Nipges v. Thornton

• Decision Date: 08 April 1922
• Docket Number: 16928.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: NIPGES v. THORNTON, County Treasurer.

206 P. 17

119 Wash. 464

NIPGES v. THORNTON, County Treasurer.

No. 16928.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 8, 1922

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County; W. P. Bunn, Judge.

Action by John Nipges against Edith M. Thornton, Treasurer of Whatcom County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Bixby &amp Nightingale, of Bellingham, for appellant.

A. O Colburn, of Spokane, amicus curiae.

Lindsay L. Thompson, of Olympia, and Loomis Baldrey, of Bellingham for respondent.

TOLMAN J.

This action is a direct attack upon chapter 174 of the Laws of 1921, commonly known as the 'Poll Tax Law,' upon the ground that it is unconstitutional. From a judgment upholding the act, this appeal is prosecuted.

The act in question, among other things, provides for the collection of an annual tax of $5 from 'all persons of this state, over twenty-one (21) years of age and under fifty (50) years of age, except idiots, insane persons, and persons supported at public expense,' payable to the treasurer of the county where the taxpayer resides. It is further provided that each county assessor shall prepare a list of the names of all those in his county liable for the payment of the tax, to be certified by the county treasurer to the sheriff, and it is made the duty of the sheriff to collect the tax by seizure and sale of property if necessary, and the treasurer and sheriff, in the name of the county, are empowered to invoke process in civil procedure to enforce collection. Section 5 of the act reads as follows:

'The various county treasurers shall on or before the first day of every month remit to the state treasurer four-fifths of all taxes collected under this act, and said taxes so remitted shall be deposited in the general fund and the county treasurers shall deposit the remaining one-fifth of said taxes collected in the current expense fund of their respective counties: Provided, that if the taxes collected under the provisions of section 8, chapter 1, Laws of the Extraordinary Session of the Legislature of 1920, shall prove insufficient to pay the interest and principal of the bonds issued under said act, then it shall be the duty of the Legislature to appropriatle moneys from the general fund to cover such deficiency in an amount not in excess of the moneys transmitted to the general fund under this act.'

Appellant's first contention is that the act violates section 12 of article 11 of the state Constitution, which reads:

'The Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may by general laws vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes'

--in that one-fifth of the tax collected is retained by the counties and placed in their respective current expense funds, and hence to that extent it is a direct that upon the individuals of the several counties for county purposes; and, further, if any portion of the tax is illegal the whole must fall.

In approaching such a constitutional question the well-established rule that the courts will not declare an act of the Legislature void unless it so clearly offends against the Constitution that there can be no reasonable doubt upon the subject must always be kept clearly in mind. Does this act so offend against the constitutional provision hereinbefore quoted? We are firmly of the opinion that it does not. It does not appear clearly, or at all, that the tax is imposed for county purposes in whole or in part. As to the four-fifths to be paid into the state treasury, there is, of course, no question. As to the remaining one-fifth to be retained by the counties, we see nothing wrong or objectionable in the state, though not obliged to do so, thereby and to that extent reimbursing the counties for the cost of collecting the tax. No doubt the Legislature recognized the fact that the counties have their own financial problems, and the burden which this act places upon them would greatly increase their current expenses, and therefore considered it but fair in opening up this new source of revenue to the state, while using the machinery of the counties for its collection, to make such an allowance from the fund realized as would, as nearly as could be anticipated, cover the cost. The requirement that the money thus retained shall be placed in the current expense fund from which must be paid the county's expenses in collecting the tax, as well as its other current expenses, such as salaries, court costs, and the like, is strong evidence of the legislative intent in this respect. We know of no constitutional provision or rule of public policy which forbids such a course.

But, in any event, should we hold this particular provision invalid, the result would be the same, for section 10 of the act provides:

'If any section, subdivision, sentence or clause of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.'

If, therefore, the provision permitting the counties to retain one-fifth of the amount collected offends against the Constitution the result would be that the whole amount collected would go into the state treasury, and appellant and those similarly situated would be relieved of no part of the burden which the law places upon them.

Appellant's second contention is that the act offends against section 5 of article 7 of the Constitution, which reads:

'No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state

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