Nissim Hadjes, Inc. v. Di Costanzo, 66--284
Decision Date | 04 April 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 66--284,66--284 |
Citation | 197 So.2d 602 |
Parties | NISSIM HADJES, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Nicholas DI COSTANZO, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
L. J. Cushman, Miami, and Donald S. Rose, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Milton R. Adkins, Miami, for appellee.
Before PEARSON and SWANN, JJ., and NATHAN, RAYMOND G., Associate Judge.
In this action both parties to this appeal sought to quiet title to a section of land in Dade County. This appeal is from a summary final decree in favor of the appellee, Nicholas Di Costanzo, plaintiff below.
The material facts are undisputed. Appellant, Nissim Hadjes, Inc., and appellee claim their titles from a common source. The appellee deraigns his claim of title through a warranty deed, absolute in form, from the Richards Land Development Corporation to Nicholas Di Costanzo, as trustee, recorded May 28, 1958, and a quit claim deed from Nicholas Di Costanzo, as trustee to Nicholas D. Costanzo (plaintiff), recorded July 12, 1965.
Appellant deraigns its claim of title under a warranty deed directly from Richards Land Development Corporation to appellant, recorded September 29, 1958.
Contemporaneously with receipt of his trust deed, which purportedly conveyed six sections of land (including the section in controversy) Di Costanzo executed a declaration of trust whereby the Casino De Capri, a Cuban corporation, was named the beneficiary. The trust declaration did not recite any purpose for its execution nor was there any evidence it was recorded.
In his deposition, Di Costanzo, in substance, testified that immediately prior to the receipt of his trust deed one Berkowitz, president of the grantor, Richards Land Development Corporation, personally owed a balance of $55,000 on a pre-existing debt to the Casino De Capri, beneficiary, under the trust declaration. Di Costanzo further testified he personally paid $5,000 of Berkowitz's Casino debt, but his testimony (and the record) is not clear as to whether said $5,000 payment was made prior to or subsequent to the trust deed conveyance to Di Costanzo.
In connection with the acquisition of his trust deed, Di Costanzo in his deposition in response to the following questions answered:
'A. Well, this man, Berkowitz at the time I was President at the Casino De Capri and this Berkowitz used up quite a large sum of the casino's money, once the time come to produce the money and he just produced a part of it. * * *
'So finally I seen that he had ran out of his resources because he put a second mortgage on his house * * * (s)o in order to make it come to a closing, I said, 'All right,' I says, 'I will O.K. the five thousand for you through the office,' which later on I paid at the cashiers in the casino, and now he owed fifty thousand more * * *
'I said, I says, 'You better put up Security, you know, you might drop dead.'
'* * *
'* * *
'So he gave me, it is about six sections of land, for security * * *
'Q. Yes.
'A. So as he raised the money, I had to release some of the land because he was making contracts, selling back and forth, so I had to release some of those in order to deliver the deeds and so he could pay off this fifty.
'So now I said, 'What are you going to do with My five, because you paid the casino and you forgot my five which I O.K.'d.'
'He said, 'Well, I got a section, I'll give it to you, that will break us about even so you are satisfied.'
'I says, 'Well, I am and I ain't, but you better give it to me. In the event you are not able to raise the money, at least I got something.''
The record conclusively shows that Berkowitz's debt to the casino was fully paid and Di Costanzo, as trustee reconveyed to Richards Land Development Corporation five of the six sections included in his original trust deed. Two of said sections were reconveyed October 19, 1958, and three sections were reconveyed December 10, 1958.
The record further shows that Berkowitz died before he paid his personal debt of $5,000 he owed to Di Costanzo. The date of Berkowitz's death is not established. Di Costanzo further testified that Berkowitz had died and could not repay his $5,000 debt so conveyance of the section of land in controversy was then made by himself, as trustee, to himself individually on July 9, 1965 to take care of the debt Berkowitz owed him.
Di Costanzo's deposition in connection with the 1965 conveyance to himself contains the following questions and his response:
'Q. Do you know what the reason was for signing a deed to yourself?
'A. Well, I was trustee. Now when he agreed to give me the section for the $5,000 I had paid the Casino for, so naturally now I got to give myself a deed. So, as trustee it is questionable, but when it is conveyed to me now, it is mine.
'Q. I see. Anyway, he was dead and you didn't have any chance of getting the $5,000 out of him, so you just deeded it to yourself, is that what you mean?
'A. He was dead, there was no doubt he couldn't pay me.
'Q. Is that the reason you transferred it to yourself?
The record also discloses that the appellee and the appellee's immediate predecessor in title, Nicholas Di Costanzo, Trustee, paid all the taxes due on the land in controversy from the time the trust deed was acquired to the time of the filing of this action below. There is however, no claim of possession by either of the parties to this appeal.
Appellant contends that 1) the original conveyance from Richards Land Development Corporation of Di Costanzo, as trustee, constitutes a mortgage under 697.01 F.S.A. and 2) was invalid as such since said conveyance was given as security for Berkowitz's personal debt. On the basis of the record the latter contention is without merit, so we shall deal only with appellant's first contention.
F.S. Section 697.01 F.S.A. provides:
Regarding the construction and application of the above-quoted statute, it is stated in 22 Fla.Jur., Mortgages, section 94, pp. 215--17:
Appropriately, it is also stated in part of section 95, p. 217, Fla.Jur., supra:
The fact that appellee paid the taxes from the acquisition date of the trust deed to the time of filing of this action is consonant with his view that a conveyance rather than a mortgage was intended. Chinn v. Llangollen Stable (C.C.A.6th) 109 F.2d 66 (1940); Lindsley v. Hamlet, 235 Ala. 335, 179 So. 234 (1938).
Considering the entire transaction in light of the record and all the applicable principles, we are constrained to hold that the trust deed from Richards Land Development Corporation to Di Costanzo was, in fact, a mortgage. Neither party to this appeal has contended that a valid trust was intended.
Moreover, we conclude that a mortgage was intended notwithstanding 689.07 F.S.A. appears to provide to the contrary. In Arundel Debenture Corporation v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765, 767 (1939), the Florida Supreme Court said:
'While it is true that by virtue of section 5666, Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927 (subsequently renumbered 689.07 F.S.) * * *, the conveyances under which Schultz acquired the property involved, vested in him a fee simple title, with full power and authority to sell, convey and grant both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate, Willys-Overland, Inc. v. Blake et al., 97 Fla. 626, 121 So. 884; it is...
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...v. Peterson, 262 F. 904, 907 [9th Cir.1920]; York v. James, supra note 12; Smith v. Lindsey, supra note 13; Nissim-Hadjes, Inc. v. Di Costanzo, 197 So.2d 602, 609 [Fla.App.1967]; Shuck v. Shuck, 77 N.D. 628, 44 N.W.2d 767, 771 [1950]; Stewart v. Cary, supra note 16 at 34.19 Barnett v. Mimic......
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...incumbent upon the counter-claimants to establish that they "acquired title from the common source." (e. o.) Nissim Hadjes, Inc. v. DiCostanzo, 197 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). See also, Bass v. Ramos, 58 Fla. 161, 50 So. 945 (1909); Florida Finance Co. v. Sheffield, 56 Fla. 285, 48 S......