Niggel Associates, Inc. v. Polo's of North Myrtle Beach, Inc., 1235
| Citation | 296 S.C. 530,374 S.E.2d 507 |
| Decision Date | 20 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 1235,1235 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Parties | NIGGEL ASSOCIATES, INC., Respondent, v. POLO'S OF NORTH MYRTLE BEACH, INCORPORATED, Horry County Airport Commission, Windy Hill Golf, Inc., and Beach Investments, a S.C. General Partnership, Defendants. Appeal of WINDY HILL GOLF, INC. MECHANICAL INDUSTRIAL, INC., Respondent, v. POLO'S OF NORTH MYRTLE BEACH, INCORPORATED, Horry County Airport Commission, Windy Hill Golf, Inc., and Beach Investments, a S.C. General Partnership, Defendants. Appeal of WINDY HILL GOLF, INC. . Heard |
Henrietta U. Golding and Preston B. Haines, III, of Bellamy, Rutenberg, Copeland, Epps, Gravely & Bowers, Myrtle Beach, for appellant.
Joseph F. Singleton, of Cross, Singleton & Burroughs, of Conway, and Daniel T. Brailsford, of Robinson, McFadden, Moore, Pope, Williams, Taylor & Brailsford, Columbia, for respondents.
Robert H. Gwin, III, of Thompson, Henry & Gwin, Myrtle Beach, for defendant, Polo's of North Myrtle Beach, Inc.
These actions for restitution were commenced by two contractors who furnished labor and materials in connection with the renovation of a building. The contractors, Niggel Associates, Inc., and Mechanical Industrial, Inc., each sued Windy Hill Golf, Inc., and others, seeking to recover for work they performed under contracts with Beach Investments, a South Carolina general partnership. The separate suits were consolidated by the circuit court. The court held that Windy Hill was liable, on the principle of unjust enrichment, to pay both Contractors for the work. Windy Hill appeals. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed.
Windy Hill operates a golfing facility in North Myrtle Beach on land it holds under a long term ground lease from the Horry County Airport Commission. On a portion of the leased land stand two buildings. Beach Investments wished to develop a restaurant and lounge on this part of the property.
In furtherance of its plan to develop the property, Beach negotiated with Windy Hill to obtain possession of the premises on which the two buildings stood. The parties reached agreement on two alternatives. Under the first alternative, Windy Hill granted Beach an option to purchase outright its leasehold interest in the premises. Under the second alternative, if Beach did not exercise the option to purchase, Windy Hill agreed to give Beach a long term sublease on the premises. The option contract gave Beach a right to enter the premises before the option was exercised for the sole purpose of commencing renovations on one of the buildings.
The option to purchase expired on June 1, 1985. During the option period, Beach hired the Contractors to install tile (Niggel) and a heating and cooling system (Mechanical) in the building. They commenced work in May and finished in mid June. Neither had any dealings with Windy Hill concerning the construction.
Beach did not exercise the option to purchase the leasehold. Instead, with the consent of the Airport Commission, it signed a long term sublease with Windy Hill on June 3, 1985.
In September, because Beach had not paid them for their work, the Contractors filed mechanic's liens on the subleased property. The filing of these liens constituted an event of default under the sublease. When Beach failed to cure the default, Windy Hill terminated the sublease.
On December 4, 1985, the Contractors commenced this action to foreclose their mechanic's liens. Thereafter, they amended their pleadings to add a common law claim for restitution. The circuit court denied recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, but granted judgment for restitution. Only the claim for restitution is before us.
To recover on a theory of restitution, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he conferred a nongratuitous benefit on the defendant; (2) that the defendant realized some value from the benefit; and (3) that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the plaintiff...
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