Nixon v. Chapman
| Decision Date | 01 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 08-70.,CA 08-70. |
| Citation | 288 S.W.3d 266,103 Ark. App. 222 |
| Parties | Scott NIXON, Appellant, v. Rebekah J. CHAPMAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Appellant Scott Nixon appeals the November 16, 2007 judgment entered by the Washington County Circuit Court that dismissed his negligence lawsuit against appellee Rebekah Chapman. His sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting appellee's motion in limine in the lawsuit, specifically in finding that appellee did not enter a plea of guilty in open court to a charge of careless and prohibited driving. We affirm.
On the morning of May 15, 2004, appellant was traveling west on U.S. Highway 412, when appellee pulled out in front of appellant's vehicle while entering the highway. In order to avoid a collision, appellant took evasive action and quickly maneuvered his vehicle into the outside lane. As he attempted to pass appellee in that outside lane, appellee changed lanes, again driving her vehicle in front of appellant's. Appellant applied his brakes to avoid a collision, at which time he lost control of his vehicle, careened off of the highway into a ditch, overturned the vehicle into a field, and came to rest right-side-up but facing back toward the east. As a result of the accident, appellant suffered damages totaling $166,000.
At the time of the accident, appellee was cited for careless/prohibited driving. Her arraignment date for the traffic citation was scheduled for June 21, 2004. She contacted the prosecutor's office and negotiated a settlement agreement prior to that date, whereby she forfeited bond or paid a fine, and the matter was taken under advisement by the Springdale District Court on May 20, 2004.
As a result of the accident, appellant filed a negligence suit against appellee. Appellee filed a motion in limine related to the district-court traffic citation on November 7, 2007, and appellant filed a response on November 13, 2007. A trial on the merits was scheduled for November 13, 2007, and after a hearing was held on the motion in limine on that same morning, the circuit court refused to allow the introduction of evidence into the record related to appellee's traffic citation and resulting negotiated plea. Subsequently, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no negligence on the part of appellee, and no damages were awarded to appellant. A judgment was entered by the trial court on November 16, 2007, dismissing the complaint against appellee with prejudice. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 13, 2007, and he filed an amended notice of appeal on December 20, 2007.
Appellant challenges the circuit court's grant of appellee's motion in limine excluding any evidence regarding her receipt of a traffic citation that resulted from the accident that was the subject matter of the negligence lawsuit. In discussing our standard of review for evidentiary rulings, we have said that circuit courts have broad discretion and that a circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 373 Ark. 378, 284 S.W.3d 29 (2008).
Appellant points out that, although a violation of a statute or ordinance is not considered negligence in itself, it can be offered as evidence of negligence to be considered by a jury. See Bridgforth v. Vandiver, 225 Ark. 702, 284 S.W.2d 623 (1955); AMI 903. He cites Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-51-104 regarding careless driving, which states that it shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any vehicle in such a careless manner as to evidence a failure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise, or in such a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper control on the public thoroughfare or private property in the State of Arkansas. Appellant asserts that evidence of appellee's violation of the statute can be shown by the plea arrangement and court docket report. He maintains that this evidence demonstrates that she did plead guilty to the violation.
Appellant acknowledges the limitation on evidence of traffic violations that can be shown to a jury, citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-50-804, which specifically provides that no record of the forfeiture of a bond or of the conviction of any person for any violation of this subtitle shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action. He notes the historic interpretation that evidence of a traffic citation, a "mere charge," is inadmissible. See Bearden v. J.R. Grobmeyer Lumber Co., 331 Ark. 378, 961 S.W.2d 760 (1998). He distinguishes, however, the situation where an individual enters a plea of guilty in open court, which has been considered admissible evidence. See Dedman v. Porch, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685 (1987). Arkansas courts have held that such guilty pleas are admissible as declarations against interest. Patterson v. Odell, 322 Ark. 394, 909 S.W.2d 648 (1995).
Additionally, he cites Ice v. Bramlett, 311 Ark. 157, 842 S.W.2d 29 (1992), where the individual was issued a traffic citation and subsequently negotiated a plea arrangement. The supreme court examined the plea agreement and determined that it was not admissible because there was insufficient evidence showing that he actually received a traffic citation. Additionally, the supreme court held that the admission-of-guilt language in the plea agreement was ambiguous, and that there was neither evidence of an appearance before the municipal judge nor a signature by the individual on the agreement.
In the instant case, appellant contends there is much more evidence indicating that appellee made a plea in open court than was present in either Bramlett or Dedman. He asserts that the evidence proves that appellee was issued a careless driving citation after the accident occurred, and that she subsequently negotiated a plea arrangement under which she would be placed on probation for a certain period and pay a fine and court costs — likely in return for the traffic citation being expunged from her driving record. Appellant states that the plea arrangement, the Springdale District Court docket sheets, and the Springdale Police Department Citation Tracking Report clearly show that appellee received a traffic violation related to the accident and that she pled guilty in open court. Specifically, he points to a notation that states, "Plea: GL."1
Appellant also asserts that the docket report shows a signature by the presiding judge, and claims that the signature is a clear indication that the plea was made in open court by the city attorney, on behalf of appellee. He urges that, just because appellee did not want to inconvenience herself by traveling to Springdale from her home in Fort Smith to sign the traffic citation plea, she should not be able to prevail on her claim that the plea was not made in open court. Appellant argues that there is no requirement in any of the cases cited that the appellee have had an actual physical appearance in the courtroom. In this situation, appellee contacted the city prosecutor's office and negotiated that agreement, including that he would enter the plea on her behalf. The district court judge heard the plea and approved the negotiated plea agreement. Appellant contends that because the guilty plea was made in open court, the related evidence should have been presented to the jury for consideration of whether or not appellee was negligent in the accident.
Appellee counters appellant's argument by reiterating the well-established rule that only when a defendant enters a plea of guilty in open court is it proper to admit evidence relating to either a traffic-citation conviction or even the mere issuance of that citation in a subsequent civil case. She points out that appellant stipulated to the fact, and the trial judge specifically found, that she did not appear in open court.
Appellee references Dedman, supra, where the individual was issued a traffic citation for failure to yield the right-of way, and later paid the citation rather than appear in court. On appeal from the circuit court's refusal to allow the introduction of evidence regarding the payment of the citation, our supreme court cited Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-50-804, stating that they were "unable to find a case which holds that paying a traffic ticket entitles the opposing side to introduce evidence of such as an admission against interest." Dedman, 293 Ark. at 574, 739 S.W.2d at 687.
That holding is consistent with the facts of the current case. Appellee did not appear in court, and accordingly, did not enter a plea in open court. Instead, she contacted the prosecutor's office and negotiated a settlement agreement prior to the scheduled arraignment date. The settlement agreement was presented to the district court on May 20, 2004, and the district court accepted the settlement agreement, under which she forfeited bond or paid a fine, and took the matter under advisement.
With respect to appellant's reliance on Bramlett, supra, appellee reminds us that the circuit court disallowed the testimony of a probation officer in that case, which would have indicated a belief that a defendant who walks up to the cashier's window at the court and pays a ticket is committing an admission of guilt. The circuit court concluded that the proffered testimony differed from telling the jury that a defendant knowingly pled guilty in court, and our supreme court affirmed that ruling. In fact, the supreme court stated that there was "a lack of evidence indicating that [Bramlett] ever appeared before the municipal judge, or that he appeared in any hearing or formal activity in which the municipal court conducts business." Bramlett...
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