Nielsen v. Flower Hosp.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85 Civ. 7182 (RJW).,85 Civ. 7182 (RJW).
• Parties: Frederick V. NIELSEN, Plaintiff, v. FLOWER HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

639 F. Supp. 738

Frederick V. NIELSEN, Plaintiff, v. FLOWER HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 85 Civ. 7182 (RJW).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 14, 1986.

Frederick V. Nielsen, pro se.

Kelley Drye & Warren, New York City (John F. Gibbons and Lawrence J. Baer, of counsel), for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERT J. WARD, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff pro se under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. Defendant moves for an order pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., dismissing the complaint for failure to satisfy the ninety-day filing requirement for actions brought under Title VII and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff cross-moves for leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a), Fed. R.Civ.P. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is denied and plaintiff's cross-motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts relevant to the instant motion. He filed charges of discriminatory conduct against defendant, Flower Hospital ("Flower"),¹ with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") on March 8, 1984. When the EEOC had not acted on the charge within 180 days, plaintiff requested that the Commission issue him a Notice of Right to Sue ("Notice" or "right-to-sue letter"), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which plaintiff avers he received on May 7, 1985.² Thereafter, on July 29, 1985, plaintiff presented a complaint and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") to the Pro Se Office of this Court. In the complaint, a four-page form pleading for Title VII actions supplied to pro se litigants by the Pro Se Office, plaintiff stated that defendant discriminated against him on the basis of race and color by failing to employ him. Plaintiff appended to the complaint the right-to-sue letter he received from the EEOC in May 1985. By order dated August 26, 1985, plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP. On September 13, 1985, the complaint and order granting IFP status were duly filed with the Clerk of the Court. Defendant concedes receiving service of the summons and complaint on December 12, 1985. Affidavit of John F. Gibbons at ¶ 3 (sworn to Jan. 2, 1986).

In its pending motion, Flower advances two related grounds for dismissing the complaint. Defendant contends, first, that plaintiff failed to file the complaint within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Second, Flower argues, the complaint must be dismissed in any event for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, Fed.R. Civ.P. Moreover, Flower maintains, plaintiff's failure to include in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," see Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., precludes plaintiff from curing that or any other defects in the complaint by repleading or amendment.

DISCUSSION

A. Flower's Motion to Dismiss

One of the statutory requirements for bringing a Title VII action in federal court is that the plaintiff commence the action within ninety days of receiving a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). By now it is well settled in this District that the presentation of a Title VII complaint to the Pro Se Clerk of the Court, if accompanied either by an application for leave to proceed IFP or the filing fee, represents the commencement of an action for purposes of satisfying the ninety-day filing requirement. See Dzaba v. Blyth Eastman Paine Webber, No. 84 Civ. 3711(GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1985) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW); Addison v. National Brands Outlet, No. 83 Civ. 7115(SWK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1984) (available on LEXIS and WESTLAW); French v. United States Trust Co., 84 Civ. 868(RJW) (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1984) (citing other unreported district court decisions); Simpson v. Bank of New York, 26 Empl.Prac.Dec. (CCH) ¶ 32,114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Motley, J.); Franklin v. Herbert Lehman College, 508 F.Supp. 945, 948 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (Tenney, J.); Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 356 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (Haight, J.); cf. Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 522 n. 1a (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872, 94 S.Ct. 102, 38 L.Ed.2d 90 (1973) (§ 1983 complaint); Salahuddin v. Milligan, 592 F.Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y.1984), aff'd mem., 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.1985) (same).³

The complaint that was ultimately filed with the Clerk of the Court in this action indicates on its face that it was received by the Pro Se Office on July 29, 1985, and that it was accompanied by an IFP application. Thus, assuming plaintiff had received the Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC on May 7, 1985,⁴ he presented a Title VII complaint to the Pro Se Clerk no later than eighty-three days thereafter, or within the ninety-day filing period prescribed by the statute.

Defendant argues, however, that the complaint plaintiff presented to the Pro Se Office on July 29, 1985 does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8, Fed.R. Civ.P., and therefore could not properly have "commenced" a civil action either within the meaning of Rule 3, Fed.R. Civ.P.,⁵ or for purposes of the ninety-day filing requirement for Title VII actions. Furthermore, defendant argues, the defect(s) in the original complaint cannot now be cured by the filing of an amended or substitute pleading because there is no "original pleading" to which the amendment(s) could "relate back" within the meaning of Rule 15(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.⁶

In support of its argument, defendant relies principally on Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (per curiam). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the filing of a right-to-sue letter with a district court does not in itself "toll" the ninety-day filing period for Title VII actions or otherwise satisfy the statutory filing requirement. A Title VII suit, like any other civil action brought in federal court, can only be commenced by the filing of a complaint, the Supreme Court stated. 466 U.S. at 149; see also Rule 3, Fed.R.Civ.P. The right-to-sue letter that the pro se plaintiff in Baldwin County had presented to the district court was not a complaint, the Court held, because it did not contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," as required under Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R. Civ.P. Baldwin County, supra, 466 U.S. at 149, 104 S.Ct. at 1724. Therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff's filing of the right-to-sue letter within the statutory period had not properly "commenced" a Title VII action, and the ninety-day filing requirement had not been met. In a footnote, the Supreme Court further observed that the plaintiff's subsequent filing of an amended complaint had not cured the pleading defects in the right-to-sue letter because the letter was not an "original pleading" to which a later amendment could "relate back" under Rule 15(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Baldwin County, supra, 466 U.S. at 149-50 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1724-25 n. 3. Finding no justification in the record for equitably tolling the statutory filing period, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, which had held that the plaintiff's filing of a right-to-sue letter had tolled the ninety-day filing requirement. Id. at 151-52, 104 S.Ct. at 1725-26.

The Court rejects defendant's implicit argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin County mandates dismissal of the instant action. The Title VII complaint in question here, while hardly a model of detailed pleading, is readily distinguishable from the right-to-sue letter at issue in Baldwin County. In contrast to a bare right-to-sue letter, the complaint filed here gave defendant actual notice that a Title VII claim was being brought against it, one of the Supreme Court's central concerns in Baldwin County. Strong policies weigh heavily against reading the Supreme Court's holding in that case to extend beyond its facts to the complaint at issue here. Furthermore, even if the complaint were deemed not to have properly commenced a Title VII action, the circumstances of this case present ample justification for tolling the statutory filing period to allow plaintiff to serve and file an amended complaint.

1. Adequacy of Complaint to Commence Action

In Baldwin County, the Supreme Court made clear that Title VII actions hold no "special status under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 466 U.S. at 150, 104 S.Ct. at 1725, and therefore can only be commenced by the filing of a complaint as provided in Rule 3, Fed.R.Civ.P. The right-to-sue letter before it could not be considered a complaint within the contemplation of Rule 3, the Court held, because it lacked the basic ingredients of a pleading, including "a short and plain statement of the plaintiff's claim," Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R. Civ.P. In discussing the applicability of Rule 15(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., the Court noted further that the right-to-sue letter could not be treated as an "original pleading" to which subsequent amendments could relate back because it had not given the defendant "`fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim was and the grounds upon which it rested.'" 466 U.S. at 149-50 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. at 1724-25 n. 3 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Indeed, it would appear that the defendant in Baldwin County first received notice of the plaintiff's Title VII claim when it was served with an "amended complaint" drafted and filed by counsel who subsequently appeared for the plaintiff in that action. See 466 U.S. at 157, 104 S.Ct. at 1728 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

The complaint plaintiff presented to the Pro Se Office of this Court on July 29, 1985 is a four-page typed form pleading that the Office...