Nolen v. State

• Decision Date: 10 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 46304,No. 2,46304,2
• Citation: 184 S.E.2d 674,124 Ga.App. 593
• Parties: Harold T. NOLEN v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 674

184 S.E.2d 674

124 Ga.App. 593

Harold T. NOLEN v. The STATE.

No. 46304.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Sept. 10, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1971.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 18, 1971.

Jack J. Helms, B. E. Blitch, III, Homerville, for appellant.

Vickers Neugent, Dist. Atty., Pearson, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

EVANS, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and tried for the offense of murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, with a sentence of five years. The appeal is from the judgment of conviction and sentence. Held:

The sole basis of this review is that the court erred in overruling the defendant's motions for directed verdict of acquittal when the state rested its case, and again at the close of all the evidence. Counsel for the appellant bases his argument upon the decisions of Gilbert v. State, 94 Ga.App. 217, 94 S.E.2d 109 and Jones v. State, 212 Ga. 195, 91 S.E.2d 514 (the latter a 4 to 3 Supreme Court decision). The Jones case was reversed because the evidence relied upon by the State to establish the fact of the homicide disclosed circumstances of mitigation or justification, and the evidence did not raise a presumption of malice, although the dissenting justices were of the opinion that the jury was authorized to infer malice upon proof of the killing by a deadly weapon. Since the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter in the case sub judice, the jury could have inferred from the evidence that the defendant acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. See Code Ann. § 26-1102 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1276). While the evidence here was sufficient to authorize the jury to return a verdict of A motion for rehearing was filed at the very end of the April term and we vacated the judgment of affirmance and withdrew the above opinion. We now adhere to it. Defendant's motion very strongly insists that the verdict of guilty should be reversed because two theories were presented, one of which was innocence, and that 'the justice and humanity of the law compels the acceptance of the theory which is consistent with innocence' and cites in support Davis v. State, 13 Ga.App. 142, 78 S.E. 866; Rutland v. State, 46 Ga.App. 417, 422, 167 S.E. 705; Scroggs v. State, 94 Ga.App. 28, 93 S.E.2d 583; and Odom v. State, 106 Ga.App. 60, 126 S.E.2d 472; and Pennamon v. State, 110 Ga.App. 475, 138 S.E.2d 890. In cases where the guilt of a defendant is dependent solely on circumstantial evidence it has been held error to fail to charge that if the proved facts are consistent with the theory of innocence, the defendant should be acquitted. Middleton v. State, 7 Ga.App. 1(1), 66 S.E. 22; Riley v. State, 1 Ga.App. 651(1), 57 S.E. 1031. But in the case sub judice the State did not depend solely on circumstantial evidence for a conviction; there was other evidence sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty. When the facts in evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two theories, one of which leads to a verdict of not guilty, and the other to a verdict of guilty, then the authorities cited by defendant in his motion for re-hearing come into play and weigh in favor of acquittal. But where the evidence of guilt is more reasonable than that of not guilty, then these cited authorities are inapplicable. In Dunson v. State, 202 Ga. 515, 521, 43 S.E.2d 504 it is held: 'It is not necessary however, in order to sustain a verdict of conviction, that the evidence exclude every possibility or every inference that may be drawn from the proved facts, but only necessary to exclude reasonable inferences and reasonable hypotheses.' Also see Wrisper v. State, 193 Ga. 157, 164, 17 S.E.2d 714; Harris v. State, 86 Ga.App. 607(1), 71 S.E.2d 861.

justifiable homicide, as the defendant contends, yet the evidence was also sufficient to authorize the verdict of guilty of manslaughter, and the lower court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdict.

We think that under the evidence here only the jury could weigh the evidence and arrive at a just verdict. This court cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence was exactly the same as to the theories advanced. See in this connection the cases of Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527; Gay v. State, 173 Ga. 793, 161 S.E. 603; Smithey v. State, 219 Ga. 247, 132 S.E.2d 666, which are somewhat similar cases. There was evidence sufficient to show that defendant, who had been having marital difficulties, shot his wife at night after a quarrel while the two were alone at home, while she was intoxicated and after she had sent a minor daughter away from home, and whose whereabouts was unknown to the father, causing him to send a son out to look for the daughter. The defendant's statement (unsworn) as to the details of the shooting is not very favorable toward supporting his contention of self-defense. He told the jury that he and his wife were in the same room, that she had a rifle in her hands and she threatened to shoot him and kill him. The rifle was fired twice, but neither shot struck him, despite his statement that he thought he was shot. (It is a little difficult to imagine how she could have missed him had she been trying to hit him at that range) Then, without looking to ascertain whether she was trying to shoot him by pointing the rifle towards him, nor indeed whether she even held the rifle in her hands, he whirled and shot as he was turning towards her. Then he said he did not remember anything further at that point, but there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have determined that he fired four times in all; that the bullets from two of his shots were found in her head and a third bullet was imbedded in a wall, having residue thereon resembling 'human body fluid'; while a fourth bullet was also embedded in a wall. The jury thus could have determined that one of his four Judgment affirmed.

shots missed and the other three struck her. An expert testified that either of the two bullets which struck her in the head would have produced death. His only explanation of the last three shots was that he did not remember. It well may have been that she did not even have the rifle in her hands, or if so, that it was pointed downward or upward and away from him. It well may have been that his first shot, as he was turning, went wild, and after facing her, that he placed three shots in her without any effort on her part to retaliate. So, defendant can gain very little solace from his own statement as to the manner in which the homicide was...