Nicol v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 11 July 1900
• Parties: NICOL v. CITY OF ST. PAUL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

80 Minn. 415

83 N.W. 375

NICOL

v.CITY OF ST. PAUL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 11, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles E. Otis, Judge.

Action by Mary J. Nicol against the city of St. Paul. Verdict directed for defendant. From an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Even if a subsequent statute, containing no repealing clause, be not repugnant in its provisions to a prior statute, yet, if the former was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern in the case provided for, it repeals the original act by implication.

2. Rule applied, and held that chapter 248, Laws 1897, supersedes and repeals the charter provisions of the city of St. Paul (Sp. Laws 1885, c. 7, § 19), as to giving notice of personal injuries. S. C. Olmstead (Albert Schaller and Otto Kueffner, of counsel), for appellant.

James E. Markham and Frank B. Arnold, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This is a personal injury action. Notice of the plaintiff's injury, and her claim for damages by reason thereof, were duly given and presented to the council of the defendant city, as required by the provisions of Laws 1897, c. 248. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, for the reason that notice of the injury had not been given to the mayor or clerk of the city as provided by its charter (Sp. Laws 1885, c. 7, § 19). The plaintiff appealed from an order denying her motion for a new trial. The only question raised by the record in this case which we find it necessary to discuss or decide is whether the general law repeals the charter provisions in question. They are as follows: ‘No action shall be maintained against the city of St. Paul on account of any injury received by means of a defect in the condition of any bridge, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare * * * unless notice shall have first been given, in writing, to the mayor of said city or the city clerk thereof, within thirty (30) days of the occurrence of such injury or damage, stating the place where and the time when such injury was received, and that the person injured will claim damages of the city for such injury, but the notice shall not be required when the person injured shall, in consequence thereof, be bereft of reason.’ The general statute in question is this: ‘Before any city, village or borough of this state shall be liable to any person for damages for or on account of any injuries or loss alleged to have been received or suffered by reason of any defect in any bridge, street, road, sidewalk, park, public ground, ferry-boat, or public works of any kind in said city, village or borough, or by reason of any alleged negligence of any officer, servant or agent of said city, village or borough, the person so alleged to have been injured, or some one in his behalf, shall give to the city or village council, or trustees, or other governing body of such city, village or borough, within thirty (30) days after the alleged injury, notice thereof, and shall present his or their claim for compensation to such council or governing body, in writing, stating the time when and the place where, and the circumstances under which such alleged loss or injury occurred, and the amount of compensation, or nature of the relief demanded from the city, village or borough, and such body shall have ten (10) days within which to decide upon the course it will pursue in relation to such claim, and no action shall be maintained after the expiration of such time on account of such claim, or unless the same shall have been commenced within one year after the alleged injury or loss.’ This general statute does not in express terms repeal the special and somewhat diverse provisions, coving the same subject-matter, found in the respective charters of a number of the municipalities of the state, including the city of St. Paul. If, therefore, the statute repeals such provisions, it must be by implication.

The general rules as to repeals by implication are well settled, and need not be here discussed. Conceding, without so deciding, that the provisions of the statute in question are not repugnant to the charter provisions, the rule applicable to this particular case is this: Even if a subsequent statute,...