Nixon v. Kent County, Mich.

Decision Date19 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1:91-CV-792.,1:91-CV-792.
Citation790 F. Supp. 738
PartiesDebra NIXON; Johnny Griffin, Sr.; Bill Brown; Juan Jimenez; Sara Ramirez; and Marshall Chavez, on Behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KENT COUNTY, MICHIGAN; Kent County Apportionment Commission; and Maurice DeJonge, in his official capacity as Kent County Clerk, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

David E. Hulswit, Jr., Pinsky, Smith, Fayette & Hulswit, James R. Rinck, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiffs.

Mark S. Allard, Scott T. Rickman, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendants.

Michael A. McInerney, Gary J. McInerney, Kevin K. Chapman, Gary J. McInerney, PC, Grand Rapids, Mich., for Kent County Democratic Party amicus curiae.

OPINION

ENSLEN, District Judge.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65(a), plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the apportionment plan enacted by defendants for the election districts of the Kent County Board of Commissioners and requiring defendants to implement an apportionment plan including two districts in which minorities comprise effective voting majorities. Plaintiffs—African-Americans and individuals of Hispanic national origin —brought this Voting Rights Act case claiming that defendant Kent County Apportionment Commission (Apportionment Commission) "unlawfully diluted" minority voting strength when it approved its reapportionment plan for County Commission districts following the 1990 census.1

I. Facts

Kent County, Michigan is governed by a Board of Commissioners, and each commissioner is elected from a single member district. Michigan law requires that counties be apportioned into districts following publication of the latest United States official decennial census figures. See Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. § 46.401, et seq. The apportionment must be performed by a county apportionment commission that consists of the County Clerk, the County Treasurer, the Prosecuting Attorney, and the chairs of the two major political parties in the county. See Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 46.403. Following publication of the 1990 census, the Kent County Apportionment Commission met and approved an apportionment plan which caused this lawsuit to be filed.

The 1990 census data for Kent County reveals that minorities constitute a total of 54,116 out of a total population of 500,631. Of the total, 438,294 or 87.5% are white; 39,432 or 7.9% are African-American; and 14,684 or 2.9% are Hispanics. African-Americans and Hispanics comprise 9.2% of the voting age population in Kent County.

Since its inception in 1968, the Board of Commissioners for Kent County has consisted of 21 members. Despite the fact that the 1990 census demonstrated that the population of Kent County had grown significantly —from approximately 444,000 to over 500,000 citizens—, the Apportionment Commission approved a plan that reduced the number of commissioners, and likewise the number of districts, to 19. Defendants submit evidence that under the 1990 census, retention of the 21 district plan would have been malapportioned with district number 6 containing more than 29,000 persons and district number 17 containing less than 21,000 persons. If the 21 district apportionment had been left essentially unchanged, two minority majority districts would not exist.

Under the county's newly adopted apportionment plan, in district 17, African-Americans (66.5%) and Hispanic-Americans (11.80%) make up a clear majority of the voters —78.3%. However, they do not come close to constituting a majority in any of the other newly apportioned districts. No other district contains more than 27% minority voters. Thus, if minority citizens vote as a bloc and white citizens vote as a separate bloc to usually defeat the candidate of the minority citizens' choice, minorities will have an opportunity of electing only one of the 19 county commissioners under the reapportionment plan adopted by the Apportionment Commission, even though minority citizens make up approximately 9.2% of the voting age population of Kent County.

Plaintiffs allege that by maintaining a 21 member commission, two districts can be drawn in which minorities, including African Americans and Hispanics, would comprise effective majorities of 68% and 65%, respectively. Even if the county retained the 21 member commission with 21 districts, there would not be sufficient concentrations of adult voting African Americans to create two districts containing a majority of African American voters. Nor would there be sufficient concentration of adult Hispanic voters to create even one district with a majority of Hispanic voters.

Plaintiffs contend that the Kent County Apportionment Plan unlawfully limits the ability of minority citizens to elect representatives of their choice, in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, codified at title 42, section 1973 of the United States Code. Plaintiffs charge defendants with packing district 17 with a larger percentage of minority voters than needed to elect a minority candidate and with splitting or fracturing the remaining minority voters among districts dominated by large white majorities. See Plaintiff's Ex. 3-A. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the recently adopted reapportionment plan so that their alternative plan can be enacted prior to the next election of county commissioners in 1992.2

II. Standard

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, this Court must consider four factors: 1) the likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable injury to plaintiff that could result if the Court does not grant the requested relief; 3) the possibility of substantial harm to others if the injunction is issued; and 4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing a preliminary injunction. Id.; Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1356 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 309 (1985). The Sixth Circuit cautions that these factors should not be viewed as prerequisites to relief, but rather as factors to be balanced. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985). The decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of the district court and is reviewed for abuse of that discretion. Forry, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc., 837 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988). The district court's findings of fact are upheld unless clearly erroneous. Id.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final determination of the lawsuit. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1834, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). It is an extraordinary remedy not to be invoked unless the movant clearly meets the burden of persuasion regarding the factors to be considered. Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216, reh'g denied en banc, 778 F.2d 793 (11th Cir.1985); State of Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975); Roghan v. Block, 590 F.Supp. 150, 152-53 (W.D.Mich.1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 540 (6th Cir.1986). The Sixth Circuit warns that courts should exercise great caution and careful deliberation in reviewing a motion for a preliminary injunction because "`there is no power ... more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction.'" Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir.1972) (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Ed.) § 1431), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 2149, 36 L.Ed.2d 687 (1973).

III. Discussion
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act3 prohibits a state political subdivision from imposing any practices or procedures that "result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote of any citizen who is a member of a protected class of racial and language minorities." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2762, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Section 2(b) provides that a violation of subsection (a) occurs if the "`totality of the circumstances' reveal that `the political processes leading to nomination or election ... are not equally open to participation by members of a protected class ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)). The legislative history explicitly indicates congressional intent that private parties have a right of action to enforce their rights under section 2. S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 204 (Senate Report). Plaintiffs must show that "the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." Id. at 205. Although Congress specifically provided that the extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office is one circumstance that may be considered, it warns that "`nothing in section 2 establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.'" Id. at 43, 106 S.Ct. at 2712.

According to the Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the question to ask in determining whether a violation has occurred is whether "as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice."4 Id. at 206. Proof of discriminatory intent is no longer required. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2364, 115 L.Ed.2d 348, 363 (1991).

1. Application to an aggregate group of multiple minorities

Plaintiff claims that if African-Americans and...

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