Noggle v. State

Decision Date08 October 1986
Docket NumberNo. 43659,43659
PartiesNOGGLE v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Jim Hudson, Hudson & Montgomery, P.C., Athens, Kenneth Kalivoda, for Richard David Noggle.

Lindsay A. Tise, Jr., Dist. Atty., Hartwell, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Eddie Snelling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BELL, Justice.

The appellant, Richard David Noggle, was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend, Annie Mae Arnold, and received a life sentence. He appeals, and we affirm. 1

At the time of the incident Noggle and Annie Mae Arnold had been living together for three years and had one two-month-old baby boy. On the morning of January 6, 1985, at 12:50 a.m., William Gabriel, Deputy Sheriff of Oglethorpe County, responded to a call placed by Richard Noggle to come to his and Annie Mae's trailer residence. On arrival he found Annie Mae, dressed in her nightgown and bathrobe, lying on top of a coffee table in the living room of the trailer with a bullet wound to her head. Noggle was cradling Annie Mae's head and crying repeatedly, "I didn't mean to shoot her. Help her, please." Annie Mae was pronounced dead minutes later by an emergency medical team.

Gabriel located a rifle, later determined to be the murder weapon, lying on the couch. Noggle's and Annie Mae's baby was found in a playpen next to the victim. He was strapped into a car seat carrier and wrapped in two or three blankets. Next to the child was an open diaper bag, packed with diapers and a cold bottle of milk. Blood was found on the carpet leading from the living room down the hall to Noggle's and Annie Mae's bedroom, as well as on the bedroom door and door handle and on a pair of men's underwear laying on top of the bed.

Two neighbors testified that they had heard a car pull up to Noggle's and Annie Mae's trailer that evening, and that about five minutes later they heard a shot fired. One of them testified that the car sounded like Noggle's.

Three of Annie Mae's brothers testified. Harold Arnold testified that on the evening of January 5, Noggle had stopped by the lounge where he worked, and told him, "Well, I found out some more stuff on that mess that got started, and when I get home there's going to be some hell raised." Harold explained he did not know what Noggle was referring to.

Eddie and Joe Arnold testified that they had been in the home of Noggle and Annie Mae two or three weeks before the shooting. Noggle and Annie Mae were arguing over Noggle losing $200.00 in a poker game. Both Eddie and Joe saw Noggle threaten to hit Annie Mae. In addition, Joe testified that he heard Noggle say that if she ever tried to leave with the baby he would kill her, and Eddie said that he heard Noggle say he was going to a bar and that Annie Mae "better not take the baby ... or else."

Evidence was introduced to the effect that Noggle had lost custody of his two other children from previous marriages. Noggle testified that due to two broken marriages and loss of custody, he mistrusted marriage in general, which was the reason he and Annie Mae never married. He also admitted that his mistrust was directed towards Annie Mae and he feared losing his third child.

Noggle testified in his defense, claiming that the shooting was accidental. He said that on the evening of January 5, between six and eleven-thirty p.m. he had driven around Athens, Georgia, drinking from a bottle in his car and stopping at two bars for drinks. Noggle admitted to speaking with Harold Arnold but denied making any threats concerning Annie Mae. He stated that when he came home Annie Mae was in the bed and the baby was in the bassinet. He got undressed and went to bed. At about that time, he said, Annie Mae got up, picked up the baby from the bassinet, and was at the door leading to the hallway when they heard a noise that sounded like a prowler outside. He said that Annie Mae walked down the hall toward the living room. At that time he got up, picked up his rifle, pulled the hammer back, and also walked to the living room. He said that as Annie Mae put the baby in the playpen and stood up, he tried to release the hammer. He said that he did not realize the rifle was aimed at Annie Mae, and that the hammer slipped and the rifle accidentally fired, shooting her in the head. Noggle said he immediately called the police and his brother who lived nearby. Noggle maintained that he did not leave Annie Mae's side until the police arrived. However, he could not account for the blood found elsewhere in the trailer. Noggle admitted to having domestic arguments but denied he had ever threatened to harm or kill Annie Mae.

1. Noggle challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in his first enumeration of error. However, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his second enumeration of error Noggle contends that it was harmful error for the trial court to instruct the jury that "should you believe from the evidence as a whole that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to convict him." We find no error in this charge, because although, as argued by Noggle, "the jury does possess a de facto power of nullification, i.e., a power to acquit the defendant regardless of the strength of the evidence against him ... it nonetheless is true that if the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt it is the jury's duty to convict. Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351 (13, b) (314 SE2d 621) (1984)." Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 642 (30, d), 340 S.E.2d 891 (1986).

3. In his third enumeration of error Noggle contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as follows: "I charge you that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion may be inferred to be the product of that person's will, and it may be inferred that a person of sound mind and discretion intends the natural and probable consequences of...

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57 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 28, 2020
    ...effect at the time of his trial was preceded by the warning: "Caution: If the defendant offers no evidence see Noggle v. State , 256 Ga. 383, 385-86 (4), 349 S.E.2d 175 (1986). "But in Mallory v. State , 271 Ga. 150, 517 S.E.2d 780 (1999), this Court squarely held that a jury charge "that i......
  • Reed v. The State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 7, 2022
    ...given by the trial court because that charge had previously been disapproved by this Court 25 years earlier. See Noggle v. State , 256 Ga. 383, 385-86 (4), 349 S.E.2d 175 (1986) (stating that the presumption of truthfulness charge given in that case could be misleading and was of little pos......
  • Whatley v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1998
    ...the truth. Although this Court has recommended that such a presumption-of-truthfulness charge not be used (Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 385-386(4), 349 S.E.2d 175 (1986)), we have also held that the use of such a charge is not unconstitutional and does not constitute reversible error. Nogg......
  • Ward v. State, S92P0087
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 11, 1992
    ... ... Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 385-86(4), 349 S.E.2d 175 (1986) ...         26. Although the pattern charge on extrinsic transactions is not immune to criticism, 7 we do not find that its delivery in this case amounts to reversible error ...         27. The court's instructions on ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions - Charles M. Cork, Iii
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...duty to reconcile a conflict in the evidence without automatically assuming that any witness had committed perjury"); Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 385-86, 349 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986) (following federal courts in stating that the presumption-of-truthfulness charge should not be given because......

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