Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n

• Decision Date: 28 June 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 12–41–cv.
• Citation: 687 F.3d 63,45 NDLR P 138,26 A.D. Cases 1060
• Parties: Christopher NOEL; Simi Linton; United Spinal, a nonprofit organization; Taxis for All Campaign, a nonprofit organization; 504 Democratic Club, a nonprofit organization; Disabled in Action, a nonprofit organization, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, a charter mandated agency; David Yassky, in his official capacity, as Commissioner of the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

687 F.3d 63

26 A.D. Cases 1060

45 NDLR P 138

Christopher NOEL; Simi Linton; United Spinal, a nonprofit organization; Taxis for All Campaign, a nonprofit organization; 504 Democratic Club, a nonprofit organization; Disabled in Action, a nonprofit organization, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, a charter mandated agency; David Yassky, in his official capacity, as Commissioner of the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, Defendants–Appellants.

Docket No. 12–41–cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: April 19, 2012.

Decided: June 28, 2012.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York (Leonard Koerner, Robin Binder, Michelle Goldberg–Cahn, Ronald E. Sternberg, on the brief), for Defendants–Appellants.

Sid Wolinsky (Julia Pinover, Mary–Lee Smith, Kara J. Janssen, on the brief), Disability Rights Advocates (Allegra L. Fishel, Outten and Golden, LLP, on the brief), for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Richard D. Emery (Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP), for Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association as amicus curiae in support of Defendants–Appellants.

Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, KEARSE and HALL, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge:

Two people who use wheelchairs and the organizations that represent persons with disabilities bring this class action against the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (“TLC”) and the TLC Commissioner David Yassky for violation of Parts A and B of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.) granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment as to liability on the claim that defendants are violating Part A of Title II of the ADA (“Title II(A)”) by failing to provide meaningful access to taxi services for persons with disabilities. The district court also entered a temporary injunction that requires that all new taxi medallions and street-hail livery licenses be limited to vehicles that are wheelchair accessible (“accessible taxis”), until the TLC proposes and the district court approves a comprehensive plan to provide meaningful access to taxi service for wheelchair-bound passengers.

Defendants appeal the injunction and the grant of partial summary judgment upon which the injunction is premised. Appellate jurisdiction exists to review the injunction and the underlying merits that relate to it. We conclude that, though the TLC exercises pervasive control over the taxi industry in New York City, defendants were not required by Title II(A) to deploy their licensing and regulatory authority to mandate that persons who need wheelchairs be afforded meaningful access to taxis. The district court therefore erred in entering the temporary injunction.

Accordingly, we vacate the temporary injunction and remand for the district court to enter summary judgment for defendants on the Title II(A) claim and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¹

BACKGROUND

The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs are [1] persons with disabilities who seek fuller access to New York City taxis and [2] organizations who represent them. They contend that the taxi services in New York City fail to give meaningful access to persons with disabilities and that the TLC thus discriminates in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

There are two types of licensed taxis in New York City: the traditional yellow cabs and the livery cabs. The yellow cabs are “medallion taxis” because the license is accompanied by a metal “medallion” that is affixed to the outside of the taxi. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 19–502(h). A yellow taxi is a 5–passenger vehicle for hire licensed “to accept hails from passengers in the street.” Id. § 19–502( l ). A livery cab is a 5–passenger vehicle for hire that is dispatched from a livery base station on a pre-arranged basis. See 35 N.Y.C. Rules & Regs. §§ 59A–03(j), (k); see generally N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 19–502(g) (defining “for-hire vehicle”). Livery cabs have not been authorized to accept street hails.²

Under the City Charter, all taxis are licensed and regulated by the TLC, an administrative agency of the City of New York under the Deputy Mayor for Operations. See 65 N.Y.C. Charter § 2300. As a condition of licensure, taxi owners and drivers must comply with the TLC's applicable laws and regulations. Id. §§ 2300, 2303; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 19–504. Under the City Charter, the TLC “adopt[s] and establish[es] an overall public transportation policy governing taxi, coach, limousine, wheelchair accessible van services and commuter van services as it relates to the overall public transportation network of the city.” N.Y.C. Charter § 2300. This includes “set[ting] standards and criteria for the licensing of vehicles, drivers and chauffeurs”; establishing “standards of service, ... insurance and minimum coverage, ... driver safety, ... equipment safety and design, ... noise and air pollution control”; and adjudicating “charges of violations of the provisions of the administrative code and rules promulgated thereunder.” Id. §§ 2300, 2303.

The number of medallions is limited by law to 13,237. At least 231 are designated for wheelchair-accessible vehicles, though any medallion owner may operate such a taxi regardless of whether the medallion has that designation. Currently, 233 taxis are so accessible; 98.2% of medallion taxis are therefore inaccessible to persons in wheelchairs.³ Not surprisingly, the wait time for accessible taxis is prolonged. The record shows that the chances of hailing any taxi in Manhattan within ten minutes is 87.33%, whereas the chances of hailing an accessible taxi within ten minutes is 3.31%.

After some discovery, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment only on the ADA claims and only as to liability. Defendants cross-moved on all claims. Each side's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and in part denied.

As to Part B of Title II of the ADA (“Title II(B)”), which governs public transportation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The district court reasoned that although the TLC has “extensive regulatory powers,” the agency itself has “no authority to provide [public transportation] services, and does not function as a transportation services provider, to the public.” Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 837 F.Supp.2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y.2011). Because the TLC does not “operate” a public transportation service, the district court held that the TLC is not obligated under Title II(B) to ensure meaningful access to taxis for persons with disabilities. Id. at 274–75.

However, as to Title II(A), which governs public services generally, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The district court reasoned that the TLC “is a public entity carrying out a public regulatory function that affects and confers a benefit on New York City taxicab riders,” and therefore may not discriminate in any of its functions—including its regulatory activities—and must ensure persons with disabilities have meaningful access to taxis in New York City. Id. at 277–78. The district court determined that plaintiffs enjoyed no meaningful access to taxis, id., and were therefore entitled to summary judgment, id. at 277–78.

The district court then entered a temporary injunction that had immediate impact in view of recent changes in New York State law, which had authorized the issuance of additional medallions and authorized, for the first time, livery cabs to pick up street hails in under-served areas of the City. See supra note 1. The injunction is as follows:

[t]he TLC must propose a comprehensive plan to provide meaningful access to taxicab service for disabled wheelchair bound passengers. Such a plan must include targeted goals and standards, as well as anticipated measurable results. Until such a plan is proposed and approved by th[e District] Court, all new taxi medallions sold or new street-hail livery licenses or permits issued by the TLC must be for wheelchair accessible vehicles.

Noel, 837 F.Supp.2d at 278.

On appeal, defendants challenge the temporary injunction and the grant of summary judgment, to the extent it bears on the injunction. While the appeal was pending, we granted defendants' motion to stay enforcement of the injunction. We now consider the merits of defendants' appeal and vacate the temporary injunction.⁴

JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the district court entered an order “granting” an “injunction[ ].” See28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). By the same token, we have jurisdiction to “consider the underlying merits of the case, to the extent they relate to the propriety of granting injunctive relief.” United States v. Allen, 155 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir.1998) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that this Court had jurisdiction to consider not only the injunction but also the merits of the district court's determination that the appellee was entitled to summary judgment). Accordingly, we review the entry of the temporary injunction as well as the grant of partial summary judgment on which it is based.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.2005). “A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on an error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Abrahams v. MTA Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d 110, 115 (2d Cir.2011).

We review the grant of summary judgment, which was the basis for the temporary injunction, de novo. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003).

I

One goal of the ADA is to “ ‘provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’ ”...