Nickell v. Gonzalez
Decision Date | 22 May 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-650,84-650 |
Citation | 477 N.E.2d 1145,17 OBR 281,17 Ohio St.3d 136 |
Parties | , 17 O.B.R. 281 NICKELL et al., Appellant, v. GONZALEZ, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The tort of lack of informed consent is established when:
(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the material risks and dangers inherently and potentially involved with respect to the proposed therapy, if any;
(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been disclosed by the physician actually materialize and are the proximate cause of the injury to the patient; and
(c) a reasonable person in the position of the patient would have decided against the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent and incidental to treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the therapy.
On March 23, 1970, defendant-appellee, Dr. Luis L. Gonzalez, performed a thoracic outlet syndrome operation. Subsequently the patient, Donna H. Nickell, a plaintiff-appellant herein, experienced a condition known as brachial plexus palsy--the paralysis of the network of nerves situated principally in the neck and in the armpit and which extends to the entire arm.
In the ensuing action the basis for recovery averred by the plaintiffs was that Dr. Gonzalez did not adequately disclose to Mrs. Nickell the risks of the procedure she was to undergo. The cause proceeded to trial whereupon Dr. Gonzalez testified concerning the risks that were disclosed to Mrs. Nickell prior to her operation. Evidence was also given by Mrs. Nickell and plaintiffs' expert witness who had treated the brachial plexus palsy, Dr. Harold E. Kleinert.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Gonzalez. On Motion the trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B), in favor of the plaintiffs. Additionally, the trial court judge ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages. After the new trial, the jury awarded zero damages to the plaintiffs, prompting their appeal.
The court of appeals reviewed the record and determined that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and therefore the new trial ordered on the issue of damages, was erroneous and accordingly reinstated the jury verdict in favor of defendant. The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Marlene P. Manes, Columbus, and Gary L. Gardner, for appellants.
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, John W. Hurst and D. Marc Routt, Cincinnati, for appellee.
The issue before us is whether the judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") was properly granted by the trial court judge in favor of the plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth below we find that the j.n.o.v. was erroneously granted and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The standard for granting a motion for j.n.o.v. is the same as that necessary to sustain a motion for a directed verdict. Agers v. Woodard (1957), 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E.2d 401 [1 O.). 2d 377], at paragraph one of the syllabus. As we set forth in Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 344 N.E.2d 334 (74 O.O.2d 427]:
At trial, Dr. Gonzalez categorically denied responsibility for the injury and that he misinformed or failed to disclose material information to Mrs. Nichell. On cross-examination, Dr. Gonzalez stated:
The record is thus specific as to what was disclosed to Mrs. Nickell in warning her of the normal dangers of the operation. The problem of a permanent brachial nerve palsy, which was suffered by Mrs. Nickell, was unrebutted as being an extraordinarily unusual occurrence; even a temporary palsy was considered rare. The stretch of the brachial plexus which Dr. Gonzalez alluded to with respect to the retraction of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich
...law and by state statute to protect all people in their fundamental sovereignty over their bodies. See Nickell v. Gonzales (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 17 OBR 281, 477 N.E.2d 1145, and R.C. 2317.54. Indeed, the requirement for informing the woman about abortion alternatives, such as adoption,......
-
Jones v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr.
...consent. It thus falls under the Ricks exception to the two-issue rule and can be heard on appeal. {¶ 91} In Nickell v. Gonzalez , 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (1985), the syllabus states the elements of a claim for lack of informed consent:The tort of lack of informed consent is esta......
-
Jones v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr.
...consent. It thus falls under the Ricks exception to the two-issue rule and can be heard on appeal. {¶ 90} In Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (1985), the syllabus states the elements of a claim for lack of informed consent:The tort of lack of informed consent is estab......
-
Davis v. Kraff
...N.J. 490, 504-05, 730 A.2d 805, 812 (1999), citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C.Cir.1972); Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 139, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1985) (requiring informed consent plaintiffs to show that "the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been d......
-
Defending the informed consent case: analyzing the materiality of the risk, causation, and expert testimony requirements.
...is generally required to explain the nature, probable consequences, risks, hazards, and benefits of the treatment. Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985); Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio Misc. Applies the subjective test of causation. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554,......