Nopson v. Wockner
| Decision Date | 19 June 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 31925,31925 |
| Citation | 245 P.2d 1022,40 Wn.2d 645 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | NOPSON, v. WOCKNER et ux. |
Knapp & Powers, Seattle, for appellant.
Pomeroy, Yothers, Luckerath & Harris, Seattle, for respondents.
The issue in this appeal is whether or not the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Plaintiff's action was based upon allegations that defendants negligently caused his automobile to be damaged by fire while it was in their exclusive possession.
The trial court found that plaintiff delivered his automobile to the defendants for a 2000-mile service, and to have the rear floor mat cemented to the floor; that defendants used a product universally used for this purpose, known as 3M cement; that this cement is inflammable in character, although it is not customary or usual for it to explode or ignite while being applied; that the defendants were applying it in the usual and customary manner employed throughout the automobile industry, when a fire started, damaging plaintiff's automobile. The court concluded that the defendants exercised reasonable care in performing this work and were not negligent in any regard. It entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's action.
In his appeal from that judgment, plaintiff's argument is confined solely to his contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur compels his recovery.
When plaintiff's evidence established that an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendants caused an injurious occurrence, which ordinarily does not happen if those in control of the instrumentality use ordinary care, the court gave effect to the inference, permissible from the occurrence itself, that it was caused by defendants' want of care. Shay v. Parkhurst, 1951, 38 Wash.2d 341, 344, 229 P.2d 510, and cases cited. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court overruled a demurrer to the evidence and denied a motion for nonsuit, despite the absence of proof of any specific act of negligence of the defendants which caused the damage. The defendants then went forward with the evidence and described the nature of the material used and the manner in which the work was done.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court decided upon the whole case that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof, that is, that the evidence did not preponderate in plaintiff's favor upon the issue of the defendants' negligence, and dismissed the case.
Without the aid of the doctrine, plaintiff would not have survived a motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of his case. If applied as he contends, it would require defendants to produce evidence explaining the accident or pay. Such an obligation might impose strict...
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Greyhound Corporation v. Blakley
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