Nielson By and Through Nielson v. Spanaway General Medical Clinic, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 65246-5,65246-5
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Christina NIELSON, By and Through her Guardian ad Litem, Bradley NIELSON and Stacey Nielson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. SPANAWAY GENERAL MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., a Corporation; General Medical Clinics; and Karel Pokorny, M.D. and Jane Doe Pokorny, his wife, Respondents.

Page 255

135 Wn.2d 255

956 P.2d 312

Christina NIELSON, By and Through her Guardian ad Litem Bradley NIELSON and Stacey Nielson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. SPANAWAY GENERAL MEDICAL CLINIC, INC., a Corporation General Medical Clinics; and Karel Pokorny, M.D. and Jane Doe Pokorny, his wife, Respondents.

No. 65246-5.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Argued Jan. 14, 1998.

Decided May 28, 1998.

Lopez & Fantel, Carl Lopez, Seattle, for Appellants.

Law Office of Stephen L. Henley, Stephen L. Henley, Seattle, for Respondents.

GUY, Justice.

In this case we consider whether a plaintiff who is awarded a judgment for damages in a medical malpractice action in federal court has a state constitutional right to have a jury redetermine the damage issue in a subsequent action in state court, based on the same injuries, against a second defendant.

FACTS

On the evening of July 28, 1989, when Christina Nielson was 7 days old, her mother brought her to the Spanaway General Medical Clinic because the infant seemed to be breathing abnormally, had gradually stopped nursing during the day, and was sleeping more than usual. At the Clinic, Christina was examined by Dr. Karel Pokorny. Dr. Pokorny's notes indicate that he prescribed a medication for thrush and told the mother to take the child to Mary Bridge Children's Hospital if the child's symptoms did not improve or if she developed further problems.

Because she was not satisfied with Dr. Pokorny's diagnosis, Christina's mother telephoned the emergency room at Madigan Army Medical Center (Madigan) within a short time after leaving the Spanaway Clinic. Madigan told Christina's mother to bring the child to Madigan's emergency room immediately.

The infant and her mother arrived at Madigan approximately 20 minutes later. Delays in diagnosing and treating Christina for cardiac problems during the 6 hours she was at Madigan's emergency treatment facility caused Christina to suffer increasing shock and respiratory failure, which ultimately resulted in permanent brain damage.

Christina and her parents (hereafter referred to collectively as Nielsons) filed an action against the Spanaway Clinic and Dr. Pokorny in Pierce County Superior Court, and filed an action against the United States, as owner and operator of Madigan, in Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington. The injuries and damages claimed in both actions are identical.

Although the complaint in state court was filed first, the action in federal court against the United States was tried and concluded before any proceedings occurred in the state court action. An action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), must be tried to the court without a jury, 28 U.S.C. § 2402. The Nielsons' suit went to trial before United States District Court Judge William L. Dwyer. The Nielsons did not request the federal court to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state court action, ¹ nor did they seek a stay of the federal proceeding so that the state court action could be tried first.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, liability and damages are determined under the law of the state where the tort occurred. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Judge Dwyer applied Washington law in determining that the United States was liable for the injuries suffered by Christina and in determining the amount of compensation due to the child and her parents. The federal judge considered that "[t]he fundamental principle of damages in Washington is that tortiously injured parties are to be returned as nearly as possible to the condition in which they would have been had the wrong not occurred." Clerk's Papers at 96. He entered 16 findings of fact relating to damages suffered by Christina and her parents and awarded a total of $3,133,202 in damages to Christina and $100,000 to each of her parents. The United States appealed the federal court decision, and Christina cross-appealed the amount of damages awarded to her. ² The United States and Christina settled for $2.85 million before the appeal was heard, and the appeal was subsequently dismissed. The final judgment entered in the trial court was not vacated.

Following the federal court action, the Spanaway Clinic and Dr. Pokorny moved for partial summary judgment in Pierce County Superior Court, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to bar relitigation of the damages issue. The parties agree that the child did not suffer any additional injury between the time she was seen at the Spanaway Clinic and the time she arrived at Madigan.

The trial court granted a partial summary judgment, ruling that the Nielsons were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the amount of damages that would fully compensate them for their injuries.

The Nielsons appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Nielson v. Spanaway Gen. Med. Clinic, 85 Wash.App. 249, 931 P.2d 931 (1997). In addition to holding that the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the damages issue, the Court of Appeals held that Christina had impliedly waived her right to a jury trial by electing to proceed in the federal forum without seeking a stay or without seeking supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in federal court. Nielson, 85 Wash.App. at 255-56, 931 P.2d 931.

This court granted the Nielsons' petition for review.

ISSUE

May the doctrine of collateral estoppel be properly and constitutionally applied to preclude relitigation of the issue of damages in a medical malpractice action in state court where the plaintiff has previously been awarded a judgment against a different tortfeasor, for the same injuries, following a bench trial in federal court?

DISCUSSION

In reviewing an order of summary judgment, an appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982); Zenkina v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 83 Wash.App. 556, 560, 922 P.2d 171 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1003, 932 P.2d 644 (1997). Summary judgment will be ordered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid a useless trial when no genuine issue of material fact remains to be decided. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wash.2d 1, 12, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).

Like the doctrine of res judicata which bars relitigation of a claim once it has been decided, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of an issue after the party against whom the doctrine is applied has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his or her case. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 561, 852 P.2d 295 (1993); Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 665, 674 P.2d 165 (1983). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) states the general rule as follows:

When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.

The purpose of the doctrine is to promote the policy of ending disputes. McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 303, 738 P.2d 254 (1987); Beagles v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 25 Wash.App. 925, 929, 610 P.2d 962 (1980). See also Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 W ASH. L. R EV. 805, 806 (1985) (collateral estoppel "limits the vexation and harassment of other parties; lessens the overcrowding of court calendars, thereby freeing the courts for use by others; and, by providing for finality in adjudications, encourages respect for judicial decisions"). We recently noted that the

doctrine of collateral estoppel is well-known to Washington law as a means of preventing the endless relitigation of issues already actually litigated by the parties and decided by a competent tribunal.

Reninger v. Department of Corrections, 134 Wash.2d 437, 449, 951 P.2d 782 (1998).

Before the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, the party asserting the doctrine must prove: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the second action; (2) the prior adjudication must have ended in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine does not work an injustice. Reninger, 134 Wash.2d at 449, 951 P.2d 782; Hanson, 121 Wash.2d at 562, 852 P.2d 295; McDaniels, 108 Wash.2d at 303, 738 P.2d 254; Chau v. City of Seattle, 60 Wash.App. 115, 119, 802 P.2d 822 (1991).

In the present case, the Nielsons agree that the issue of damages decided in the federal court action is identical to the issue of damages in the state action against the Spanaway Clinic and Dr. Pokorny. They also admit they were parties in the prior action. Only the second and fourth elements are disputed here.

With respect to the second element, the Nielsons argue that the judgment entered in the federal court is not a "final judgment" because Judge Dwyer's determination of damages was appealed and the appeal was settled and dismissed before it was concluded on the merits. The Nielsons cite to Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 33 Wash.App. 685, 658 P.2d 20 (1983), in support of their argument. In Marquardt, the Court of Appeals held that "collateral estoppel should not be applied to judgments of dismissal, even when based on settlement agreements, since the parties could settle for myriad reasons not related to the...