Niles v. State
Decision Date | 13 June 2018 |
Docket Number | NO. PD–0234–17 & PD–0235–17,PD–0234–17 & PD–0235–17 |
Citation | 555 S.W.3d 562 |
Parties | Scott NILES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jonathan D. Landers, Houston, TX, for Scott Niles.
John R. Messinger, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, Stacey Soule, State’s Attorney, Austin, TX, for State of Texas.
Newell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keller, P.J., and Keasler, Hervey, Alcala, Richardson, Keel and Walker, JJ., joined. Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Terroristic Threat is usually a Class B misdemeanor, but the offense is Class A misdemeanor "if the offense is committed against a public servant." Scott Niles, a firefighter, was charged by information with two counts of the Class A version for threatening his fellow firefighters. He was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced on the two Class A counts. But the jury charges had tracked the Class B misdemeanor version of the crime; the jury was not asked if the terroristic threats were against public servants. Niles raised an "illegal sentence" claim on direct appeal. The State conceded that the jury charges only authorized convictions for Class B Terroristic Threat. The court of appeals reformed the judgments to convictions for Class B misdemeanors and remanded for re-sentencing in the Class B range.1 The question here is whether the court of appeals erred in doing so. We hold that it did. The failure to include a jury instruction on an element of an offense included within the charging instrument amounts to jury charge error subject to a harm analysis. We remand the case to the court of appeals to determine whether Appellant suffered any harm.
Appellant was a Houston firefighter assigned to Fire Station 64. The firefighters were required to have an unexpired driver's license–a regular one to drive the ambulance, or "a class B CDL" to drive the "heavy apparatus, the ladder trucks and the pumpers." They were assigned to drive an ambulance on a rotating basis, an assignment that paid extra. On April 29, 2014, Appellant was assigned to drive. But a fellow firefighter overheard him say that he did not have a driver's license and reported that to Captain Bradley Maddin. Appellant was summoned to meet with Maddin and Senior Captain Andrew Haygood. They asked for his license, and Appellant showed them his concealed handgun license, something that looks "very similar to a Texas driver's license" and "said that the concealed handgun license was enough." But it wasn't, and Haygood ordered Appellant to assume the role of patient care for the day; he would not be driving the ambulance. He was ordered to get the appropriate driver's license before his next shift. Appellant did not take it well. Later that morning, firefighters Robert Gordon and Mark Keelen approached Appellant. Gordon said that Appellant was 2 Keelen elaborated.
Like many of the other firefighters, Keelen knew Appellant owned several guns. Appellant would bring his guns to the station, leave them in the back of his Subaru, and take firefighters down to show them off or try to sell them. "One that I remember, I would call it an UZI MAC–10 kind of looking gun that was black in color."3
Firefighter Robert Sadler and Appellant made an emergency run together that same day. Sadler testified that Appellant appeared to be "distant" and "upset" when he got in the ambulance.
Sadler said that back at the station, and in front of another firefighter, Michael Lucas, Appellant said "if y'all piss me off, I will just come out and kill everyone."
This was not an isolated occurrence. Appellant's next shift was on May 5, 2014. Once again, he talked about shooting up the station–this time to firefighter Samuel Feris.
Captains Maddin and Haygood became aware of the threats that same day. Haygood was concerned about his personal safety, as well as that of his firefighters.
The next day Haygood called Chief Robert Gutierrez for advice, and two days later, on May 7, 2014, Haygood called Chief Casey. "Chief Casey told me over the phone to tell Firefighter Niles to report [immediately] to his office." Appellant was also ordered to see Dr. Sam J. Buser, the clinical staff psychologist for the Houston Fire Department. While Appellant was absent from the station, investigators took statements from the firefighters regarding Appellant's comments. Appellant was later told not to come back to the station.
Trial
During the trial, it was never an issue that Keelen and Haygood were "public servants." Instead, Appellant's defense was that this was "not a crime but a human relations issue." There was no imminent threat; In response to Appellant's motion for directed verdict on the cases, the trial judge said of the "public servant" element, "The Houston Department firefighter, they got that." The judge ultimately denied the motion for directed verdict on the cases.
Unfortunately, the jury charges did not ask the jury to determine whether Keelen and Haygood were public servants. Though there were separate written charges for each count, the judge read the two as a combined charge out loud. Neither the accusation nor the application paragraph included the public servant element. And the words "public servant" do not appear anywhere in the middle of the charge.
In closing arguments both sides made numerous references to firefighters, but not "public servants." The prosecution specifically went over the three listed elements of Class B, Terroristic Threat, with the jury, and made no mention of a public servant element. The defense did tie the job of firefighter to the serving of the public:
And to send him back to work for two more–two-and-a-half more solid days to mingle and to be in a position to have to save members of the public. Imminent threat of serious bodily injury? No, it's not. It's not even close.
The jury convicted Appellant. Sentencing was by the judge and the...
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...correctness of that conclusion, we address the views of Appellant and the court of appeals.C. Appellant's "Failure to Join" ArgumentIn Niles v. State , the jury charge failed to include an element of the charged offense of terroristic threat that raised the offense from a Class B misdemeano......
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...Snowden v. State , 353 S.W.3d 815, 822 n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Niles v. State , 555 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), provided certain guidelines for our analysis. The Niles court specifically pointed to the harmless-error analysis in Ne......
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Trial Issues
...an element of an offense included within the charging instrument amounts to jury charge error subject to a harm analysis. Niles v. State, 555 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). It is error for the trial court to submit an entire statutory definition that affects the meaning of an eleme......
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Trial issues
...an element of an offense included within the charging instrument amounts to jury charge error subject to a harm analysis. Niles v. State, 555 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). It is error for the trial court to submit an entire statutory definition that affects the meaning of an eleme......
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Trial Issues
...an element of an offense included within the charging instrument amounts to jury charge error subject to a harm analysis. Niles v. State, 555 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). It is error for the trial court to submit an entire statutory definition that affects the meaning of an eleme......
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Trial Issues
...an element of an offense included within the charging instrument amounts to jury charge error subject to a harm analysis. Niles v. State, 555 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). It is error for the trial court to submit an entire statutory definition that affects the meaning of an eleme......