury. Appellee says that,...
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