Nix v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc. (Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc.)

• Decision Date: 04 January 2019
• Docket Number: 1170623
• Citation: 290 So.3d 402
• Parties: EX PARTE MERCEDES-BENZ U.S. INTERNATIONAL, INC. (In re: Gregory Nix v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

290 So.3d 402

EX PARTE MERCEDES-BENZ U.S. INTERNATIONAL, INC.(In re: Gregory Nix

v.Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.)

1170623

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 4, 2019

Special Writing Issued on Denial of Rehearing May 10, 2019

Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. ("MBUSI"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order denying MBUSI's motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

I. Facts and Procedural History

MBUSI is an automobile-manufacturing company that manufactures certain Mercedes-Benz vehicles at its facility in Tuscaloosa County. MBUSI's headquarters and its principal place of business are also in Tuscaloosa County. Although MBUSI does not maintain any corporate offices in Jefferson County, MBUSI purchases parts used in manufacturing automobiles from multiple suppliers located in Jefferson County, one of which is Kamtek, Inc.

Gregory Nix is a resident of Jefferson County; he was employed as an assembly worker at MBUSI's manufacturing facility in Tuscaloosa County until June 23, 2017. Nix alleges that, during his employment with MBUSI, he suffered on-the-job injuries the cumulative effect of which have left him permanently and totally disabled.

On August 22, 2017, Nix sued MBUSI in the trial court seeking worker's compensation benefits for the injuries he allegedly suffered during his employment with MBUSI. MBUSI filed a one-sentence answer, stating: "Venue is improper in Jefferson County, Alabama." That same day, MBUSI filed a motion to transfer the case to Tuscaloosa County asserting that venue in Jefferson County was improper or, in the alternative, that the doctrine of forum non conveniens required the transfer of the case to Tuscaloosa County.

In his response to MBUSI's motion for a change of venue, Nix asserted that venue was proper in Jefferson County under § 6-3-7(a)(2) and (3), Ala. Code 1975, and additionally that a transfer of the case was not warranted under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Nix attached various exhibits to his response, including two news articles highlighting the expansion of Kamtek's facility. MBUSI filed a supplemental motion for a change of venue and attached in support an affidavit of its general counsel, Richard Clementz.

The trial court denied MBUSI's motion for a change of venue. MBUSI filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals, which that court denied. Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc., 261 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). The Court of Civil Appeals, relying on Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So.2d 79 (Ala. 2002), held that venue was proper in Jefferson County and that the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not require a transfer of the case to Tuscaloosa County. MBUSI then petitioned this Court seeking the same relief.

II. Standard of Review

" ‘The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition for the writ of mandamus. Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver, 492 So.2d 297, 302 (Ala. 1986). "Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). "When we consider a mandamus petition relating to a venue ruling, our scope of review is to determine if the trial court [exceeded] its discretion, i.e., whether it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. Our review is further limited to those facts that were before the trial court. Ex parte American Resources Ins. Co., 663 So.2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1995).’ "

Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So.3d 371, 373 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998) ).

III. Discussion

In its petition, MBUSI reasserts the two arguments it made to the trial court in its motion for a change of venue: (1) that venue in Jefferson County is improper; and (2) that, even if venue is proper in Jefferson County, the action should be transferred to Tuscaloosa County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Based on our resolution of the first argument, we pretermit discussion of the forum non conveniens argument.

Under § 25-5-81(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, a worker's compensation action may be filed in "the circuit court of the county which would have jurisdiction of a civil action in tort between the parties." Venue for a civil action against domestic and foreign corporations is governed by § 6-3-7(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides:

"(a) All civil actions against corporations may be brought in any of the following counties:

"(1) In the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of real property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

"(2) In the county of the corporation's principal office in this state; or

"(3) In the county in which the plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is an entity other than an individual, where the plaintiff had its principal office in this state, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such corporation does business by agent in the county of the plaintiff's residence; or "(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) do not apply, in any county in which the corporation was doing business by agent at the time of the accrual of the cause of action."

(Emphasis added.)

Nix argues that venue is proper in Jefferson County under § 6-3-7(a)(3) because he was a resident of Jefferson County at the time his cause of action against MBUSI accrued and because, he alleges, MBUSI "does business by agent" there. It is undisputed that Nix was a resident of Jefferson County at the time the cause of action accrued. The parties dispute whether MBUSI "does business by agent" in Jefferson County.

Relying on Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., Nix claims that MBUSI "does business by agent" in Jefferson County because it regularly transacts with suppliers of automotive parts, such as Kamtek, that are located in Jefferson County. Indeed, this Court's opinion in Scott Bridge does support that argument. The Court of Civil Appeals stated as much in its opinion denying the petition for a writ of mandamus MBUSI filed in that court. See Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc., 261 So.3d at 1216 ("[I]t appears that, under the holding in Scott Bridge, the only inquiry required is whether MBUSI regularly transacted with a supplier in Jefferson County to purchase parts that were used to fulfill a primary business function." (citing Ex parte Elliott, 80 So.3d 908, 914 (Ala. 2011) ) ).

MBUSI argues that its automotive-parts suppliers are not its "agents" and disputes that its transactions with those suppliers in Jefferson County, such as Kamtek, constitute "doing business by agent" in Jefferson County. MBUSI contends that Scott Bridge was incorrectly decided and should be overruled or not applied to the facts of this case.

The petitioner in Scott Bridge, the employer, sought a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its denial of the petitioner's motion for a change of venue. The underlying action had been filed by an employee in the Chambers Circuit Court against his employer, a company in the business of constructing bridges. Evidence indicated that the company's principal office was located in Lee County and that it had never constructed a bridge in Chambers County; however, at least one of the company's suppliers, from which it purchased more than $50,000 in parts and equipment each year, was located in Chambers County. Based on those facts, this Court concluded that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in finding that the company was "doing business by agent" in Chambers County for the purpose of determining if venue was proper there under § 6-3-7(a)(3). See Scott Bridge, 834 So.2d at 82 (noting that "Scott Bridge's primary business function of building bridges ... immediately and directly depends upon the transactions it has with its Chambers County suppliers").

That holding, however, was not unanimous. Two Justices dissented. Writing in dissent, then Justice Stuart stated that she "[did] not agree that purchasing materials in a county, regardless of the dollar amount of the materials purchased, constitutes ‘doing business by agent’ in that county for purposes of determining proper venue under § 6–3–7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975." Scott Bridge, 834 So.2d at 82-83 (Stuart, J., dissenting). Justice Stuart has since maintained that Scott Bridge was wrongly decided. See Ex parte Greenetrack, Inc., 25 So.3d 449, 455 (Ala. 2009) (Stuart, J., concurring specially). Moreover, other Justices have questioned the underlying premise of the holding in Scott Bridge. See Greenetrack, 25 So.3d at 456 n. 4 (Shaw, J., concurring specially) ("I question the conclusion reached in Scott Bridge that a corporation's mere purchase of materials necessary to fulfill a principal corporate function actually equates, for purposes of § 6–3–7(a)(3), to the performance of the principal corporate function for which the corporation was created."); and 25 So.3d at 458 (Murdock, J., dissenting)("I question whether the fact that Scott Bridge was the purchaser in those transactions meant that it was ‘do[ing] business by agent in [Chambers County]’ within the meaning of § 6–3–7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, intended by the legislature."). See also Ex parte Elliott, 80 So.3d at 914 (Murdock, J., dissenting); id. at 917 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

It is well established that "[a] corporation ‘does business’ in a county for purposes of § 6-3-7 if, with some regularity, it performs there some business functions...