Nielander v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1901
• Citation: 87 N.W. 285,114 Iowa 420
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: NIELANDER ET AL. v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

114 Iowa 420

87 N.W. 285

NIELANDER ET AL.

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 2, 1901.

Appeal from district court, Allamakee county; L. E. Fellows, Judge.

The plaintiff's elevator, situated on the depot grounds of the defendant, was burned September 27, 1898, and action was begun for its value, with that of its contents, August 29, 1899, based on the alleged negligent operation of defendant's engine. The company, among other things, set up the defense that the premises were occupied under a lease exempting it from liability, and plaintiff denied that the ground on which the elevator stood was included therein. Thereupon the defendant filed a cross petition in equity, averring a mistake in drafting the lease, by which the commencement point in the description contained therein had been stated to be the west instead of the east side of Oak street, and prayed for a reformation. Issue was joined therein, hearing had in equity, and relief denied. The defendant appeals. Reversed.J. C. Cook, J. H. Trewin, and M. B. Hendrick, for appellant.

J. P. Conway and D. D. Murphy, for appellee.

LADD, J.

Plaintiff occupied a part of defendant's right of way on the depot grounds from 1878 till 1894 without rent charge, and as a tenant at will. In the latter year the company's agent advised the local manager of Nielander & Co. that the company would expect the firm to sign a lease for all business done on the right of way, and on April 24th the latter made this application to the defendant's division superintendent on a printed form prepared by the company: “The undersigned, Nielander & Co., P. O. address, New Albin, Ia., desire to lease, subject to the company's usual terms and conditions, a part of its depot grounds at this station for the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon a grain warehouse, and request that such ground may be located on the northwest side of main track and northwest side of station, and have a track frontage of 139 feet.” Thereupon a lease for a term of three years, beginning July 1, 1894, was prepared by the company, and signed by the firm, though with this notation: “Agreeing to all but the second condition.” The second condition, it should be said, exempted the company from liability for damages occasioned by the negligent operation of the trains. When informed that the lease would not be accepted with the notation, it was erased by plaintiff. It appears that the precise location of plaintiff's property had been fixed by a careful survey, using as a point of beginning the intersection of the center of the main track with the east side of Oak street. In preparing the lease a doubt arose as to whether this point was on the east or west line of the street, and, being referred to the local agent, who had assisted in the survey, he erroneously declared it to be on the west line, and the lease was mistakenly drawn so as to locate the property the width of the street west of where it really was. As a result, only the annex is within the description. At the expiration of three years, a new lease, embodying the same mistake, to continue one year, and until terminated upon 60 days' written notice, was executed. It seems in the operation of the railroad general directions are only considered,--that is, the track leading toward Chicago is spoken of as east, and that toward St. Paul as west, regardless of the direction of the track locally,--and that the mistake was occasioned by the agent inadvertently reporting with respect to this custom, rather than the points of the compass. That there was a mistake on the company's part is manifest. But it is insisted that this was not mutual; that plaintiff merely acquiesced in what was proposed, and consented to the contract prepared by the company alone. Unquestionably, land other than that described in the lease must be shown to have been the subject of this contract before it can be reformed. The inquiry in such a case is always directed to the ascertainment of what was really the subject of the agreement. Had the parties the land described in mind in making the lease, or some other? If they had some other, and the arrangement was made in reference to that, then clearly there has been a mutual mistake for them. Their minds have met, not with relation to the subject-matter described, but another, not expressed. The question is not whether there has been previous agreement in parol, but whether the subject of the agreement...