Nicholson v. Bennett (In re John Doe)
| Decision Date | 14 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47550 |
| Citation | 462 P.3d 1184,166 Idaho 720 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the GUARDIANSHIP OF John DOE, A Minor Child. Jon and Ronda Nicholson, Petitioners-Respondents, v. Brittany Bennett, Respondent-Appellant. |
Chaney Law Office PLLC; Gregory D. Chaney, Caldwell, for appellant.
MSBT Law, Chartered; Frances Ruth Stem, Boise, for respondents.
HUSKEY, Chief Judge Brittany Bennett appeals from the magistrate court's judgment appointing Jon and Ronda Nicholson (the Nicholsons) as co-guardians of T.J.T.-M. Bennett argues a variety of reasons the magistrate court erred when it appointed the Nicholsons as co-guardians of T.J.T.-M. Bennett also claims the magistrate court erred when it denied Bennett's motion to reconsider and awarded attorney fees to the Nicholsons.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the magistrate court's judgment appointing the Nicholsons as co-guardians. However, we vacate the magistrate court's judgment awarding attorney fees and costs.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bennett is the biological mother of the minor child, T .J.T.-M. Jon Nicholson is the paternal great uncle and Ronda Nicholson is the paternal great aunt of T .J.T.-M. On March 1, 2019, the Nicholsons filed a temporary guardianship action involving T J.T.-M. which the magistrate court granted. On June 4, 2019, the Nicholsons filed a second guardianship petition. The magistrate court held a hearing on June 12, 2019, where it heard testimony from various witnesses regarding T.J.T.-M. and found that temporary guardianship was appropriate for the health, safety, and welfare of T.J.T.-M.
A permanent guardianship hearing was held on September 11, 2019. The magistrate court determined that appointing the Nicholsons as co-guardians was in the best interests of T.J.T.-M. because of Bennett's inability to provide a stable home environment pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1603(1). The magistrate court entered the order on October 1, 2019, and that same day, Bennett filed a motion to reconsider the evidentiary decisions, for a new trial, and for the magistrate court to amend its findings. On October 13, 2019, Bennett also filed a motion for leave to appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The magistrate court held a hearing on October 29, 2019, regarding Bennett's motion to reconsider. On October 31, 2019, the magistrate court denied Bennett's motion for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court and Bennett's motion to reconsider, for a new trial, and for amendment of findings. The magistrate court awarded the Nicholsons attorney fees and costs. Bennett timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court will not set aside a magistrate court's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 682, 687, 330 P.3d 1040, 1045 (2014). Substantial, competent evidence is evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court explained:
This Court is required to conduct an independent review of the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court's judgment because the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive, and to judge the character of the parties.
Doe , 156 Idaho at 687, 330 P.3d at 1045.
The paramount issue in guardianship proceedings is the best interests of the child. In re Guardianship of Copenhaver, 124 Idaho 888, 892, 865 P.2d 979, 983 (1993). The best interests of the child is "the primary factor in the determination whether to appoint, and whom to appoint, as a guardian for such child." I.C. § 15-5-204 ; In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 757, 339 P.3d 1154, 1161 (2014).
III.
ANALYSIS
Bennett claims the magistrate court erred in five ways when it appointed the Nicholsons as co-guardians of T.J.T.-M.:2 (1) The magistrate court should have applied the standard set forth in I.C. § 32-1013 ; (2) the magistrate court took judicial notice of the testimony from the June 12 hearing without identifying each piece of testimony or fact of which the court was taking notice; (3) the magistrate court applied res judicata to the issue presented in the September 11 hearing based on the testimony adduced at the June 12 hearing; (4) the evidence presented was not sufficient as a matter of law and fact to support the magistrate court's judgment appointing the Nicholsons as co-guardians; and (5) the magistrate court awarded attorney fees to the Nicholsons.
Bennett argues I.C. § 32-1013 applies to this case, and because the magistrate court did not apply this statute, it used the wrong legal standard when analyzing the evidence. According to Bennett, the guardianship proceedings were a State action that implicated her fundamental right to parent, and thus, the magistrate court failed to consider whether the proceedings were established by clear and convincing evidence and whether the guardianship was the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest.
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 649-50, 262 P.3d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such interpretation must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id. Only where a statute is capable of more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and invoke the rules of statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust , 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101 (2002).
Here, the issue is whether I.C. § 32-1013 applies. Idaho Code § 32-1013 states:
The plain language of the statute applies only to "the state of Idaho" and "any political subdivision thereof." Here, unlike a termination case in which the state of Idaho initiates an action, the Nicholsons were the petitioners in this case. The Nicholsons are not the State or a political subdivision of the State. Although the magistrate court entered a judgment appointing the Nicholsons co-guardians of T.J.T.-M., such a ruling by the magistrate court does not convert an action initiated by private citizens into a State action. Because this case does not involve a State action, I.C. § 32-1013 does not apply, as Bennett argues on appeal. As a result, we need not address whether this guardianship proceeding constituted the least restrictive means available for furthering a governmental interest.
Bennett argues the magistrate court erred during the September 11 hearing when it took judicial notice of the June 12 testimony. During the hearing on Bennett's motion to reconsider, Bennett argued that when the magistrate court took judicial notice of testimony from the June 12 hearing, it failed to indicate with specificity which facts the court was taking notice of. According to Bennett, by failing to identify with specificity which testimony or facts were being noticed, the magistrate court violated Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(c).
Bennett did not object to the judicial notice taken by the magistrate court during the September 11 hearing. From the context of the hearing, it appears that off the record, the parties discussed the magistrate court taking judicial notice of the June 12 testimony. On the record, Bennett inquired what the "scope of Courts’ [sic] acknowledgment" of the prior testimony would be and whether the court was taking notice of "the testimony, the findings, or both?" The magistrate court stated it was going to take judicial notice of the testimony that was given at the June 12 hearing, but it would not take notice of the court's findings from that day. Bennett did not object to the "scope" or content of the judicial notice. Bennett followed up by asking the magistrate court to take notice of the filings in the guardianship case, and the magistrate court took judicial notice of the entire court file.
Bennett filed a motion to reconsider, wherein she asked the magistrate court to reconsider its September 11 decision to take judicial notice of the testimony from the June 12 hearing. The magistrate court held a hearing on Bennett's motion to reconsider. There, Bennett clarified her position regarding judicial notice and argued the magistrate court erred in the September 11 hearing when it took notice of the testimony from the June 12 hearing without identifying which specific facts were being noticed. Bennett stated:
Once again, I don't believe I restated on the record, but in chambers I objected to the application of INAUDIBLE to the conclusions arrived at from the June 12th hearing, and in this motion I would reassert that position. And that for purposes of established facts, then that would be the general admission of that testimony, therefore was improper.
After arguments by the parties, the magistrate court ruled that it did not err when it took judicial notice of testimony...
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