Nicklas v. Crowell

• Citation: 205 Okla. 432,238 P.2d 347
• Decision Date: 16 October 1951
• Docket Number: No. 34268,34268
• Parties: NICKLAS v. CROWELL et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Page 347

238 P.2d 347

205 Okla. 432

NICKLAS v. CROWELL et al.

No. 34268.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 16, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A resulting trust may be established by parol upon evidence of the most satisfactory kind.

2. The burden of establishing a resulting trust rests upon him who seeks its enforcement, and a court of equity will decree a resulting trust where the evidence supporting it is clear, convincing and decisive.

3. Where the consideration paid for land on which a resulting trust is sought to be established was contributed by both parties, the court will consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction in determining whether or not a resulting trust should be decreed and will enter the judgment that should have been decreed.

4. Where the grantee, sought to be charged with a resulting or implied trust, misrepresented material facts to the agency making an insured loan on land under the National Housing Act, a court of equity will not aid such party in retaining title as against an innocent party, for whom beneficial interest was intended.

Charles E. Dierker, George Miller, Jr., Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Mark Ingle, John Barry, Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.

HALLEY, Vice Chief Justice.

This is a controversy between a mother and her oldest daughter. Mrs. Emma Nicklas was the mother of nine children. The oldest child, Alma Nicklas, now Crowell, was living in a rented house in Oklahoma City with her mother and four or five minor children in 1944, when the transaction here involved occurred. Mrs. Nicklas had been separated from her husband for several years, but not divorced. Alma had regular employment. She paid her mother $5 per week for her room and board. Mrs. Nicklas had no regular earning capacity, but had secured an order for her husband to pay her $80 per month for child support, and had an allowance of $80 per month from sons in the armed service. Mrs. Nicklas also earned a few dollars occasionally.

The landlord gave Mrs. Nicklas a ninety-day notice to vacate. This period was about to expire, and he refused to extend it. They found no house suitable to rent, but did find the house in controversy for sale at $5,000, with $1,000 as a down payment. They did not have the $1,000. They talked to Mrs. Nicklas' married daughter, Mrs. Loretta Briece, who had no home of her own, but she and her husband owned an automobile. It was suggested that Loretta and her husband mortgage their car to obtain enough money for the down payment on the house. Loretta agreed, and secured a loan of $750 on the car. Mrs. Nicklas gave Alma $75 in cash to deposit with the owner of the house as earnest money. Alma and Loretta went to the F.H.A. representative, who arranged for an insured loan to cover the balance of $4,000 on the purchase price. Upon advising the agent of their financial circumstances and the urgency for a prompt loan, Alma and Loretta were told that since their mother had no earning capacity they had better take title in the name of Alma, who was regularly employed, since the loan would more likely be made to her than to Mrs. Nicklas and would be made more promptly if taken in Alma's name. The daughters did not want their estranged father in the transaction. These facts were made known to Mrs. Nicklas, and she agreed to the suggested method of purchase.

Alma signed the application for an insured F.H.A. loan. The rules required that no other loan be against the property and that no additional obligations exist other than the insured loan. Alma was required to secure and file a 'gift letter' from Loretta, stating that the $750 advanced by Loretta and her husband was a gift to Alma. Alma agreed with Loretta that she would repay her the $750 in installments. The application for the loan also recited that Mrs. Nicklas would live with Alma, and that her annual income was $960. Mrs. Nicklas appears to have left the loan matter entirely to her two daughters. Certain loan expense accrued, part of which was paid by Alma, making her outlay approximately one thousand dollars. Some minor repairs were required before the loan could be completed, and Mrs. Nicklas claimed that she paid $138 for these repairs, but Alma claimed that she paid most of that amount.

Alma, her mother, and the minor children moved into the new home in April of 1944. Alma turned the deed over to her mother, who placed it among her private papers. Alma paid nothing further for room or board, but began to pay Loretta installments on the $750. Mrs. Nicklas made the loan installment payments, which included taxes and insurance, and had paid $1,333 at the time this suit was filed. A little more than a year after the house was purchased, Alma was married and established a separate home, leaving the deed to the property in controversy with Mrs. Nicklas. Alma testified that nothing was said about conveying the home to her mother until November of 1947, when her mother mentioned that she would repay Alma what she had paid on the house and would like to have title in herself so she could claim the homestead exemption. Alma replied that she 'would see about it.'

In August of 1948, Mrs. Nicklas, having obtained $1,000 from one of her sons, went to the home of Alma with a deed from Alma and husband to Mrs. Nicklas. Alma and husband refused to execute the deed for less than $2,000 because the property had advanced in value.

Upon the refusal of Alma and husband to convey to Mrs. Nicklas, this action was filed by Mrs. Nicklas. The court found for the defendants, and Mrs. Nicklas has appealed. She claims that the court erred in failing to declare a resulting trust in her favor and award her the property involved, and in excluding certain testimony offered by her through her witness Harold Briece, to the effect that he and Loretta borrowed the $750 on their car to buy the home for Mrs. Nicklas and would not have borrowed money to apply on the purchase of a house for Alma. We shall consider these questions in the order named, and shall refer to the parties as they appeared below, or by name.

Resulting trusts are declared by Sec. 137, 60 O.S.1941, as follows: 'When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.'

It is well established by the decisions of this court that a resulting trust may be established by parol. In the early case of Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 P. 379, it is said in Syllabus (1): 'Resulting trusts are those which arise where the legal estate in property is disposed of, conveyed, or transferred; but the intent appears or is inferred from the terms of the disposition, or from accompanying facts and circumstances, that the beneficial interest is not to go to or be enjoyed with the legal title. In such a case, a trust is implied or results in favor of the person for whom the equitable interest is assumed to have been intended, and whom equity deems to be the real owner.'

In the later case of Fibikowski v. Fibikowski, 185 Okl. 520, 94 P.2d 921; Id., 190 Okl. 152, 121 P.2d 304, 306, 307, the court quoted from Babcock v. Collison, 73 Okl. 232, 175 P. 762, wherein it is said: 'A resulting trust may be established by parol evidence, but the law requires that the proof necessary to establish it should be of the most satisfactory kind. The onus of establishing a resulting trust rests upon him who seeks its enforcement, and before a court of equity will be warranted in making a decree therefor, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive.'

In Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Okl. 268, 205 P.2d 314, it is said in the third syllabus: 'A finding or decree of the trial court of the existence of a resulting trust based upon oral evidence as to the facts and circumstances will not be disturbed upon appeal where the evidence with reference thereto is clear, unequivocal, convincing and decisive.'

Measured by the foregoing rules, is the evidence sufficient to establish a resulting trust in the land involved in the plaintiff, Mrs. Emma Nicklas? There is little in writing to prove the intention of the parties, other than the application for the F.H.A. loan and the deed to Alma Nicklas. There are some receipts for money paid in completing the purchase of the house, but there is a conflict in the evidence as to who made all of the payments. We must look to parol evidence and the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and the relationship of the parties in determining whether or not a resulting trust should be declared.

Alma Crowell testified that the property was to be hers, and that she never made any agreement that she would transfer the title to her mother upon receipt of the amount that she had advanced in payment of the purchase price. Mrs. Nicklas testified as follows:

'Q. And what was that conversation? A. Well, I took her the money and I said: 'I would like to have the title.' She said: 'No, I won't give you the title.' She said: 'I want another thousand dollars.'

Q. Did she say why she wanted another thousand dollars? A. The property had increased in value.

'Q. Was there anything more said? A. Well, that was all, the property had increased and she wanted another thousand dollars.

'Q. Did you say anything to her? A. I said I wouldn't give it to her.

'Q. Why? A. I didn't have it and I--it was understood, if I would give her the thousand, she would give me the title.

'Q. Did you tell her that, at that time? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. What did she say to that? A. She said No, she wouldn't give it to me.

'Q. Did she make any demand upon you at that time, about you and the children vacating the property? A. No, sir.'

Alma testified in regard to that conversation as follows:

'Q. And now, coming down to the conversation that your mother testified to shortly before this lawsuit was...