Nolan v. Taylor, 51A05-0608-CV-442.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 51A05-0608-CV-442.,51A05-0608-CV-442.
• Citation: 864 N.E.2d 419
• Parties: Linda NOLAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Richard TAYLOR in his Capacity as the Chairman of the Martin County Democrat Central Committee, and John Hunt, and The Martin County Democratic Central Committee, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

864 N.E.2d 419

Linda NOLAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Richard TAYLOR in his Capacity as the Chairman of the Martin County Democrat Central Committee, and John Hunt, and The Martin County Democratic Central Committee, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 51A05-0608-CV-442.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 20, 2007.

Thomas D. Seal, Richmond, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Fremont O. Pickett, Shoals, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Case Summary and Issue

Linda Nolan appeals the trial court's order denying her Petition to Challenge Results of Caucus, dissolving a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, and declaring John Hunt the pro tempore Clerk of the Martin Circuit Court. On appeal, Nolan raises many issues,¹ but we find one issue dispositive: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Nolan's challenge to the results of a political caucus held to appoint a pro tempore court clerk. Concluding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, we affirm in part, and remand with instructions to dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History²

In 2002, Debra S. Christmas, a member of the Democratic political party, was elected as the Martin County Circuit Court Clerk. On October 18, 2005, Christmas tendered her resignation, which was to be effective on January 6, 2006. At this and all relevant times, James Richard Taylor was the Chairman of the Martin County Democratic Central Committee, as well as a committeeperson. Pursuant to Indiana statute,³ Taylor convened a caucus of the Martin County Democratic precinct committeepersons on November 19, 2005, for the purpose of appointing a new clerk. Also pursuant to Indiana statute,⁴ Taylor mailed notice of this caucus to all the committeepersons who were eligible to participate. Two of the committeepersons to whom Taylor mailed notice had moved out of the precinct they represented. According to the Rules of the Indiana Democratic Party ("Party Rules"), "[i]f a committeeperson moves out of his or her precinct and the County chair has knowledge of the same, the chair shall notify said committeeperson by registered mail of his retirement in absentia as committeeperson." Party Rule 11(l)(1). Both committeepersons received notice of the caucus at their new residence. Neither had been notified of their retirement in absentia, and both participated in the caucus.

The night before the caucus, committeeperson James Sorrells resigned and informed Taylor that he would not be attending the caucus. Sorrells testified that Taylor told him that Sorrells' vice committeeperson would not be allowed to vote as his proxy. Taylor testified that he did not make this statement, but did state that he told others on the day of the caucus that he would not allow Sorrells' vice committeeperson to vote.⁵ Neither Sorrells nor his vice committeeperson attended the caucus. Additionally, committeeperson Robin Haulk failed to attend the caucus, leaving a total of sixteen committeepersons in attendance.

Prior to the caucus, Taylor prepared hand-made ballots on index cards that directed committeepersons to either "mark box for one only" or "mark one box only." The four candidates were listed with empty boxes next to the names. At the caucus, Taylor passed these ballots out to the committeepersons, who were all seated near each other. After the committeepersons had voted, Taylor collected the ballots and announced the votes. Nolan and Hunt each received eight votes.⁶ At this point, pursuant to Indiana statute, Taylor broke the tie by voting again for Hunt.⁷

On December 28, 2005, Nolan filed a Petition to Challenge Results of Caucus, along with a motion for preliminary injunction and motion for temporary restraining order, naming as defendants Taylor, in his capacity as Chairman of the Martin County Democratic Central Committee, Hunt, and the Martin County Democratic Committee (collectively, the "Appellees").⁸ A hearing on the injunction and restraining order was held on either January 5 or 6, 2006, in front of Judge R. Joseph Howell, of the Martin Circuit Court.⁹ Following the hearing, Judge Howell extended the temporary restraining order and issued the preliminary injunction.¹⁰ On January 17, 2006, Judge Howell issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, some of which Nolan quotes in her brief. However, as our record does not contain a copy of these findings, we will not consider their content. See Hughes, 808 N.E.2d at 148 (referring to appellant's citations to documents not provided to the court as "meaningless"). At some point, the Appellees filed a motion to disqualify Judge Howell. This motion was granted pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 79,¹¹ and on January 18, 2006, Judge William E. Weikert, Judge of Dubois Circuit Court, assumed jurisdiction over the case as Special Judge of Martin Circuit Court. Another hearing was held on March 1, 2006, in front of Judge Weikert. The court issued its judgment, along with findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 24, 2006, denying Nolan's petition, dissolving the preliminary injunction, and declaring Hunt the pro tempore clerk. Nolan now appeals the trial court's order.

Discussion and Decision

Although the Appellees do not argue on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction,¹² "[i]f the circuit court had not jurisdiction of the general subject-matter of the action, that fact could be raised at any state of the proceedings, and, in fact, must be taken cognizance of by this court, whether formally raised or not, if apparent on the face of the record." Bd. of Comm'rs of Marion County v. Jewett, 184 Ind. 63, 67, 110 N.E. 553, 555 (1915). Further, if "the lower court was without power to entertain the action and decide the questions involved, this court is equally without power to review the correctness of its decision of such questions. Jurisdiction of the general subject-matter cannot be waived, and cannot be conferred by the parties." Id.

It has long been the rule that the judicial branch will not address purely political questions. See State ex rel. Marion County Democratic Comm. v. Superior Court of Marion County, 214 Ind. 322, 322, 15 N.E.2d 379, 379 (1938). "The rule that equity has no jurisdiction to try disputed questions concerning rights that are purely political, nor to undertake the protection of such rights by issuing restraining orders and injunctions, has been long established, and is declared by authorities too numerous for citation." State ex rel. Coffin v. Superior Court of Marion County, 196 Ind. 614, 618-19, 149 N.E. 174, 175 (1925); see also Porter County Democratic Party Precinct Review Comm. v. Spinks, 551 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) ("Courts of equity have no jurisdiction to give injunctive relief with respect to matters or questions of a political nature unless civil property rights are involved and will not interfere to enforce or protect purely political rights.").

The right to hold a political office is not a civil or property right, but is instead a privilege. State ex rel. Seal v. Superior Court of Knox County, 221 Ind 36, 43-44, 46 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1943) (citing Hay v. White, 201 Ind. 425, 169 N.E. 332 (1930)). Therefore, absent statutory authority, the courts are without the power to issue injunctions or restraining orders or to otherwise interfere with the results of a caucus. See Coffin, 196 Ind. at 625, 149 N.E. at 177 ("[A] trial judge sitting as a chancellor has no authority to interfere [in political matters] by injunction . . . unless he is so empowered by statute."); State v. Marion Circuit Court, 199 Ind. 4, 9-10, 145 N.E. 883, 885 (1925) (absent a statute, rule, or regulation conferring specific right upon city chairman, circuit court was without jurisdiction to determine whether right to serve as presiding officer belonged to chairman or another).

Here, no statute provides an individual the right to appeal the result of a caucus held to appoint a pro tempore clerk. The legislature has provided a statutory procedure for individuals to contest a nomination or election of a local office. See Ind.Code § 3-12-8 et seq. However, as statutory language makes clear, the result of a caucus to fill a vacancy is not an election or a nomination, but an appointment. See, e.g., Ind.Code § § 3-13-11-1 ("Selections made [pursuant to a caucus] are appointments pro tempore for the purposes of Article 2, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana.") (emphasis added), 3-13-6-3 ("The person who is appointed holds office for the remainder of the unexpired term and until a successor is elected and qualified.") (emphasis added). The difference between this appointment and an election is not merely semantic. Indeed, an elected official is chosen by the eligible voting population, while the person appointed to fill a vacancy is chosen by select officers belonging to the political party to which the elected official belonged. Thus, a person elected is the choice of the people, while a person appointed is the choice of a political party. Cf. State ex rel. Garn v. Bd. of Election Commr's of Marshall County, 167 Ind. 276, 283-84, 78 N.E. 1016, 1018 (1906) (discussing the distinction between the results of an election and the placement of candidates on the ballot: "`The question is not, who shall be chosen to any particular public office? That is for the voters of all political parties to determine at the polls. It is simply, who shall represent the organization as its nominees? And certainly the determination of that question should be controlled by the action of the party itself[.]'" (quoting State ex rel. Howells v. Metcalf, 18 S.D. 393, 100 N.W. 923 (1904))).

It is true that the legislature has prescribed certain procedures that the caucus must follow in making its appointment. See Ind.Code §§ 3-13-11 et seq. However, it does not follow that because there is a statutorily prescribed procedure, the courts have jurisdiction to hear a complaint that a political organization did not follow its...