Niman v. Niman
| Decision Date | 18 November 1958 |
| Citation | 15 Misc.2d 1095,181 N.Y.S.2d 260 |
| Parties | Ruth B. NIMAN, Plaintiff, v. M. Robert NIMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Peter J. Unger, New York City, for plaintiff.
Irving T. Bergman, New York City, for defendant.
Action by the former wife of the defendant to recover alleged payments due to her under a separation agreement.
In his answer, defendant counterclaims for certain advances allegedly in the form of loans made for the benefit of the daughter, and asserts as a defense the illegality of the agreement as violative of public policy.
The parties were married in the State of New Jersey, in July 1937. Their only issue, a daughter, was born in 1940. The parties separated in 1944, and after a series of events, including legal and judicial proceedings, entered into a written agreement, the subject of this action.
This instrument sets forth many provisions and stipulations usually incorporated in a separation agreement. It contains, among other provisions the agreement on the part of the defendant to pay to his wife the sum of $100 per week as alimony and support for their infant child. The subject of divorce is also mentioned in the agreement. It provides that in the event she obtains in a court of competent jurisdiction a decree of divorce absolute which would incorporate the alimony payments aforementioned, she would then have the option, in lieu of such payments, of demanding the payment of $67,310, as follows: (1) $10,000 upon delivery of the decree; (2) $57,310 in weekly instalments of $110 each, tax free, over a period of ten years and one week. A time limit on the exercise of the option, of one year after the decree, was placed, and the payments were to continue even if the wife remarried. Payments were to cease in the event of the husband's death. In the event of the wife's death, reduced payments were to be made into a trust fund to be created for the daughter.
Immediately after the execution of the agreement, plaintiff obtained a divorce in another jurisdiction and, pursuant to the contract, notified the defendant of her election to exercise the option. Defendant, thereupon, turned over to plaintiff the sum of $10,000, and, until June 15, 1957, kept up payments on the balance. Upon his failure to continue, the wife has commenced this action.
It is axiomatic that a separation agreement whose direct tendency is to promote divorce or to facilitate its procurement is void as against public policy. Domestic Relations Law, § 51; Rs. Contracts, § 586. The law favors the preservation of the marriage relationship, and such an agreement, aside from imperilling the marital status, interferes with the proper administration of justice and constitutes a fraud on the courts. Schley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812.
Where the benefit to be secured by the wife under the agreement is contingent upon the dissolution of the marriage, it is invalid (cf. Lake v. Lake, 136 App.Div. 47, 119 N.Y.S. 686). This also holds where 'the value of the contractual benefit to the wife is substantially in excess of the value of what the court would ordinarily grant under the circumstances of the case pursuant to the applicable statute of divorce'. Van Voorhis, J. in Yates v. Yates, 183 Misc. 934, at page 940, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135, at page 141.
The plaintiff, as a condition of her divorce, received $10,000 and a promise of payments secured by collateral over a period of ten years, whether or not she remarried. However, without proof of defendant's financial worth at the time of the agreement, it cannot be said that the contractual benefit to the plaintiff exceeded anything she might have obtained in court. Viewed, as it must be, in light of conditions at the time of the signing of the agreement, there is nothing intrinsic in the agreement to justify a holding that it was inducive to a divorce.
Defendant attacked the validity of the agreement on the basis of conversations had with his wife prior to its execution. He offered such testimony in order to indicate that its purpose was to arrange for her to secure a divorce in order to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harges v. Harges
...23 Misc.2d 257, 200 N.Y.S.2d 661; Towers v. Towers, 21 Misc.2d 56, 195 N.Y.S.2d 556. Neither the parol evidence rule, Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc.2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260, affd. 8 A.D.2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948; see Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 200 N.E.2d 567; nor the general......
-
Fitzgerald v. Morgenstern
...formerly Domestic Relations Law, Sec. 51, relying on Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 200 N.E.2d 567; Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc.2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260, aff'd 8 A.D.2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948; Fisher v. Fisher, 43 Misc.2d 905, 252 N.Y.S.2d 643. These cases merely carry out the......
-
Viles v. Viles
...596, 96 N.E.2d 894; Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681; Murthey v. Murthey, 287 N.Y. 740, 39 N.E.2d 941; Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc.2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260, affd. 8 A.D.2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948). Through plaintiff at the trial denied knowledge of any agreement relating to a di......
-
McLean v. Friar
...567 and cases therein cited (Reed v. Robertson, 276 App.Div. 902, 94 N.Y.S.2d 905, aff'd 302 N.Y. 596, 96 N.E.2d 894; Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc.2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260, aff'd 8 A.D.2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d In the Viles case, supra, this agreement was not incorporated in the divorce decree obtai......