Nolan v. Davidson

• Decision Date: 06 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 350-75,350-75
• Citation: 134 Vt. 295,357 A.2d 129
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Martin NOLAN et al. v. Madelyn DAVIDSON, Commissioner of Department of Employment Security.

Page 129

357 A.2d 129

134 Vt. 295

Martin NOLAN et al. v. Madelyn DAVIDSON, Commissioner of Department of Employment Security.

No. 350-75.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April 6, 1976.

Zander B. Rubin, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., St. Johnsbury, and Michael H. Lipson, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, for plaintiffs.

Raymond S. Fitzpatrick, Montpelier, for defendant.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, DALEY, LARROW and BILLINGS, JJ.

SMITH, Justice.

This case was initiated in Washington Superior Court as an action authorized by 3 V.S.A. § 807, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The suit raises questions as to the validity of a Vermont Department of Employment Security rule of general applicability interpreting and implementing sections 1344(b)(1) and 1344(a)(2) of Title 21, V.S.A. Pursuant to V.R.C.P. 23(b)(2), the plaintiffs filed their suit as a class action, and it was so certified by the superior court. The case comes before this Court prior to the entry of final judgment by virtue of Rule 5(a) of V. R.A.P. and the agreement of the parties and the presiding judge of the Washington Superior Court that the dispute raises questions of such weight as to warrant reporting the action before final judgment.

The agreed facts reveal that the plaintiffs, and the members of the class they represent, filed claims for unemployment benefits with the Department during a period of high level unemployment which had begun the week of January 11, 1975. At that time each was issued an initial determination finding that the claimant had left his/her last employment voluntarily without good cause. None of the plaintiffs appealed this determination. Therefore, in accord with 21 V.S.A. § 1344(b)(1) each was given a fixed disqualification of between six to twelve weeks after which they would be eligible for benefits. This fixed week disqualification applies solely in periods of high level unemployment as defined by 21 V.S.A. § 1344(b)(2). In normal periods of low level unemployment, the rather draconian 'work requirement' disqualification is uniformly applied to 'voluntary quits' under § 1344(a)(2). This work requirement is a complete denial of benefits of indefinite tenure until the claimant finds employment and earns wages equal to six times his weekly benefit. Effectively, as we observed in Marsh v. Department of Employment Security, 133 Vt. 425, 340 A.2d 93, 94 (1975), this prerequisite acts as a permanent bar to those voluntary quit claimants unable to secure employment.

As previously noted, the plaintiffs originally filed in a period of high unemployment. However, during the time span in which their fixed disqualifications were still in effect, the state left the period of high unemployment. Immediately upon entering this new period of low level unemployment, the department issued E.D.P.M. Bulletin No. 102 which states:

All determinations . . . rendered on or after October 6, 1975 will impose work requirement disqualification only, even though the first week of disqualification is prior to the week ending October 11, 1975, provided the disqualification period would extend at least through the week ending October 11, 1975.

In accordance with this interpretation, when the fixed disqualifications ended, each plaintiff was given an amended determination imposing a work requirement which effectively denied them benefits.

Pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(a), the following questions have been certified to this Court for resolution prior to judgment below:

(1) Whether the Department has properly interpreted 21 V.S.A. §§ 1344(b)(1) and (a)(2)?

(2) Whether the proper interpretation of 21 V.S.A. §§ 1344(b)(1) and (a)(2) should be that claimants who are disqualified for benefits during a period of 'high level unemployment' under 21 V.S.A. § 1344(b)(1), and receive a fixed disqualification of between 6-12 weeks, are eligible for benefits at the end of such period without having to satisfy a work requirement, even if the period of 'high level unemployment' ends before the fixed disqualification period has terminated?

(3) If the Department's interpretation of §§ 1344(b)(1) and (a)(2) is correct, whether those sections deny plaintiffs either the due process of law or the equal protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Undoubtedly, the key element in this appeal involves determining to which interpretation, that espoused by plaintiffs or the one enforced by the Department, the language of 21 V.S.A. § 1344(b)(1) lends itself. The function of this Court in such circumstances is to apply to the facts as accurately as possible the intent of the Legislature as evidenced by the statute itself. In pursuing this goal, the Court is guided by certain canons of statutory construction. Foremost among these is the rule that when the meaning of a statute is plain on its face, this Court is required to enforce the statute according to its express terms. State v. Santi, 132 Vt. 615, 617, 326 A.2d 149 (1974); Swanton v. Highgate, 131 Vt. 318, 325, 305 A.2d 586 (1973); State v. Bartlett, 128 Vt. 618, 622, 270 A.2d 168 (1970); Marsh v. Department of Employment Security, supra. In respect to this particular statute, it is to be remembered that the Unemployment Compensation Act, as remedial legislation, is to be interpreted in line with its benevolent objectives, and therefore no claimant should be excluded from its provisions unless the law clearly intends such an exclusion. In re Potvin, 132 Vt. 14, 18, 313 A.2d 25 (1973); In re Moore, 128 Vt. 581, 586, 269 A.2d 853 (1970).

Turning to the language of 21 V.S.A. § 1344(b)(1), it is...