NLRB v. Mrak Coal Company

• Decision Date: 09 September 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18575.,18575.
• Citation: 322 F.2d 311
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. MRAK COAL COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

322 F.2d 311 (1963)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. MRAK COAL COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.

No. 18575.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

September 9, 1963.

Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Robert A. Armstrong and Charles Henderson, Attys., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Burr, Boney & Pease and D. A. Burr, Anchorage, Alaska, for respondent.

Before BARNES, HAMLEY and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.

BARNES, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to enforce the Board's order based on a finding that respondent violated § 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act,¹ by discharging one Gary Smart for his action as financial secretary of a union in removing August 2, 1961 the names of three foremen from the check-off list, as "nonmembers" of the said union. One of the three was Smart's boss, Wayne Kanack. The union was the collective bargaining representative of the company's empoyees, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.

The general counsel for the Board produced testimony that Kanack resented the removal of his name as a member, because it made him (Kanack) ineligible for participation in the union's welfare and pension fund. This was a particularly acute aggravation at that particular time, because Kanack's wife was about to have a child.

Smart, who had been operating a bucket loader for several days, was, on August 3, 1961, assigned by Kanack to manually dig a ditch. After some conversation, Smart threw a shovelful of dirt in Kanack's direction which "came close," but missed Kanack. Kanack then fired Smart for "assault."

Was Smart fired because of his "assault" or because Kanack was angry with his loss of pension and welfare status, and wanted an excuse to fire Smart?

As is usual in these cases, the facts emphasized by the employer are entirely different than those emphasized on behalf of the union employee.²

Petitioning Board has reason for such emphasis. It need merely point to evidence supporting the conclusions and order. Bon Hennings Logging Company v. N. L. R. B., 9 Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 548. Respondent seeks to avoid the rule of that case by suggesting it applies only where the record discloses "the grossest type of hostile, anti-union conduct on the part of the employer which admittedly preceded the discharge of the employee." We enunciated no such rule in Bon Hennings Logging Company v. N. L. R. B., supra. Instead we pointed out "our role in reviewing decisions of the Board is a limited one. We are confined to determinations of whether decisions are supported by substantial evidence in records considered as a whole." Id. at 553.

Even were the employer's evidence uncontradicted as to his motive behind any certain action, the Board may, but need not, accept it; nor is it bound thereby. National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 82 S.Ct. 853, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962).

Nor can we accept the respondent's theory that proof or lack of proof of prior anti-union animus is controlling. Such a rule would automatically always insulate the first unfair labor practice charged against an employer. National Labor Relations Board v. Williams, 4 Cir. 1952, 195 F.2d 669, holds "the presence of an anti-union attitude and the absence of other valid reasons must necessarily lend strong weight to a finding of discrimination." This does not mean the presence or absence of such anti-union animus is controlling.

Respondent sets up another straw man in claiming it was prevented "from showing a complete lack of anti-union attitude and history on the part of respondent company," (Respondent's Brief, p. 13), citing the transcript, p. 115. That reference shows only that the hearing officer refused to permit respondent to prove that issue on cross-examination of petitioner's witnesses. That this is so is established by lines 16 and 17, where the trial examiner states: "However, if in your case you wish to establish that, all right." Then on the respondent's case, over objection by general counsel for petitioner, the respondent was permitted to introduce into evidence all that it desired to offer on this question of anti-unionism. (Tr. p. 149, 189.)

Assuming, as we will here, that such testimony is always admissible under the theory expressed in National Labor Relations Board v. Williams, supra, we still find nothing in the record to support any claim of rejected evidence.

There is but one question here. Was there substantial evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to fairly support the decision of the Board? Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456. We hold there was; therefore we agree with the Board's conclusion that Mrak Coal Company, Inc., was guilty of an unfair labor practice proscribed by the...