Noble v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston

Decision Date27 March 1941
Docket Number7 Div. 635.
Citation1 So.2d 289,241 Ala. 85
PartiesNOBLE ET AL. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF ANNISTON ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Willett & Willett and Rutherford Lapsley, all of Anniston, for appellants.

Knox, Liles, Jones & Blackmon, of Anniston, for appellees.

GARDNER Chief Justice.

In Noble v. First National Bank, 236 Ala. 499, 183 So 393, 396, the salient features of the will of Susie Parker Stringfellow are to be found and reference thereto as set out in the report on former appeal will suffice all purposes here.

It was there insisted that the estate of Susie Parker Stringfellow had suffered so great a shrinkage in value from the date of the execution and probate of the will in 1920 to the time of the falling in of the life estate of the husband, that no reasonable prospect remained for the establishment and maintenance of a hospital for the City of Anniston as contemplated by the will, and of consequence the project should be abandoned and the estate divided among the heirs.

Upon due consideration of the evidence this insistence was rejected with the observation that "we are in full accord with the trial judge in holding there is no good reason to abandon the hospital project, defeat the will of the testatrix, and divide the estate among the heirs".

As will be observed from the reading of the will the testatrix made careful and rather elaborate provisions for selection of suitable trustees. These trustees have been chosen and the Board of Trustees duly organized, consisting, as said on former appeal, "of leading men and women of Anniston, with admitted ability and experience, who stand ready to proceed with the needed adjustments, equipment, and operation of the Hospital".

The hospital has been established and for some time has been in full operation. The trustees have used no part of the corpus of the estate, but have operated this hospital on the income with a remaining surplus, and the accumulated income has shown a marked increase. True there have been secured contributions from the City of Anniston and the County of Calhoun, and the State through its Health Department likewise makes a contribution. But as observed on former appeal "there is no inhibition against obtaining other benefactions, or making further enlargements, when practical so long as the terms of the will are not violated".

That the hospital has been most successfully operated clearly appears from its financial status, especially in view of the rather extensive good accomplished, all of which reflects much credit upon the Board of Trustees who have evidently given much of their time and thought to this worthy project.

But, say the heirs, the hospital established is for tubercular patients only which is unauthorized by the will, as the testatrix intended the maintenance and operation of a general hospital and no other for the City of Anniston. The definition of a hospital established by the proof and uncontradicted was as follows: "An institution for the reception, care, and medical treatment of the sick or wounded; also the building used for that purpose".

Mrs. Stringfellow in her will made no requirement for a general hospital. She merely provided for a hospital "for the use of the public without gain or profit". The evidence in this case, without serious conflict, discloses that the hospital now in operation by the Board of Trustees is a public hospital and well within the provisions of this will. True the treatment is confined to tubercular patients who may be treated with reasonable expectancy of improvement. But the hospital is open to the public of the City of Anniston and the proof is that it is being operated well within the income and practically on a charity basis.

Those in charge have the latest equipment and are giving the most modern and effective treatment. There are at present only fifteen beds. But the treatment and cure of a single patient does not tell the whole story of public good received. For every such case there is removed a source of infection to twenty or thirty contacts.

Merely because the hospital facilities are limited presents no argument against the theory that it is a public hospital and devoted to a public use. By analogy the cases of State v. Housing Authority, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725; Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 A. 834; Brammer v. Housing Authority, 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256, are in point and the opinion of this court on former appeal is properly to be interpreted to like effect.

If it should be conceded for the purpose of this case that the testimony of Mrs. Houser as to a conversation with testatrix prior to the execution of the will comes within the influence of National Jewish Hospital v. Coleman, 191 Ala. 150, 67 So. 699, yet it would not suffice to sustain appellant's contention in this regard. This will was drawn with care and evidently by a skilled hand. Uppermost in the mind of testatrix was the use of her home place for a hospital for her native city, one that would fill a public need. If at that time she had an indefinite idea as to a general hospital she did not so express it in the will and we can find no foundation in all the proof justifying an intention on her part to so restrict the trustees, whose selection was provided for with such meticulous care.

The principle is well settled that charitable trusts are especially favored by courts of equity and all reasonable intendments, consistent with the terms and purpose of the gift, will be made in support of their validity. Sparks v. Woolverton, 210 Ala. 669, 99 So. 102.

"Public charities indefinite in terms are necessarily limited in their administration by the amount of the foundation (or...

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3 cases
  • Hollis v. Erwin
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 3, 1964
    ...A bare and empty building could hardly fit that definition. We like the language of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Noble v. First National Bank, 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289: 'The definition of a hospital established by the proof and uncontradicted, was as follows: 'An institution for the rece......
  • State By and Through Dept. of Revenue Gross Income Tax Division v. Bethel Sanitarium, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 19, 1975
    ...the reception and care of sick, wounded, infirm, or aged persons. Blacks Law Dictionary 871 (4th ed. 1951); Noble v. First National Bank of Anniston (1941), 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289. See also 41 C.J.S. Hospital § 1 The trial court found that Bethel met this definition, and the evidence was ......
  • Kew Gardens Sanitarium, Inc. v. Wyman
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • November 19, 1963
    ...generally incorporated, * * * also building used for such purpose. In re Curtiss (Sur.), 7 N.Y.S. 207; Noble v. First National Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289, 290.' The court finds that the ownership and operation of the Hospital is authorized by the corporate petitioner's certi......

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