Nixon v. State

Decision Date29 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. 67583,67583
Parties15 Fla. L. Weekly S630 Joe Elton NIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

T. Whitney Strickland, Jr. of Oven, Gwynn & Strickland, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Patricia A. Conners, Gary L. Printy and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

EHRLICH, Justice.

Joe Elton Nixon appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death for the 1984 murder of a Tallahassee woman. He also appeals his convictions of kidnapping, robbery, and arson and the trial court's departure from the recommended guideline sentence for those convictions. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm the convictions and sentences.

On Monday, August 13, 1984, the charred body of Jeanne Bickner was found tied to a tree in a wooded area in Leon County. The next morning Ms. Bickner's car, the interior and trunk of which had been gutted by fire, was found in a Tallahassee drainage ditch. The same day, after receiving information from Joe Elton Nixon's girlfriend, Wanda Robinson, and brother, John Nixon, that he had admitted the killing, had been driving the victim's car prior to burning it, and had pawned two of her rings, Tallahassee police arrested Nixon. Nixon was charged with first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson.

At trial, there was testimony that after church on August 12, 1984, Ms. Bickner went to a local mall to have lunch with friends. She parked her orange M.G. convertible in the mall parking lot. Ms. Bickner After his arrest, in a taped confession which was played to the jury, Nixon admitted murdering Ms. Bickner. He described how he met Ms. Bickner at the mall and asked her to take him to his uncle's house because he was having car trouble. Once on the road, Nixon hit Bickner in the face. When she stopped the car, Nixon put her in the trunk and then drove to a secluded wooded area where he took her from the trunk and tied her to a tree with jumper cables. According to Nixon, the two talked about their lives. Ms. Bickner offered to give Nixon money, to sign her car over to him, begging him not to kill her. Nixon recounted how he burned Ms. Bickner's personal belongings and then threw the top of the convertible into the fire. At some point after placing a paper bag over her head, Nixon threw the smoldering convertible top on Ms. Bickner, setting her on fire. He then left the scene in the M.G. According to the medical examiner, Ms. Bickner was alive at the time she was set on fire and the fire was the cause of death. The jury convicted Nixon of the offenses charged. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, finding five aggravating factors 1 and no mitigating factors, the trial court imposed the death penalty.

was later seen in the parking lot giving a black man jumper cables from the trunk of her car. Witnesses testified that on the afternoon of August 12 they saw the orange M.G. driven by a black male, later identified as Nixon, near the vicinity of the site where the body was found. Ms. Bickner's body was discovered by a couple riding through the woods who reported the incident to the police. The charred body was in a seated position tied around the waist with jumper cables to a pine tree. Her left arm was tied to another pine tree. Wanda Robinson, John Nixon and other witnesses testified that they saw Nixon driving Ms. Bickner's orange M.G. Robinson and John Nixon also testified that Nixon admitted killing a white woman by tying her with jumper cables and burning her. Nixon also showed them two of Ms. Bickner's rings and later said he had pawned the rings. Robinson and John Nixon also testified that on the morning of the fourteenth, Nixon told them that he was going to burn the orange M.G. There was testimony that Nixon attempted to sell the M.G. prior to burning it. A pawn shop receipt signed by Nixon for two of Ms. Bickner's rings was entered into evidence. A laboratory analyst for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement testified that Nixon's palm print was found on the trunk lid of Ms. Bickner's M.G.

Nixon raises seven claims in connection with the guilt phase of the trial and eight claims in connection with the penalty phase. Of the fifteen claims raised only nine merit discussion. 2

GUILT PHASE

Nixon's first claim is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his In this case, there will be no question that Jeannie [sic] Bickner died a horrible, horrible death. Surely she did and that will be shown to you. In fact, that horrible tragedy will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt.

trial counsel, without record approval of Nixon, conceded Nixon's guilt and sought leniency. This claim is based on the following comments by counsel made during opening statement and closing argument. In opening statement, defense counsel stated:

In this case, there won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt. This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it should occur within the next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration after a lifetime of confinement.

During closing argument defense counsel made the following comments:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I wish I could stand before you and argue that what happened wasn't caused by Mr. Nixon, but we all know better. For several very obvious and apparent reasons, you have been and will continue to be involved in a very uniquely tragic case. In just a little while Judge Hall will give you some verdict forms that have been prepared. He'll give you some instructions on how to deliberate this case. After you've gotten those forms and you've elected your foreperson and you've done what you must do, you will sign those forms. I know you are not going to take this duty lightly, and I know what you will decide will be unanimous. I think that what you will decide is that the State of Florida, Mr. Hankinson and Mr. Guarisco, through them, has proved its case against Joe Elton Nixon. I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charged, first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson.

Nixon takes the position that counsel's statements were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, requiring a record inquiry as to whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to this strategy. Nixon argues that this concession of guilt resulted in a "complete breakdown in the adversarial process which resulted in a complete denial of his right to counsel" and therefore constitutes ineffective assistance per se under the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See, e.g., Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.) (petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel admitted petitioner's guilt, without first obtaining petitioner's consent to the strategy), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091, 102 S.Ct. 656, 70 L.Ed.2d 630 (1981); People v. Hattery, 109 Ill.2d 449, 94 Ill.Dec. 514, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985) (defense counsel is per se ineffective where counsel concedes defendant's guilt, unless the record shows that the defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to this strategy), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 3314, 92 L.Ed.2d 727 (1986); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985) (it is per se ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel admits defendant's guilt without the defendant's consent), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 106 S.Ct. 1992, 90 L.Ed.2d 672 (1986).

Over Nixon's objection, this Court remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Nixon was informed of the strategy to concede guilt and seek leniency. Order of October 27, 1987. After a second order of this Court, dated October 4, 1988, clarifying the procedure to be followed in connection with the evidentiary hearing, the defendant was allowed to present witnesses but the state was not. The state's cross-examination of Mr. Corin, Nixon's trial counsel, was limited to the scope of direct examination by the defense. Because the trial court did not interpret the order of October 4, 1988, as requiring him to make findings or conclusions, none were made. On further remand We recognize the confusion resulting from our remand for these atypical proceedings and decline to dispose of this claim on the present state of the record which we view as less than complete. 3 Accordingly, we do so without prejudice to raise the issue in a later motion to vacate pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

by order of February 1, 1989, the state was allowed to present witnesses. However, the state's examination of Mr. Corin was extremely limited due to his refusal to testify concerning matters not already addressed during his testimony for the defense absent Nixon's waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Nixon refused to waive the privilege and the state was unable to fully examine Mr. Corin.

As his second claim, Nixon contends that the prosecutor made an impermissible "Golden Rule" argument when he told the jury "we have an obligation to make you feel just a little bit ... of what Jeanne Bicker [sic] felt." In closing argument during the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated:

I noticed sometimes people wonder about and I guess have different ideas on what makes a prosecutor tick. You probably wonder: Well, do Mr. Guarisco and I enjoy the fact that we're presenting this horrid thing to you. I assure you we don't.

Yet, at the same time, we have an obligation to make you feel just a little bit, just a little bit, of what Jeanne Bicker [sic]...

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