Nielson v. Robbins, No. 63479-8-I (Wash. App. 6/1/2010)
| Decision Date | 01 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 63479-8-I.,63479-8-I. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SHARON NIELSON, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Marvel F. Robbins, Respondent, v. RHINARD G. ROBBINS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Benjamin W. Robbins, Deceased, and Dale R. Leishner, a single man, Appellants. |
Appeal from Snohomish Superior Court. Docket No: 08-2-03155-0. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/06/2009. Judge signing: Honorable Ronald X Castleberry.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Larry Mcconnell Trivett, Attorney at Law, 5010 Grove St, Marysville, WA, 98270-4475.
Counsel for Respondent(s), James a Jackson, Simburg Ketter Sheppard & Purdy, LLP, 999 3rd Ave Ste 2525, Seattle, WA, 98104-4089.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This case requires that we decide whether reformation is available to correct either a scrivener's error or a mutual mistake in the legal description of a deed gifting real property. Rhinard Robbins and Dale Leishner appeal a summary judgment order holding that two deeds containing incorrect legal descriptions purporting to gift property from Marvel F. Robbins to her son were void because they violated the statute of frauds and the unilateral gift exception barred their reformation. Finding no error, we affirm.
The property at issue in this case is located at 9401 Grandview Road, Arlington, Snohomish County, Washington. This property was the only real estate owned by Marvel Robbins.1
In 1966, Marvel and her husband entered into a real estate contract to purchase the property as a single parcel. They received and recorded a statutory warranty fulfillment deed in 1976. Sometime later the Snohomish County Assessor divided the property into two tax parcels.
In 1977, Marvel's husband passed away, survived by Marvel and their nine children: Marvel, Gail, Ben, Sharon, Sheila, Rhinard, Anthony, Victorine, and Dale.
Around 1983, Ben began living on the property. Rhinard makes the following disputed claims. Marvel incurred substantial debt following her husband's death since she received no income other than minimal Social Security benefits.2 Ben provided Marvel with financial assistance and care, including payment of more than $20,000 of Marvel's debts and her property taxes.3 Ben and Marvel subsequently entered into an oral agreement in which she agreed to convey the property to Ben for his past and continued support. Rhinard supports this last claim with the declarations of Anthony and Sharon that they were aware of a verbal agreement between Ben and Marvel.4
In 1986, Marvel executed two quitclaim deeds purporting to convey the property to Ben. The deeds were signed by Marvel and notarized on October 9, 1986. The record does not disclose who drafted the deeds. In answers to interrogatories, appellants stated that either Marvel or Ben prepared the deeds, but in their cross motion for summary judgment they claimed that the deeds were prepared by a third party scrivener. The metes and bounds descriptions in the deeds are incomplete. The parties agree that, because the description in the first deed (Deed One) omitted a series of calls, it does not close and, because the description in the second deed (Deed Two) omitted one call, it does not describe the correct property.
A separate real estate excise tax affidavit was prepared for each deed. These affidavits repeated the deficient descriptions in the deeds but contained the correct tax parcel numbers. They also described the transaction as a "gift from mother to son." Ben signed the affidavit for Deed One; Marvel signed the affidavit for Deed Two.
The deeds and affidavits were submitted to the Snohomish County Treasurer for review. The treasurer's office placed on each of the documents the stamped notation "NO EXCISE TAX REQUIRED OCT 14 1986." A treasurer's office employee also hand wrote on each deed the receipt number for the corresponding affidavit. The auditor recorded each deed and stamped each "RECORDED 1986 Oct 13."
Ben and Marvel continued living together on the property until August 2007. About this time, Ben was hospitalized for cancer treatment, and Marvel's five daughters filed a petition for a protective order for Marvel as a vulnerable adult and to establish a guardianship. Around August 20, 2007, Marvel was moved from the property to an assisted living facility and ultimately diagnosed with dementia and blindness. On November 8, 2007, the Snohomish County Superior Court appointed Sharon Nielson as the guardian of Marvel's person and estate.
On December 12, 2007, Ben executed a last will and testament, leaving the property to his friend Dale Leishner. He also left $10,000 each to Rhinard and Anthony and $1 to each of his sisters. Ben passed away on January 5, 2008, and Rhinard was appointed the personal representative of his estate.
On March 18, 2008, Nielson filed a petition to quiet title in the property against the claims of Rhinard and Leishner (hereinafter "Robbins") and for other relief. In the petition, Nielson asserted that the deeds should be set aside on several grounds, including fraud, financial and mental abuses, undue influence, breach of contract, neglect, and violation of the statute of frauds. Robbins filed a response denying petitioner's claims and cross-claiming for reformation of the deeds. Nielson later stipulated to the dismissal of all of her claims except for the statute of frauds claim.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted Nielson's motion for summary judgment and denied Robbins's cross motion. The court held that the legal descriptions in the deeds did not satisfy the statute of frauds, rendering them void. The court further held that the deeds did not incorporate descriptive information contained in the real estate tax affidavits and that these deeds could not be reformed under the unilateral gift exception.
The court denied Robbins's motion for reconsideration and entered a final order quieting title to Marvel. Robbins timely appealed.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court.5 Summary judgment is affirmed if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."6 In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we construe the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.7 The burden lies with the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.8 If the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence demonstrating that material facts are in dispute.9 If the nonmoving party fails to do so, then summary judgment is appropriate.10
Whether a deed violates the statute of frauds is a question of law reviewed de novo.11
Robbins challenges the court's determination that the legal descriptions in the two quitclaim deeds were insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.
The real estate statute of frauds provides, "Every conveyance of real estate, or any interest therein, and every contract creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon real estate, shall be by deed."12 To satisfy this statute, the description of the land in a deed must be "sufficiently definite to locate it without recourse to oral testimony, or else it must contain a reference to another instrument which does contain a sufficient description."13 A deed containing an inadequate legal description is void.14 Washington's rule is 15
In this case, the parties agree that the deeds contained incomplete metes and bounds descriptions. These descriptions, with the omitted calls indicated in bold, are shown below. Deed One described the first parcel as follows:
SEC 13 TWP 32 RGE 05 RT-38 PTN SW1/4 NE1/4 DAF BEG SE COR TH W ALG S LN 372 FT TPB TH N30*0500W 200FT TH E200 FT PLW S LN SD SUB TH N30*05 00W 576FT TH W 250 FT TH S 393 FT TO N LN 00 CO RD R/W TH SELY ALG SD N LN CO RD 488 FT TO S LN SD SUB TH E AL SD S LN 83 FT TO TPB.
Deed Two described the second parcel as follows:
SEC 13 TWP 32 RGE 05 TH PTN SW 1/4 NE 1/4 DAF BEG SE COR SD SUB TH W 172 FT TPB TH CONT W ALG S LN SD SUB 200FT TH N30*05 00W 220 FT TH E PLW S LN SD SUB 200FT TH S30*05 00E 220 FT TO TPB.
According to the surveyors retained by the parties, the description in Deed One fails to "include calls which would take it back to the True Point of Beginning," while the description in Deed Two does not "include the proper quarter sections."
Nielson compares these incomplete descriptions to the one held to be insufficient in Bigelow v. Mood.16 There, our Supreme Court decided that a metes and bounds description did not satisfy the statute of frauds because it described the north boundary of the property "only by course, not by distance" and was "utterly silent as to any western boundary."17 As the defect in Deed One is like the one in Bigelow, that deed fails to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. While the defect in Deed Two is arguably less deficient than the one in Bigelow, Robbins has not cited any authority demonstrating that the description in this deed satisfies the statute of frauds.18
Instead, Robbins attempts to distinguish Bigelow, characterizing it as a case about "specific performance, and not reformation." The fact that Bigelow involved an action for specific performance does not render it inapposite.19 Robbins, however, correctly notes that the parties in Bigelow did not ask the court to reform the defective description. We therefore address the availability of reformation.
Robbins claims...
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