Niday v. State, 2-69420
| Decision Date | 22 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-69420,2-69420 |
| Citation | 353 N.W.2d 92 |
| Parties | Jeffry D. NIDAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Raymond Rogers, Asst. Appellate Defender, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen. and Mark Hunacek, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.
This appeal involves the validity of the decision of a reformatory disciplinary committee.
In December 1981 Jeffry D. Niday, an inmate at the men's reformatory, was placed in summary segregation. Subsequently, he received a disciplinary notice charging him with various institutional rule violations arising out of incidents which involved assaulting another inmate, making threats, and strongarming. Following a disciplinary hearing, the disciplinary committee found Niday had violated three rules. The decision was based on Niday's admission at the hearing that he had struck another inmate and on confidential information from three other inmates. The committee imposed a penalty of ten days in solitary confinement, an indefinite period of administrative segregation, and some loss of good time. Niday unsuccessfully appealed this decision to the warden and the director of the division of adult corrections.
Niday then sought postconviction relief basing his application upon grounds that the disciplinary committee gave an inadequate statement of evidence or reasons for the decision, improperly relied on confidential information, and refused to disclose the identity of the informant. During the postconviction hearing, the trial court reviewed the confidential material in camera. The court concluded there had been no violation of due process and denied relief.
The record discloses that Niday received a disciplinary notice prior to his hearing that disclosed his alleged violations of prison rules. The notice described the nature and general circumstances of the charges and indicated that, after oral notification of these accusations, Niday had admitted an assault, but denied making other threats and strongarming. Niday was neither informed of the identity of the confidential informants, nor allowed to see their statements. Following the hearing, Niday was provided with a copy of the committee's decision which contained a statement of the reasons for the decision and the evidence relied on, which included the confidential statements. Additionally, the committee prepared and preserved written summaries of the statements of the three confidential informants in a separate confidential file. Two written statements and the staff memo which summarized an oral statement were also preserved. This confidential material was made available to the parties hearing Niday's appeals and to the district judge for in camera inspection.
On this appeal, the issues have narrowed to Niday's present assertion that his right to due process was violated because the disciplinary committee's written summaries of the confidential information did not include the reasons why the committee believed the information to be credible. Consequently, he claims he is entitled to expungement of the record and restoration of all good and honor time lost. The State denies that a due process violation occurred, but also argues that even if such a violation occurred, Niday is not entitled to the requested relief. The State raises no claim concerning preservation of error; therefore, we address the issue raised. We cannot accept Niday's claim. Thus, we affirm the trial court.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court established minimum requirements of procedural due process to be afforded prisoners in disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the Constitution contains no guarantee of "good time" for satisfactory behavior in prison; however, when a state enacts laws that provide good time which may be lost by misbehavior, the prisoner's right in retaining good time rises to the level of "liberty" protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 951. Some form of due process must be applied before an inmate can be deprived of this liberty interest. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89, 100...
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Jackson, In re
...did not suggest, however, that the board must interview any informant in camera. 6 Iowa cases are similar: for example, in Niday v. State (1984) 353 N.W.2d 92, 93-94, the disciplinary board prepared a confidential file of the confidential informants' written statements, which file was made ......
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Williams v. State
...in disciplinary proceedings have been in the context of challenges involving either procedural due process, see, e.g., Niday v. State, 353 N.W.2d 92, 93-95 (Iowa 1984), or the substantive component of the due process clause, see, e.g., Wilson v. Farrier, 372 N.W.2d 499, 501-02 (Iowa 1985). ......
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Losee v. State
...based on intelligible rules, with decisions setting forth evidence relied on and reasons for discipline inflicted) with Niday v. State, 353 N.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Iowa 1984) (disciplinary committee not required to include in its decision an explanation why it found confidential information This ......
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Wilson v. Farrier
...right to examine the confidential informant. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568-69, 94 S.Ct. at 2981, 41 L.Ed.2d at 958; Niday v. State, 353 N.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Iowa 1984). The postconviction testimony of a hearing officer committee member that petitioner was a Vice Lord, and the confidential informa......