Nieting v. Blondell

• Decision Date: 31 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 45361,45361
• Citation: 235 N.W.2d 597,306 Minn. 122
• Parties: Janice R. NIETING, Respondent, v. Henry R. BLONDELL, Jr., and Sawyer Transportation, Inc., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. MICHELIN TIRE CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant, Respondent, State of Minnesota, Third-Party Defendant, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 597

235 N.W.2d 597

306 Minn. 122

Janice R. NIETING, Respondent, v. Henry R. BLONDELL, Jr., and Sawyer Transportation, Inc., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. MICHELIN TIRE CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant,

Respondent,

State of Minnesota, Third-Party Defendant, Respondent.

No. 45361.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 31, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

The tort immunity of the State of Minnesota with respect to tort claims arising on or after August 1, 1976, is abolished subject to any appropriate action taken by the legislature.

Arthur Chapman & McDonough, Lommen & Cole and John P. Lommen, Minneapolis, for appellants.

DeParcq, Anderson Perl & Hunegs and Richard G. Hunegs, Minneapolis, for Nieting.

Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, for Michelin.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Peter W. Sipkins, Sol. Gen., John R. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for the State.

Gordon W. Shumaker, Jr., St. Paul, Adrian E. Herbst and Paul D. Tierney, Minneapolis, for Minnesota Trial Lawyers Assn., amicus curiae, seeking reversal.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

MacLAUGHLIN, Justice.

Defendants appeal from an order of the district court dismissing their third-party complaint against the State of Minnesota on the ground that the state is immune from suit. For reasons stated herein we affirm as to this case, but establish a new rule of law in Minnesota for cases arising on and after August 1, 1976.

This case arises from a multiple-vehicle collision involving a tractor-trailer unit and seven automobiles on Interstate Highway No. 94 (I-94) near Victoria Street in St. Paul, Minnesota, on April 6, 1972. The tractor-trailer unit had traveled through the chain-link fence which at the time of the accident separated the eastbound and westbound lanes of I-94 and collided with several automobiles.

Plaintiff, Janice R. Nieting, the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident, instituted this suit against defendants Henry R. Blondell, Jr., the driver of the tractor-trailer, and Sawyer Transportation, Inc., the owner of the tractor-trailer, for injuries sustained in the accident. Defendants impleaded the Michelin Tire Corporation based on the theory of negligence, warranty, and strict liability in tort, alleging that the tires on the truck, which had been manufactured by Michelin, were defective and had caused the accident. Defendants Blondell and Sawyer also filed a notice of claim with the State Claims Commission against the State of Minnesota pursuant to Minn.St. 3.66 et seq., ¹ alleging that the cement and chainlink fence median barriers were negligently designed, constructed, and maintained and were thus unsafe and hazardous to the public. The State Claims Commission, at the request of defendants, did not act on the claim. Defendants then moved for leave to file a third-party complaint against the State of Minnesota. The district court granted defendants' motion. Third-party defendant State of Minnesota then moved for dismissal of the third-party complaint. Because of the long-established tort immunity of the state, the district court granted the motion for dismissal, and this appeal followed. ²

The sole issue for our decision is whether this court should abolish the tort immunity of the State of Minnesota. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is often associated with the maxim that 'the King can do no wrong.' Blackstone has attributed the maxim to the royal prerogative which he defines as 'that special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all other persons, and out of the course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity.' According to Blackstone, '(t)he law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty.' The King is 'sovereign and independent' and 'owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth. Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him * * * (f)or all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.' I Blackstone, Commentaries, Book I, § 339. Edwin M. Borchard, in the first of several articles on government liability in tort, observed that--

'(n)othing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely personal. How it came to be applied in the United States of America, where the prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution.'

Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4. See, also, by the same author, Governmental Responsibility in Tort VI, 36 Yale L.J. 1; Governmental Responsibility in Tort VII, 28 Col.L.Rev. 577; and Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 Col.L.Rev. 734.

There is no question that the rule of sovereign immunity as it exists today originated with the courts. Its origins may be traced to an English case, Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng.Rep. 359, 2 T.R. 667 (1788). The rule was transported across the Atlantic to the United States where it has been perpetuated in a long line of cases beginning with Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). In that case, the court denied recovery on the authority of 'Men of Devon.' ³

We recognized the sovereign immunity of the State of Minnesota as early as 1877 in St. Paul & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Brown, 24 Minn. 517 (1877). ⁴ That case involved an action 'virtually against the state' to determine the title to certain land. We noted without citing authority that the state is exempt 'from actions by its citizens,' stating that the exemption 'is not based on any constitutional provision, but merely on grounds of public policy.' 24 Minn. 574. And, in 1886, in Sanborn v. City of Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 314, 29 N.W. 126 (1886), we stated that '(t)he state cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts, nor be compelled to defend in them.' 35 Minn. 318, 29 N.W. 127.

In Berman v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society, 93 Minn. 125, 127, 100 N.W. 732 (1904), an action to recover damages for the wrongful arrest of a person visiting the state fairgrounds, we observed that 'it has been uniformly held that a suit by an individual cannot be maintained against a sovereign state without its consent.' And, by 1970, the rule that the State of Minnesota cannot be sued in a tort action without its consent was so well established that it was followed without citation to controlling authorities. Johnson v. Callisto, 287 Minn. 61, 176 N.W.2d 754 (1970).

While this history clearly indicates that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally court-made, it has been argued that today the tort immunity of the state has been established by the legislature. This argument is based on the fact that the legislature has created a State Claims Commission, ⁵ has provided for the payment of the premiums of insurance on state- owned vehicles, ⁶ and has waived its immunity in other areas, ⁷ while at the same time retaining tort immunity. We are urged to interpret these legislative actions as an affirmative decision by the legislature to retain tort immunity. However, we do not believe this to be the case. What has been cited is a series of sporadic statutes, each operating in a separate area in which the legislature has modified the state's governmental immunity, but which do not, in our judgment, support the argument that the legislature has established a doctrine of state tort immunity. Therefore, it is this court's duty and prerogative to determine whether it should adhere to its own rule of tort immunity for the State of Minnesota. See, Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). ⁸ The doctrine of state tort immunity is a creature of the judiciary and not the legislature, and what we have created, we may abolish.

The question of the fairness of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been presented to us previously, and we have found it wanting. In Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), we indicated our intention to abolish sovereign immunity as a defense with respect to tort claims against school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government on which immunity had been conferred by judicial action. The legislature responded by enacting Minn.St. c. 466, which abolished the tort immunity of local governmental units. Spanel did not, however, abolish the tort immunity of the state. Later, in 1970, in Johnson v. Callisto, supra, we were again asked to abolish the doctrine as it applied to the state. We declined, saying that 'if there is to be a change, it should come about by legislation which would be based upon findings warranting it and which would provide for procedures and limits of liability, as was done in the enactment of Minn.St. c. 466 subsequent to the Spanel case.' 287 Minn. 65, 176 N.W.2d 757.

In the 5 years that have elapsed since Johnson v. Callisto, supra, the legislature has failed to proceed to alleviate the hardships created by the sovereign immunity rule. We have therefore elected to re-examine the question at this time.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an exception to the fundamental concept of tort law that liability follows tortious conduct and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the acts of their employees acting in the course of their employment. We are aware of no substantial reasons, and none have been called to our attention, which support the continuation of this exception to the well-established principles of tort law. And we will certainly not retain the doctrine on the basis of stare decisis alone.

'* * * (W)hen a rule, after it has been tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.' Cardozo, Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, p. 107, 152 (1947).

The reasons for the creation of ...