Nolan v. Clarksville Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 23 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 10A04–1510–CT–1824.,10A04–1510–CT–1824. |
| Citation | 60 N.E.3d 1128 |
| Parties | Kyleigh NOLAN, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. CLARKSVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT and Town of Clarksville, Indiana, Appellees–Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Matthew J. Schad, George A. Budd, V Schad & Schad, P.C., New Albany, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
R. Jeffrey Lowe, Crystal G. Rowe, New Albany, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
[1] Nineteen-year-old Kyleigh Nolan volunteered to play the role of a hostage in a training exercise being conducted by the Clarksville Police Department. She was injured and later sued the police department and the Town of Clarksville. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants after finding that Nolan had failed to provide sufficient pre-suit notice of her claim pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). While we agree that Nolan failed to comply with the statutory-notice requirement, we also conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants, by virtue of their own conduct following the incident, are estopped from asserting Nolan's noncompliance as a defense. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On remand, Nolan is entitled to present her estoppel claim to the jury at trial.
[2] In accordance with the standard of review in summary-judgment matters, we begin by reciting the evidence most favorable to the non-moving party, Nolan. In June 2012, Nolan was employed at a store in the Green Tree Mall in Clarksville. The Clarksville Police Department was conducting a training exercise at the mall, and Nolan agreed to act as a hostage. As the hostage scenario was being played out, Nolan was involved in a collision with officers, and her nose was broken. The police department called for an ambulance, but Nolan, who was nineteen at the time, declined assistance and called her mother instead. Nolan's mother went to the mall, and Chief Mark Palmer, who was present for the training exercise, told Nolan and her mother that the police department would cover Nolan's medical expenses relating to the accident. Chief Palmer also told them that bills should be sent to the Town of Clarksville and that “if they sent them to the Police Department the office manager would forward them to the Town's insurance representative.” Appellant's App. p. 162.
[3] Over the next few months, Nolan continued to contact Chief Palmer, and her mother did the same. Nolan attempted to reach him via e-mail and telephone in mid-to-late July and then went to the police station in August and tried, but was unable, to meet with him to provide medical bills. Nolan's mother emailed with Chief Palmer and met with him in person, at which time he told her that “the Clarksville Police would be taking care of the bills and not to worry about it.” Id. at 127. Nolan's mother later brought some bills to the police department and gave them to a receptionist, who said that she would give them to Chief Palmer. However, neither the police department nor the Town of Clarksville has ever paid any of Nolan's medical bills.
[4] In early 2014, Nolan filed a lawsuit against the police department and the town (collectively, “the Town”). The Town filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Nolan had not provided pre-suit notice of her claim within 180 days of the incident, as required by the ITCA, and that her claim is therefore barred. See Ind.Code § 34–13–3–8 ().
[5] In response, Nolan conceded that she had not filed a “formal” notice of claim but argued that her contacts with the Town amounted to substantial compliance with the statutory requirement. Alternatively, she argued that, even if she had not substantially complied with the ITCA, the Town led her to believe that formal notice would not be necessary and should therefore be estopped from asserting non-compliance as a defense.
[6] After hearing oral argument from counsel, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, concluding that Nolan “did not provide sufficient notice to Defendants until well after th[e] statutory period had expired.” Appellant's App. p. 16. The court did not specifically address Nolan's estoppel claim in its order.
[7] Nolan now appeals.
[8] Nolan contends that the trial court erred by concluding that she failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of the ITCA and by granting summary judgment in favor of the Town on that basis. It is well established that in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we address the issues de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009) ; Ind. Dep't of Corr. v. Swanson Servs. Corp., 820 N.E.2d 733, 736–37 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Nonetheless, both parties agree that we are to review a summary judgment based on non-compliance with the ITCA using the deferential “negative judgment” standard, under which we reverse “only if the evidence in the record, along with all reasonable inferences, is without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court.” Infinity Products, Inc. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind.2004) (), reh'g denied. In support of this proposition, the Town cites Hupp v. Hill, 576 N.E.2d 1320 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), and Nolan cites Fowler v. Brewer, 773 N.E.2d 858 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied, where we relied on Hupp.
[9] It is true that, in Hupp, a panel of this Court stated that judgments based on non-compliance with the ITCA “are subject to review as negative judgments[.]” 576 N.E.2d at 1324. For that proposition, the panel cited this Court's earlier decision in Dunn v. City of Indianapolis, 451 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), reh'g denied. Id. We read Dunn more narrowly. In Dunn, the city raised the ITCA defense by way of a motion for summary judgment. 451 N.E.2d at 1123–24. At the plaintiff's request, the trial court set a hearing on the motion. Id. Before the hearing, however, the trial court ordered the parties to “stipulate all facts necessary for hearing on [the] Tort Claims notice and [to] be ready to present any other facts at the hearing” and to “prepare [the] factual issue.” Id. at 1124. At the hearing, witnesses were sworn and testified. Id. Thereafter, the trial court issued findings of fact and concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply with ITCA notice requirements. Id. On appeal, we explained, Id. at 1124–25. We then went on to review and affirm the trial court's ruling under the negative-judgment standard. Id. at 1125–26. In short, we applied the negative-judgment standard because the trial court, after putting the parties on notice, held an evidentiary hearing, weighed the evidence, and made findings of fact. See also Lett v. State, 519 N.E.2d 749, 750 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (), reh'g denied.
[10] Dunn, then, does not stand for the proposition that all judgments based on noncompliance with the ITCA “are subject to review as negative judgments[.]” Hupp, 576 N.E.2d at 1324.1 The negative-judgment standard only applies when the trial court has weighed the evidence and made factual determinations. See Dunn, 451 N.E.2d at 1123–26. When, on the other hand, the trial court grants summary judgment based strictly on the parties' briefs, designated summary-judgment evidence, and oral arguments, we apply the traditional, de novo summary-judgment standard of review. See, e.g., Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 19 N.E.3d 254, 259 (Ind.2014) ; Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind.2013).
[11] Here, the parties filed their summary-judgment papers, their attorneys made oral arguments at a typical summary-judgment hearing, and there is no indication that the trial court weighed the evidence or resolved disputed issues of fact. Therefore, we will review the trial court's decision de novo. See Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 761 ; Swanson Servs. Corp., 820 N.E.2d at 736–37. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “In reviewing the record, we construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Gruber v. YMCA of Greater Indianapolis, 34 N.E.3d 264, 266 (Ind.Ct.App.2015).
[12] Nolan's first argument is that even though she did not file a notice with the Town in accordance with the ITCA, see I.C. § 34–13–3–8, the contacts that she and her mother had with the Town, including the delivery of certain medical bills to the police station, put the Town on notice that a claim might be filed and therefore amounted to substantial compliance with the statutory-notice requirement. Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the failure to fully satisfy the precise notice requirements of the ITCA is excused as long as “the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied.” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 707 (emphasis added). However, our Supreme Court recently clarified that the doctrine can only be invoked by a claimant who has filed a timely notice-of-claim that is technically defective, not by a claimant who has filed no notice or late notice. Lyons, 19 N.E.3d at 259 (...
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