Nolan v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 September 1907 |
| Citation | 91 P. 1128,19 Okla. 51,1907 OK 84 |
| Parties | NOLAN v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
In this territory, attorneys at law receive their license, and are authorized by the Supreme Court to engage in the practice of the law, and to transact business as attorneys at law, and the courts of the territory will take judicial notice of the fact that one appearing and acting as an attorney is or is not duly authorized.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 1.]
Any duly authorized attorney may, after the subject-matter has been placed in his hands, give any notice affecting the substantial rights of his client which the client himself might have given, and those affected by such notice must take notice of it.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 147.]
Where notice material to the maintenance of a suit has been given by an attorney, those disputing the authority of the attorney, and who rest their defense, in an action based thereon, upon the fact that they dispute the attorney's authority to give important notices, must maintain such defense in court, for a court of record in Oklahoma will presume that an attorney admitted to the practice is acting in all matters affecting his client's rights, with authority from the client he represents.
[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 104.]
Error from District Court, Grant County; before Justice James K. Beauchamp.
Action by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, a corporation, against Thomas Nolan. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Mackey & Mackey, for plaintiff in error.
Flynn & Ames, for defendant in error.
This action was commenced in the probate court of Grant county, to recover possession of a portion of the depot grounds and right of way in the town of Lamont, in said county, which at the time of bringing said action, to wit, June 2, 1905, and from the 28th day of April, 1903, had been occupied by defendant under and by force of a license from the plaintiff which license provided that it should terminate on 60 days' notice by the plaintiff railroad company, and provided that the defendant on receiving such notice should at once vacate such premises. The license was signed by both plaintiff and defendant. On the 18th day of March, 1905, the agent of the plaintiff at Lamont served a notice upon the defendant terminating said lease within 60 days from the date of such service, describing the premises, and requesting defendant to remove therefrom and give possession of the same, which notice was signed: "St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Company, by Flynn & Ames." The defendant failed to vacate the premises at the expiration of 60 days, and on the 27th day of May, 1905, the agent of the company at Lamont served another notice upon the defendant such as required by the statute to be given prior to the commencement of the action of forcible entry and detainer, and which notice demanded the immediate vacation of the premises, or suit for such possession would be commenced within three days, which notice was also signed by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, by Flynn & Ames, its attorneys. The defendant continuing the occupancy of the premises notwithstanding the foregoing notices, suit was brought therefor in the probate court of Grant county and tried on the 24th day of June, 1905, resulting in a judgment for plaintiff and for the restitution of the premises above described. Thereupon the defendant appealed...
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