Nichols v. GD Searle & Co., Civ. No. B-87-985
| Decision Date | 22 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | B-89-127,B-88-1190,B-88-3942,B-88-3235,B-88-3605,Civ. No. B-87-985,B-89-15,B-87-2107,B-88-2496,B-87-1312,B-89-50,B-89-259,B-89-128,B-89-696,B-88-2937,B-87-3172 to B-87-3174,B-88-371,B-89-618,B-89-305 to B-89-308,B-89-255,B-87-2473 |
| Citation | 783 F. Supp. 233 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
| Parties | Sharon L. NICHOLS and David R. Nichols, Virginia Ann Callan and Charles Oliver Richardson, III, Marilyn Goodman and Thomas J. Goodman, Debra A. Lopez and Rudolph Lopez, Sharon Ruth Anderson, Rosemary Madrid Castaneda and Jesse Castaneda, Karen Ley-Lloyd, Jacqueline Templin, Katherine Galati Novick, Karen Janet Davis, Peggy Lee Patterson, Michelle James, Patricia Ann Ehlert, Dana Messerly and Raymond Leroy Messerly, Susan Gail Parlon, Alicia Roberts, Lindsy Gail Syroid, Barbara Ruth Ames, Susan Partridge and David Partridge, Ruby Caroline Larabie, Deanna H. Robb, Carmen Callier, Anna Caruso, Cynthia Isabelle and Jean Claude Isabelle, Nancy Delsanto and James Delsanto, Barbara Hayden and Norman Hayden, Deborah Ann Muscato, Stoina Hibbard and Michael Hibbard, Denise K. Liberman, Gayle E. Donnelly, Martha Caust-Moran and Pascal Moran, Roberta Walls and Charles Walls, Linda Phillips, Susan Lee Smirl Krupa, Karen Prewitt, Janet Rae Fregonese, Wanda S. McAlister, Tamara M. Felix, Felicitas L. Singer and Thomas J. Singer, Nicole Cohen Blair, Mary Ina Delisle Courville and George Vincent Courville, Prisuave Walker and Mark Dale Walker, Gail R. Zucker and Kenneth Jay Wolf, Roberta Fryer, Sharon P. Loftus and Michael J. Loftus, II, Janet Lynn Billings, Julia Mae Lambert Thaxton, Pauline Johnson, Catherine Evans, Cheryll Smith and Michael Smith, Nancy Daru Yaeli and Ron Thomas Yaeli, Barbara Helm-Gottsleben, Harriet Birnbaum Helberg and Sandy Morris Helberg, Nancy Frisch and Paul Frisch, Linda Jo McCarver and Byron Marvin McCarver, Sandra Carol Smith and Joseph James Smith, Debbie Dolores Stallings and John Francis Stallings, Jr., Carol A. Lofquist Cummins and Dirk P. Cummins, Lilyan Chrappa-Spool and Roger Owen Spool, Bonnie Eugenia Crownover and George Donald Crownover, Jr., Joyce Elaine Andrew-Lavage and William Michael Andrew-Lavage, Cynthia Corrine Hand and Michael Joseph Tracy, Monica Gay Ward, Cheryl Jane Gerhart and Ronald Scott Gerhart, Cindy Fohn Coleman and Kyle Howard Coleman, Janet Stein, Catherine Susan LaRosa, Sandra Lynn Pusep, Nancy Peeler Sheehan and Charles M. Sheehan, Irene Sylvia Angelico and Abbey Jack Neidik, Elsie Espana and Elio Espana, Gayle Peterson v. G.D. SEARLE & COMPANY and Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
H. Robert Erwin, Jr. and Pamm G. Wiggin, Baltimore, Md., and Roger L. Pardieck, Seymour, Ind., for plaintiffs.
Paul F. Strain, Elizabeth C. Honeywell and James L. Shea, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
Presently pending before the Court are defendant's Motions for Rule 12(d) Preliminary Hearing on its Defense of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Beginning in 1983, more than one hundred female plaintiffs began to file products liability claims in Maryland against G.D. Searle & Company and Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Searle"). Each plaintiff alleges that she was injured due to use of Searle's Copper-7 device, a contraceptive product.
To support a finding of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs contend that Searle, a nonresident defendant, has certain contacts with the State of Maryland. In particular, plaintiffs claim that their cause of action arises directly out of two Searle activities in the state: its testing of Copper-7 and its fraudulent reports to the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), which is located in Maryland. Plaintiffs also assert that jurisdiction may be based on Searle's continuous business presence in Maryland, even though this contact is unrelated to the underlying dispute.
In opposition, Searle filed the present motion in 72 separate actions. Although the motion formally seeks a preliminary hearing, defendant actually moves this Court to dismiss these actions for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a general matter, defendant asserts that Maryland has no connection to these proceedings because the parties are non-residents and the alleged injury was not caused or suffered here. Moreover, defendant accuses plaintiffs of forum-shopping.1
In light of the fact that the parties have already presented oral argument at a hearing in open court, the Court turns its attention to the complex issues relating to dismissal.
Once a defendant has raised a 12(b)(2) defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the factual basis necessary to support this Court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 439 F.Supp. 1078, 1081 (D.Md.1977). The plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence. See Wessel Co. v. Yoffee & Beitman Management Corp., 457 F.Supp. 939, 940 (N.D.Ill.1978). In the event of a dispute between the affidavits offered by the opposing parties, the Court is obligated to resolve the conflict in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Id.
When sitting in diversity, a federal court has the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if 1) an applicable state "long-arm" statute confers jurisdiction and 2) the assertion of that jurisdiction comports with the constitutional requirement of due process. Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 755 F.2d 371, 373 (4th Cir.1985); Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 711 (4th Cir.1966). With respect to the first factor, the Court is bound by the interpretations and rulings of the Maryland state courts. Federal law, however, governs the second. Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 747 n. 3 (4th Cir.1971); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.1948).
The applicable state statute, section 6-103 of Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., provides the following:
Although subsection (a) appears to indicate that a plaintiff may only sue a non-resident defendant for an act arising out of a Maryland contact, the courts have refused to extend the language to control subsection (b)(4). Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 232, 352 A.2d 818 (1976); Greenwood v. Tides Inn, Inc., 504 F.Supp. 992, 996 (D.Md.1980). Instead, subsection (b)(4) does not require that a defendant's contacts bear any relationship to the alleged acts giving rise to the suit. Geelhoed, 277 Md. at 232, 352 A.2d 818. Where there is no relationship, however, the defendant's contacts to the forum must be "extensive, continuous, and systematic." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 422-423, 540 A.2d 482 (1988).
In adopting this long-arm statute, the Maryland legislature expanded in personam jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the U.S. Constitution. Geelhoed, 277 Md. at 224, 352 A.2d 818. See also A.S.C. Leasing, Inc. v. Porter, 651 F.Supp. 384, 385 (D.Md.1987). Therefore, federal law provides valuable guidance in interpreting the statute. In addition, the Court must rely on federal law in conducting the second half of a jurisdictional analysis: assessing the extent to which the exercise of personal jurisdiction accords with due process. Ratliff, 444 F.2d at 747 n. 3.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects defendant's "liberty interest in not being bound in personam by judgments of a forum with which defendant lacks meaningful contacts, ties or relations." First American First, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1515 (4th Cir.1986). To safeguard this liberty, the Supreme Court has required that defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). In essence, defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State must be such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
A court is duty-bound to treat this jurisdictional analysis with the seriousness deserving of constitutional questions. Indeed, a finding of personal jurisdiction should not turn on hollow distinctions with precedent or on a mere counting of contacts. The U.S. Supreme Court specifically spoke to this point in International Shoe:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those...
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