Nicholson v. Scurry, 5315.

Decision Date17 May 1930
Docket NumberNo. 5315.,5315.
Citation28 S.W.2d 512
PartiesNICHOLSON v. SCURRY.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Alton V. Grant, of Wichita Falls, and W. J. Townsend, of Lufkin, for plaintiff in error.

F. W. Fischer, C. C. McDonald, and Wm. N. Bonner, all of Wichita Falls, for defendant in error.

PIERSON, J.

The following is reproduced from the opinion of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals as a statement of this case:

"This appeal is from an order of the Honorable Judge of the eighty-ninth district court of Wichita county, granting appellee a temporary injunction. The appellee, in his petition for the writ, alleged in substance, that he was a Democrat, taxpayer, and a qualified voter in precinct No. 17, of Wichita county, and as such became a candidate for and was duly elected as chairman of said precinct in the primary election on July 28, 1928, and as such became a member of the Wichita county Democratic executive committee, having since duly qualified as such officer and assumed the duties of said office; that the defendant on the same date had been elected chairman of the Wichita county executive committee, and had entered upon the duties of such office; that the county Democratic executive committee was duly convened on September 4, 1928, to attend to important matters brought before them, and that the defendant, `without any reason or cause whatsoever, unlawfully and fraudulently and with malice against this plaintiff declared the chairmanship of precinct No. 17 vacant, and then and there informed this plaintiff that said plaintiff would no longer be allowed to serve as said precinct chairman and member of said committee,' and would no longer recognize the plaintiff as a member of said committee, refused to count the vote of said plaintiff on important motions voted upon, and thereby deprived plaintiff of his legal right to function as said precinct chairman and member of said committee. It was further alleged that, unless restrained by order of the court, the defendant will declare the office of the plaintiff vacant, and will completely dispossess this plaintiff from the same and attempt to appoint a successor. The prayer of the plaintiff was for notice to the defendant and a granting of the petition.

"On the same day, the defendant appeared and filed his duly verified answer, which, omitting the general demurrer and general denial, reads as follows:

"`The defendant, specially answering, says that at the first meeting of the members of the Democratic executive committee for Wichita county, who were elected on July 28, 1928, the defendant called said members together, he being the duly elected chairman of said committee; that at said meeting the majority of the members thereof prescribed a pledge of fealty to the Democratic party to be taken by each member thereof as a qualification to membership of said committee, as is fully shown by the attached Exhibit A; that the plaintiff refused to take such pledge, and announced that he was then supporting and would continue to support the Republican nominees for President and Vice President of the United States; that the members of the executive committee, by a majority vote, then declared the office of precinct chairmanship of precinct No. 17 vacant, and authorized this defendant to fill such vacancy by appointment; that, in pursuance of such authority, this defendant has appointed J. B. Hatchitt to fill such office, and he has accepted such office, and is now filling the same, having taken the pledge prescribed by the committee; that, by reason of the foregoing facts, the plaintiff's petition for injunction should be denied: Wherefore, the defendant prays that he be dismissed herein with his costs.'

"The resolution referred to in the answer of the defendant, and shown in Exhibit A, reads as follows:

"`Resolution No. I.

"`Whereas, it has been rumored that certain members of the Democratic executive committee of Wichita county, Tex., who were elected on July 28, 1928, are not supporting all of the nominees of the Democratic Party, and in order to refute such rumors and assure the Democracy of Wichita county, Tex., that the members of the executive committee are unanimously in support of all of the nominees of the Democratic Party, be it resolved that we, the undersigned, the members of the Democratic executive committee of Wichita county, hereby individually pledge ourselves to vote for Alfred E. Smith for President of the United States, as well as all of the other nominees of the Democratic Party, and we further pledge ourselves to openly and publicly support and work for the election of Alfred E. Smith as President of the United States, as well as all other nominees of the Democratic Party.'

"It appears that a hearing was had, after which the order from which the appeal has been prosecuted was entered, granting the prayer of the plaintiff for writ of temporary injunction. No statement of facts has been brought before us, but the court filed his conclusions of law and fact which, so far as we deem it necessary to quote, reads as follows:

"`The court then heard the testimony in the case, which established the following facts:

"`(1) That on July 28, 1928, the persons voting in the Democratic primary in election precinct No. 17 elected relator as precinct chairman, and he entered upon his duties by attending the first meeting of the new executive committee. That he has heretofore affiliated with the Democratic Party, and still claims allegiance to the same, but refuses to support Governor Smith and Senator Robinson, the nominees for President and Vice President.

"`(2) That he refused to sign the pledge proposed by the majority of the county executive committee, and said committee declared his office vacant for that reason, and authorized the county chairman, respondent here, to appoint his successor and report the appointment on Saturday September 8th to the full committee.

"`(3) That on the 5th day of September, 1928, respondent verbally appointed J. B. Hatchitt to...

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4 cases
  • Carter v. Tomlinson
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 22 Febrero 1950
    ...because the plaintiff sued only Scurry and complained not of his conduct but only of acts of the county committee Nicholson v. Scurry, 119 Tex. 250, 28 S.W.2d 512. If precinct chairmen may be removed by party action after they have been elected, the power to remove them should rest in local......
  • Strawder v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Diciembre 1992
    ...who is not a party to the proceeding. State Mortgage Corp. v. Traylor, 120 Tex. 148, 36 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1931); Nicholson v. Scurry, 119 Tex. 250, 28 S.W.2d 512, 515 (1930); Lobit v. Crouch, 293 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Nor does a court have jurisdicti......
  • Carter v. Tomlinson
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 11 Marzo 1949
    ...the national nominees of the party for President and Vice President. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court in Nicholson v. Scurry, 119 Tex. 250, 28 S.W.2d 512, 514 because, among other things, "the rights of others, not parties to this suit, have been undertaken to be litigated and adj......
  • Currie v. Wall
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Marzo 1948
    ...v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037; Scurry v. Nicholson, Tex.Civ.App., 9 S.W.2d 747, affirmed Supreme Court, Nicholson v. Scurry, 119 Tex. 250, 28 S.W. 2d 512; Couch v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 10 S.W.2d 170; Pulliam v. Trawalter, Tex. Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d The foregoing principle is one of g......

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