Nordbye v. BRCP/GM Ellington
Decision Date | 26 October 2011 |
Docket Number | 071113782; A141698. |
Citation | 246 Or.App. 209,266 P.3d 92 |
Parties | Sarah NORDBYE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. BRCP/GM ELLINGTON, an Oregon limited liability corporation; and the Oregon Housing and Community Services Department, Defendants–Respondents. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alice Warner argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was Edward Johnson.
Thomas H. Tongue argued the cause for respondent BRCP/GM Ellington. With him on the brief were Brian R. Talcott and Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue LLP.
Judy C. Lucas, Senior Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Oregon Housing and Community Services Department. With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and David B. Thompson, Interim Solicitor General.Jeffrey B. Litwak filed the brief amicus curiae for Columbia River Gorge Commission.Dennis Steinman and Kell Alterman & Runstein, LLP, filed the brief amicus curiae for National Housing Law Project.Mark Manulik, Sara Kobak, and Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon Land Title Association.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and ARMSTRONG, Judge, and DUNCAN, Judge.
Plaintiff, a former tenant of a residential rental property that was financed, at least in part, through the federal Low–Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, appeals.1 Plaintiff challenges (1) the trial court's allowance of summary judgment, on grounds of “ Chevron deference,” 2 against her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief pertaining to the enforceability of certain “use restrictions” related to the LIHTC program; and (2) the court's denial of her cross-motion for summary judgment. As described below, we conclude that Chevron deference is inapposite. We further conclude that, as a matter of law, plaintiff is entitled to enforce the disputed use restrictions pertaining to the operation of the property as low-income housing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Before turning to the particular circumstances of this dispute, it is not only useful, but essential, to describe the LIHTC program. The purpose of the LIHTC program is to encourage the development of low-income rental housing through the allocation of tax credits pursuant to section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Oti Kaga v. South Dakota Housing Dev. Authority, 188 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1152 (D.S.D.2002), aff'd, 342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir.2003). In general, the federal government allocates tax credits, and state housing agencies are responsible for distributing the credits and monitoring recipient projects for compliance with program requirements. Treas. Reg. § 1.42–1 T; Treas. Reg. § 1.42–5. The LIHTC program is regulated by, and state housing agencies report to, the Internal Revenue Service. IRC § 42( l ), (n). Further, as a general rule, the tax credits are claimed annually by the recipient taxpayer over the first 10 years of a project. IRC § 42(f)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.42–1 T(a)(1). In return for receiving the tax credits, the taxpayer must commit to maintain the project as low-income housing for 30 years. The 30–year term is composed of an initial 15–year compliance period and an additional 15–year “extended use period.” IRC § 42(h)(6).
For our purposes, it is not necessary to describe the LIHTC program rental and occupancy restrictions in detail. Suffice it to say there are three salient features. First, the taxpayer agrees that a specified number of units in the project will be rented for a restricted amount of rent to tenants whose income is a certain percentage less than the median income of the geographical area in which the project is located. See IRC § 42(g). Second, federal law requires that the taxpayer and state housing agency enter into an “extended low-income housing commitment,” which is to be “binding on all successors of the taxpayer,” and recorded as a restrictive covenant pursuant to state law. IRC § 42(h)(6)(A), (B). Third, “individuals who meet the income limitation applicable to the building * * * (whether prospective, present, or former occupants of the building)” have the right to enforce the extended low-income housing commitment “in any State court.” 3 IRC § 42(h)(6)(B)(ii).
Consistently with those requirements, in December 1990, Rose City Village Limited Partnership, the original owner of the project, entered into a Low–Income Housing Tax Credit Reservation and Extended Use Agreement (the extended use agreement) with the Department. The original owner agreed, among other things, that it would maintain 100 percent of the project as low-income housing for 30 years and that, as a condition precedent to the issuance of tax credits, it would record a “declaration of land use restrictive covenants.”
In the Declaration of Land Use Restrictive Covenants for Low–Income Housing Tax Credits (the declaration), which was recorded in Multnomah County, the original owner acknowledged the obligations and restrictions imposed under the extended use agreement. Section 2(b) of the declaration provides:
Further, and of critical significance, section 8 of the declaration, which is captioned “Enforcement of Section 42 Occupancy Restrictions,” provides, in part:
(Uppercase in original.)
The Department allocated more than $2 million of LIHTC tax credits to the project and monitored the project for conformity with LIHTC program requirements. The project experienced compliance problems over the years. In the course of trying to remediate those problems, the Department learned that, in 2002 or 2003, the original owner had transferred ownership of the project to Rose City Village Affordable Housing Limited Partnership (the middle owner). The manner in which the original owner transferred the project violated the terms of the declaration. The declaration requires, among other things, that the owner notify the Department prior to any transfer of ownership and that the owner obtain the agreement of any buyer “that such acquisition is subject to the requirements of” the declaration and IRC section 42. Those requirements were not satisfied.
The Department ultimately concluded that, although the middle owner had made substantial progress in some respects, the project could not be brought into full compliance with all of the requirements of the LIHTC program.4 In 2004, a Department compliance officer notified the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of that conclusion in a letter, which stated, in part:
With that letter, the Department also submitted multiple IRS 8823 forms, entitled “Low–Income Housing Credit Agencies...
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