Norfolk S. Rr. Co. v. Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng'r.
| Decision Date | 22 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1332,CA-97-267,98-1332 |
| Citation | 217 F.3d 181 |
| Parties | Page 181 217 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2000) NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS; CLARENCE V. MONIN, Individually and as Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers President; P. T. SORROW, Individually and as Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Vice President; EDWARD DUBROSKI, Individually and as Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers First Vice President; RUSSELL W. BENNETT, Individually and as Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Secretary/Treasurer; R. C. WALLACE, Individually and as Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers General Chairman; AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS DEPARTMENT BLE; LES A. PARMELEE, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department BLE President; WILLIAM A. CLIFFORD, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department BLE Vice President; JAMES A. PARKER, Page 182 Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department BLE Vice President; DAVID W. VOLZ, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department BLE Vice President (West); F. LEO MCCANN, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Secretary/Treasurer; S. A. HUNNICUTT, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department General Chairman; E. A. LANHAM, JR., Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Office Chairman; C. W. HENDRICKS, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Office Chairman; T. E. RUSSELL, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Office Chairman; M. G. GIDEON, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Office Chairman; W. L. MOSLEY, Individually and as American Train Dispatchers Department Office Chairman, Defendants-Appellees. ( |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
COUNSEL ARGUED: Jeffrey Stephen Berlin, SIDLEY & AUSTIN, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael Stephen Wolly, ZWERDLING, PAUL, LEIBIG, KAHN, THOMPSON & WOLLY, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Mark E. Martin, Edward R. McNicholas, SIDLEY & AUSTIN, Washington, D.C.; Mark D. Perreault, Roanoke, Virginia; Frank H. Gibbes, III, Deborah Casey Brown, GIBBES, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel G. Orfield, ZWERDLING, PAUL, LEIBIG, KAHN, THOMPSON & WOLLY, P.C., Washington, D.C.; Harold A. Ross, ROSS & KRAUSHAAR CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.
Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Luttig joined. Judge Widener wrote a separate concurring opinion.
The question in this appeal is whether there is an implied remedy under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (the RLA or the Act), for damages caused by a union strike over what is known as a "minor dispute." We hold that a damages remedy is not available in this circumstance.
This case arises out of a five-hour strike called on September 3, 1997, by the American Train Dispatchers Department of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (the union) against the Norfolk Southern Railway Company (the railroad). For several years prior to the strike, the union and the railroad had been at odds over one aspect of the railroad's work assignment authority under the collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, the parties disagreed about whether the railroad could assign a dispatcher to work a shift or "desk" other than his regular one. (In a train dispatchers' office each "desk" governs a particular region of the railroad's operations.) On August 25, 1997, Harry G. Shirley reported for duty at the railroad's Birmingham, Alabama, train dispatching office to work at his regular desk. When a supervisor directed him to work "off assignment," that is, at another desk in the same office, Shirley said he was too sick to work at the other desk. Despite warnings from the chief dispatcher and the superintendent, Shirley marked off sick and left the office. A week later, on September 2, 1997, the railroad issued a "notice of charge" to Shirley for insubordination and marking off sick under false pretenses.
The union called a strike in response, and the dispatchers walked off the job at about 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1997. The strike lasted five hours until a federal district judge in South Carolina entered a temporary restraining order directing the dispatchers to return to work.
On October 2, 1997, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the strike, concluding that the union had struck the railroad "over a minor dispute, in violation of the commands of the Railway Labor Act." The railroad then filed an amended complaint that added a claim against the union for damages caused by the strike. The railroad asserted damages of approximately $250,000 for, among other things, the payment of overtime wages, the payment of wages to employees who were not productive on the day of the strike, and costs associated with the delay of freight trains. On the union's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) the district court dismissed the railroad's claim for damages, holding that a damages remedy cannot be implied under the RLA when, as in this case, employees strike over a minor dispute. Final judgment was then entered, and the railroad appealed the dismissal of its claim for damages.
Today's question -whether a carrier has an implied RLA remedy for damages resulting from a union strike over a minor dispute -is best answered with some history in mind. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Railway Labor Act `cannot be appreciated apart from the environment out of which it came and the purposes which it was designed to serve.'" Burlington N. R.R., Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987) (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 751 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). History and experience, in other words, dictated the purpose and structure of the RLA, as passed in 1926 and amended in 1934.
Our history lesson begins with World War I, when the federal government took control of the country's railroads. During the war the railroads were operated under the authority of the U.S. Railroad Administration, an agency run by a Director General who was appointed by the President. The Director General and the rail unions entered into national agreements covering wages and working conditions. See Charles M. Rehmus, Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Railroad and Airline Industries, in The Railway Labor Act at Fifty 1, 6 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1977). The unions gave a no-strike pledge for the duration of the war. See Frank N. Wilner, The Railway Labor Act & the Dilemma of Labor Relations 38 (1991). Adjustment boards with equal representation from management and labor (the Director General voted in case of a tie) decided grievances arising out of interpretation of the national agreements. See Jacob Seidenberg, Grievance Adjustment in the Railroad Industry, in The Railway Labor Act at Fifty , supra, at 209, 209-10. The Railroad Administration controlled wartime freight rates and passenger fares, and the government guaranteed the carriers a set rate of return. See Wilner, supra, at 39-40.
As World War I drew to a close, Congress became concerned about the potential for labor-management discord when the railroads were returned to private management and the unions were free to call strikes. The consensus in Congress was that continued (and substantial) government involvement in railroad labor relations would be necessary to preserve the peace in the rail industry. Thus came the Transportation Act of 1920. See Rehmus, supra, at 6.
To start off, the Transportation Act of 1920 restored possession of the railroads to their private owners. Title III of the act then imposed a comprehensive system for the resolution of rail labor disputes. First, Title III called upon carriers and labor organizations to create local adjustment boards to decide disputes that "involv[ed] only grievances, rules, or working conditions." Transportation Act of 1920, tit. III, § 303, 41 Stat. 456, 470 (repealed 1926). Second, and more important, Title III created a Railroad Labor Board (to be appointed by the President) that was empowered to decide all wage disputes and any dispute not dealt with by an adjustment board. See title III, §§ 304307, 41 Stat. at 470-71. This dispute resolution scheme was characterized as "a form of compulsory arbitration," see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 756-57 (1961), although the Railroad Labor Board could not seek judicial enforcement of its orders, see Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 79 (1923). In any event, both labor and management believed that the 1920 act was seriously flawed because it failed to place primary reliance on collective bargaining and mediation, the means preferred by the parties for the resolution of their disputes. See Rehmus, supra, at 7.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the 1920 act, fueled in part by a national strike of 400,000 shop-craft workers in 1922, led representatives of rail labor and management to begin discussions aimed at formulating a joint proposal for legislation to replace the 1920 act. In January 1926, after months of negotiations, a bill worked out between labor and management was introduced in Congress. The bill -publicly endorsed by both sides and enacted virtually without change -became the Railway Labor Act of 1926. See Wilner, supra, at 44-47. The RLA of 1926, with some amendments, remains on the books today.
The RLA of 1926 relies first and foremost on collective bargaining for the settlement of labor-management disputes. Section 2 (Second) of the Act imposes a duty...
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