Nivens v. Gilchrist

• Decision Date: 11 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1176.,02-1176.
• Parties: Kenneth Scott NIVENS, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.; Glen Lance Maners, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.; Terri Lynn Stork, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Peter S. GILCHRIST, III, In his official capacity as District Attorney for the 26th Prosecutorial District for the State of North Carolina, and as representative of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 151

319 F.3d 151

Kenneth Scott NIVENS, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.; Glen Lance Maners, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.; Terri Lynn Stork, Individually and as representatives of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Peter S. GILCHRIST, III, In his official capacity as District Attorney for the 26th Prosecutorial District for the State of North Carolina, and as representative of a class pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-1176.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued September 24, 2002.

Decided February 11, 2003.

As Amended March 11, 2003.

ARGUED: Aaron Edmund Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. Norma Smithwick Harrell, Special Deputy Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ and Judge KING joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Kenneth Scott Nivens, Glen Lance Maners, and Terri Lynn Stork brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2002) and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202 (West 1994), to enjoin the pending state criminal drug prosecutions against them, alleging that their payment of North Carolina's drug tax was a criminal, not civil, penalty, and thus any criminal punishment imposed in their pending criminal trial will violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court abstained from exercising jurisdiction and intervening in the state proceedings based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), which reaffirmed the principle that a federal court "should not act to restrain a [state] criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746. The district court concluded that Appellants had not exhausted their state remedies and that they would not suffer irreparable damage if the state action was not enjoined because Appellants had yet to be subjected to a criminal prosecution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's decision to abstain.

I.

The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. On July 8, 2000, Appellants were arrested for various violations of the North Carolina Unauthorized Substances Act relating to the sale of 1024 ecstasy pills. Shortly thereafter, North Carolina assessed taxes for possession of the drugs, including penalties and interest, totaling $8,677.13,¹ pursuant to North Carolina's Unauthorized Substances Tax Act, N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 105-113.105 et seq. (2000).² Within a month or so, Appellants paid the taxes in full and without contest. Subsequently, North Carolina indicted Appellants for possession, sale, delivery, and transportation of, and conspiracy to sell and deliver, an unauthorized substance and scheduled a criminal trial for the November 5, 2001 term of the Superior Court of North Carolina.³ On October 29, 2001, Appellants filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in the district court to stay their trial. North Carolina voluntarily stayed Appellants' prosecution until January 2002 to allow Appellants adequate time to raise their contentions before the district court, and we issued a stay of the district court's order pending the outcome of this appeal. Because we now affirm the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, we lift our stay.

II.

A.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly abstained from exercising jurisdiction under Younger, thus declining to reach Appellants' Fifth Amendment claims under the Double Jeopardy Clause.⁴ We review the district court's decision to abstain under Younger for abuse of discretion. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Rel., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir.1994); see also Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion).

Based upon principles of federalism, the Supreme Court in Younger articulated the policy of comity underlying the federal courts' obligation to refrain from adjudicating the merits of federal constitutional claims in an underlying state criminal action: adjudicating such claims needlessly injects federal courts into ongoing state criminal prosecutions, undermines the state's ability to enforce its laws, and does not show "a proper respect for state functions." Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746. The Court also recognized that federal courts acting as courts of equity in this context "should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Id. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746. Later, in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Court held that a federal court should abstain from interfering in a state proceeding, even though it has jurisdiction to reach the merits, if there is (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit. Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515; Martin Marietta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1396 (stating the same considerations).

All three of the circumstances identified in the Middlesex inquiry are present here. First, Appellants instituted this lawsuit in an effort to stop, and eventually dismiss, North Carolina's pending criminal proceedings against them. Second, North Carolina has a very important, substantial, and vital interest in preventing violations of its criminal laws. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746; see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (noting that "the State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice system" is an "important state interest[]"). Third, as is discussed below, infra at 158-162, Appellants have an adequate opportunity in the state prosecution to raise the double jeopardy claim advanced in the federal lawsuit, although they assert that it would be futile. The district court, accordingly, did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from hearing Appellants' case, unless the case falls under an exception to the general principle requiring abstention.

B.

The Supreme Court has recognized that in "extraordinary circumstances," federal courts have discretion to disregard the "strong federal policy against federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings." Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515. In Younger, the Supreme Court explained the exception to this "strong federal policy":

"[W]hen absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights, courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done, except under extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officers; primarily, they are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the state, and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should first set up and rely on his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection."

Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746 (emphasis added) (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926)); see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-24, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975) (holding that federal equitable intervention in a state trial may be warranted upon a showing of "bad faith or harassment by state officials," "where the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions," or where "other extraordinary circumstances" exist that present the necessary threat of irreparable injury). Thus, a federal court must abstain from interfering with an ongoing state proceeding where a litigant has "an `opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved' and... no bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances dictate to the contrary." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973)).

Appellants do not claim that their prosecution was undertaken with the intent to harass or because of any bad faith. Nor do they claim that they have exhausted their avenues for relief in the state court proceeding. See Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-10 & n. 21, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (requiring, for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over federal issues under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 in a pending state action, exhaustion of state appellate remedies "unless [the claimant] can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger"). Accordingly, for a federal court to disregard the mandates of Younger, Appellants must show extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that they do not have an adequate remedy at law and the danger of irreparable injury if they are denied equitable relief is both great and...