State ex rel. Coffin v. Superior Court of Marion Cnty.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1925
• Docket Number: No. 24882.,24882.
• Citation: 196 Ind. 614,149 N.E. 174
• Parties: STATE ex rel. COFFIN v. SUPERIOR COURT OF MARION COUNTY et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

196 Ind. 614

149 N.E. 174

STATE ex rel. COFFIN

v.SUPERIOR COURT OF MARION COUNTY et al.

No. 24882.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 27, 1925.

Original prohibition by the State, on the relation of George V. Coffin, directed against the Superior Court of Marion County and others. Temporary writ made permanent and absolute in certain particulars.

Ira Holmes, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

The principal question for consideration and decision is whether or not the equity jurisdiction of a circuit or superior court, under the Constitution and laws of the state of Indiana, extends to granting a restraining order or injunction, forbidding the chairman of a local organization of a political party, who is authorized to preside at a meeting of representatives of the party for the purpose of reorganizing the “city committee” of such party to exclude certain persons from taking part in the meeting as committeemen of their respective precincts, and forbidding him to put anybody else in the places of such persons as the committeemen and representatives of said precincts, and further commanding him to admit those persons, as representing their respective precincts, to participate in the said organization meeting and in all other meetings of the “city committee” of the party, and to recognize them as such in all meetings that the party might hold. Incidentally, the question is also presented whether or not, if the respondent court was without jurisdiction as to these matters, a proper case is presented for issuing a writ of prohibition to control its action with respect thereto.

The relator filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, alleging, in substance, that the time for holding a meeting of the committeemen representing precincts within the city of Indianapolis, for the purpose of choosing a city chairman and effecting a reorganization of the city committee of the Republican party of that city, was fixed for Saturday afternoon, January 17, 1925, at 1 o'clock, and that by order of the Republican state committee the relator was selected to open the meeting and preside until a city chairman should be chosen; that at the primary election in May, 1924, certain persons had been returned as elected to the positions of precinct committeemen for their respective precincts, lying wholly or partly within the city of Indianapolis, and had acted as such until after the general election in November, 1924; that the Republican state central committee had adopted certain rules (recited in the complaint) declaring certain acts to be “sufficient cause for the removal of any officer or any member of any party committee,” and providing for appeals from “any ruling by a subordinate committee or chairman which affects *** the right of any person to hold any place in the party organization,” with an ultimate appeal to the state chairman, “a decision of whom shall be final and binding”; that, alleging the existence of causes within said rules, relator had caused 24 of the persons so acting to be removed from their positions as precinct committeemen “by action of the Republican county committee, acting through relator as its chairman,” and thereafter said committee, acting through him, appointed successors as precinct committeemen to succeed them; that the county committee had unanimously adopted a rule declaring that relator, as county chairman, should and did have full authority to remove any and all precinct committeemen for cause, and to fill the places of all such committeemen who should refuse to carry out proper instructions and orders of the county chairman; that no appeal was taken from such removal and filling of the places of said committeemen; that on the day before the day fixed for said organization meeting the persons so removed as committeemen by relator filed in room 2 of the superior court of Marion county, Ind., their complaint against relator, asking that he be enjoined from attempting to exclude them from acting as precinct committeemen at the organization meeting and elsewhere, and from putting others in their places; but that the next day, before the hour fixed for holding said organization meeting, the said action was dismissed, and the same parties filed a suit in room 3 of said superior court, the judge of which thereupon issued a restraining order, without notice, forbidding relator to interfere with the plaintiffs therein as precinct committeemen in the exercise of their right to vote at said meeting for the organization of the city committee and at other meetings which might be called by it, or to attempt in any way to put others in their places; that notwithstanding the meeting was to be held at 1 o'clock that afternoon, said judge fixed January 24, 1925, at 9:30 in the morning, as the date for a hearing on the petition for a temporary injunction, and the restraining order so issued without notice was directed to remain in force “until the notice of hearing on plaintiff's petition can be given and a hearing had thereon, and until the further order of the court”; that on the same day this relator, as defendant therein, prepared his motion to dissolve said restraining order, and, not finding the judge of room 3 at his court or in the courthouse at that hour, presented the motion to another judge of said superior court, who ordered that the motion be sustained, and at 15 minutes before 1 o'clock entered an order that the restraining order “be and the same is hereby dissolved”; that said petitioners for the restraining order prayed an appeal, but two days later, on Monday, they withdrew such request, and the judge of room 3 then made an order book minute in his docket that “the order dissolving the restraining order is set aside *** restraining order heretofore ordered reinstated in full force and effect”; that thereafter relator filed a demurrer to the complaint on which said restraining order had been obtained, pointing out that the superior court had no jurisdiction to try or determine the matter, but the judge overruled said demurrer and ruled relator to answer on a named date; and that unless prohibited he would try the cause and make the temporary order permanent, on a specified date, two or three days after the time of filing the petition asking for a writ of prohibition; and that such order, if made permanent, would interfere with the relator in the performance of his duties as chairman of the local committee of his party in certain particulars specified.

The Supreme Court issued a temporary writ of prohibition forbidding the superior court to proceed further in the matter until the application could be heard and decided. The return admits these facts substantially as alleged. Both parties have filed briefs on the assumption that the facts stated in the complaint are substantially correct.

The rule that equity has no jurisdiction to try disputed questions concerning rights that are purely political, nor to undertake the protection of such rights by issuing restraining orders and injunctions, has been long established, and is declared by authorities too numerous for citation, many of which are collected in text-books and reference books. 14 R. C. L. p. 374; 21 Corpus Juris, p. 156, § 137; 5 Pomeroy Equity (4th Ed.) § 1746; Bishpam Equity (10th Ed.) § 37, p. 64; High, Injunctions (4th Ed.) §§ 20b, 1312, 1313; Kerr, Injunctions (5th Ed.) p. 10.

[1][2] In affirming a judgment refusing to enjoin a county committee and its chairman from enforcing a rule promulgated in its name, but alleged to have been adopted when only a minority of the committee, all living in one town, were present, with relation to printing ballots for use at a primary election, the Supreme Court of Nebraska said:

The doctrine that equity is conversant only with matters of property and the maintenance of civil rights, and will not interpose for the protection of rights which are merely political, is supported by an almost unbroken line of authorities [citing cases]. A civil right is ‘a right accorded to every member of a district, community or nation,’ while a political right is ‘a right exercisable in the administration of government.’ Anderson's Law Dictionary, 905. In 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 929, it is said: ‘Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment and management of the government. These political rights are fixed by the Constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of being elected; these are the political rights which the humblest citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which have no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying property, of exercising the paternal or marital powers and the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of civil rights, which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political, although in full enjoyment of his civil rights.’ ***

“Notwithstanding the array of authorities which support it, we should not care to commit ourselves unqualifiedly to the doctrine that a court of equity will not under any circumstances interfere for the protection of political rights. But, we think it is perfectly safe to adopt the doctrine to the extent of holding that a court of equity will not undertake to supervise the acts and management of a political party, for the protection of a purely political right. We do not overlook the fact that primary elections have become the subject of legislative regulation, and it may be conceded that each member of a political party has a right of a voice in such primaries, and to seek nomination for public office at the hands of his party. But, when he is denied these rights, or unreasonably hampered in their exercise, he must look to some other source than a court of equity for redress. To...