Noll v. Special Elec. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 77888-9-I,77888-9-I |
| Citation | 14 Wash.App.2d 230,471 P.3d 247 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Candace NOLL, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald Noll, Deceased, Appellant, v. SPECIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Respondent, and American Biltrite, Inc.; Ametek Inc.; Bird Incorporated; Borgwarner Morse TEC Inc. as successor-by-merger to Borgwarner Corporation; CBS Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, f/k/a Viacom Inc., successor by merger to CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corporation; CertainTeed Corporation; Conwed Corporation; Domco Products Texas Inc ; Ford Motor Company; General Electric Company; Georgia-Pacific LLC; Hercules Incorporated; Honewell International Inc.; Industrial Holdings Corporation f/k/a The Carborundum Company; Ingersoll-Rand Company; J-M Manufacturing Company Inc.; Kaiser Gypsum Company Inc. ; Kelly Moore Paint Company Inc., Defendants. |
PUBLISHED OPINION
Hazelrigg, J. ¶1 This case returns following entry of findings of fact on remand as directed by our opinion in Noll v. Special Electric Company, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 2d 317, 444 P.3d 33 (2019). We ordered this remand because neither the trial court's reasoning nor the underlying facts supporting its decision that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Special Electric Company could be discerned from the original record on appeal. We remanded for the trial court to return to the documentary evidence previously submitted by the parties, determine whether Special Electric purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Washington, and provide us with the record necessary to engage in our analysis of the issues raised by appellant Noll. We retained jurisdiction for subsequent review. On remand, a different judge reviewed the record and issued findings of fact. This trial court's findings support the conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists over Special Electric. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Noll's lawsuit against Special Electric.
FACTS
¶2 The trial court dismissed Donald Noll's asbestos claims against Special Electric Company (Special Electric) for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 Noll appealed and the Washington Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of State v. LG Electronics, Inc., 186 Wash.2d 169, 375 P.3d 1035 (2016). Noll v. Am. Biltrite Inc., 188 Wash.2d 402, 416, 395 P.3d 1021 (2017) ( Noll I ). The court concluded that Noll did not allege sufficient facts for Washington to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Special Electric. But the court also indicated that it did not intend to preclude the trial court from making its own finding of jurisdiction on remand "depending on the allegations that the plaintiff then raises."
Noll I, 188 Wash.2d at 406, 395 P.3d 1021. Because "Noll failed to allege any action taken by Special to purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of the Washington market," the court declined to decide "if showing actual knowledge or awareness is necessary, or sufficient, to finding specific personal jurisdiction in stream of commerce cases." Noll I, 188 Wash.2d at 416, 395 P.3d 1021.
¶3 On remand, Noll presented a new motion to establish specific jurisdiction with additional evidence. After conducting a preliminary hearing based solely on documentary evidence, the trial court denied Noll's motion to establish personal jurisdiction over Special Electric. The trial court did not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, entering only the following order denying the motion:
The evidence presented by Plaintiff is insufficient to establish that Special [Electric] to [sic] purposely avail[ed] itself of the benefits and protections of the Washington market, thus conferring specific jurisdiction in this matter. Special [Electric]’s other unrelated contacts with two Washington State companies are not relevant to [the] issue of specific jurisdiction which is the only basis that is asserted.
¶4 Noll appealed. Noll v. Special Elec. Co., 9 Wash. App. 2d 317, 444 P.3d 33 (2019) ( Noll II ). We held that it was appropriate to apply the "usual standards of review in Washington," i.e., de novo for conclusions of law and substantial evidence review for findings of fact. Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 321, 444 P.3d 33. While acknowledging that case law permits Washington courts to review documentary evidence de novo, we also recognized our authority to defer to the trial court's findings in cases where the evidence was voluminous and complex. Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 321, 444 P.3d 33 (citing Dolan v. King County, 172 Wash.2d 299, 310-11, 258 P.3d 20 (2011) ). Because the evidence here "involves a number of complex questions, including the meanings of corporate documents, abbreviations, figures, and percentages," we held "it appropriate to defer to the trial court as to the facts in these circumstances." Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 321, 444 P.3d 33.
¶5 We rejected Special Electric's invitation to rely on implied findings of fact based on the trial court's decision, noting that Special Electric failed to prepare a formal order or request findings of fact and this court was "not inclined to speculate on findings beneficial to the party that failed to procure them." Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 323. We further acknowledged that "the subject of specific jurisdiction is not well-settled law," noting a "significant disagreement" among courts about how to test evidence of personal jurisdiction. Id.
¶6 We then remanded for the trial court to make specific factual findings in support of its ruling "[b]ecause we cannot discern the reasoning or underlying facts supporting the decision to deny personal jurisdiction against Special Electric," and "[b]ecause we have no reliable indication of the facts as the trial court understood them." Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 319, 323, 444 P.3d 33. Specifically, we asked the trial court to answer the following questions "as well as any other findings of fact that support its decision":
Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 323-24, 444 P.3d 33.
¶7 The trial judge who made the ruling underlying this appeal retired prior to our remand and the case was ultimately reassigned to another.6 As we instructed, the trial court reviewed the evidence, clarifying that "[t]his court's role is not limited to finding only facts that support the trial court's prior decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction," and "acts as a neutral fact finder – it does not view the facts in a light favorable to one side or the other, and will only make reasonable inferences based on the evidence in the record." The court made extensive findings of fact and the following findings in answer to our questions on remand:
DISCUSSION
¶8 We review factual findings following a preliminary hearing for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 320-21, 444 P.3d 33. We defer to the trial court as the fact finder to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Perebeynos, 121 Wash. App. 189, 196, 87 P.3d 1216 (2004). As noted above, we held it appropriate to defer to the trial court to make factual findings rather than act as initial fact finders, due to the complexity of the factual issues raised in this case. Noll II, 9 Wash. App. 2d at 321, 444 P.3d 33.
¶9 We remanded for the trial court to enter findings because we did not have sufficient information to review the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction. As the trial court indicated on remand, the task before it was to review the record, find the facts, and answer the questions set out in our first opinion. The parties agreed that all the evidence to be considered on remand was properly before the court. Now having before us the relevant findings, our task...
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