Noonan v. Noonan, 05-27.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
| Citation | 122 P.3d 964,2005 WY 145 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-27.,05-27. |
| Parties | Karie L. NOONAN, n/k/a Karie L. Anderson, Appellant (Defendant), v. Robert Christian NOONAN, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Decision Date | 22 November 2005 |
v.
Robert Christian NOONAN, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Representing Appellant: Tom Sutherland, Casper, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Richard L. Harden, Casper, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
VOIGT, Justice.
[¶ 1] Karie Noonan (the Wife) appeals the district court's denial of her motion to vacate and set aside a default divorce decree granted to Robert Noonan (the Husband). The divorce decree awarded the couple joint legal and split physical custody of their two children, established a detailed visitation schedule, and ordered the Husband to pay child support to the Wife. The divorce decree was entered without a hearing and without any other evidentiary basis, and in the absence of the financial affidavits required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) (LexisNexis 2005). We
Page 965
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
[¶ 2] Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default divorce decree?
[¶ 3] The Husband and the Wife married either on December 31, 1989 or November 12, 1994.1 Their union bore two children: one born in 1994, and another in 2000. On July 1, 2004, the Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce, a property distribution, split legal and physical custody of the children, and a child support determination. The Wife was served with a copy of the complaint on July 16, 2004, but failed to appear or answer. The Husband filed an affidavit for entry of default on August 6, 2004, and the clerk of court entered default on that same day. A default divorce decree was entered on September 24, 2004, granting the divorce, dividing the couple's property, awarding joint legal but split physical custody of the children, detailing visitation, and ordering the Husband to pay monthly child support of $295.00. The divorce decree was entered without a hearing, the only evidentiary support for the divorce decree being the Husband's brief affidavit estimating the parties' respective income.
[¶ 4] On October 29, 2004, the Wife moved to vacate the divorce decree pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (6). The Wife argued that the divorce decree was procedurally flawed and that it deprived her of the fundamental right to associate with her children without due process of law. The Wife later supplemented her motion and claimed that the divorce decree was unworkable because a mutual protection order prevented the parties from communicating to arrange visitation with the children. After a hearing, the motion was denied. This appeal followed.
[¶ 5] The Wife challenged the default divorce decree under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (6).2 That rule reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the judgment is void; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
[¶ 6] We have said that granting relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial court. MAM v. State Dept. of Family Services, 2004 WY 127, ¶¶ 10-11, 99 P.3d 982, 984-85 (Wyo.2004). Under that rule, we will reverse the trial court for an abuse of discretion only in special situations justifying extraordinary relief and upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Id. Our standard for the review of discretionary decisions has been stated many times and will not be repeated here. See, for example, Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d 1240, 1242-43 (Wyo.2001).
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