Norman v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.

• Citation: 627 S.E.2d 382
• Decision Date: 15 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. A05A2097.,No. A05A2218.,A05A2097.,A05A2218.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
• Parties: NORMAN v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC. Lend Lease Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Norman.

Page 382

627 S.E.2d 382

NORMAN v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC.

Lend Lease Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Norman.

No. A05A2097.

No. A05A2218.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cash, Kurgler & Fredericks, Andrew B. Cash, Alwyn R. Fredericks, Atlanta, for Norman.

Hicks, Casey & Foster, William T. Casey, Jr., Marietta; Sommers, Scrudder & Bass, Henry E. Scrudder, Jr., Atlanta, for Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.

Allen, Kopet & Associates, James A. Meaney III, Alisa W. Ellenburg; Goodman, McGuffey, Lindsey & Johnson, C. Wade McGuffey, Jr., W. Davis Hewitt, Atlanta, for Lend Lease Real Estate Investments, Inc.

ELLINGTON, Judge.

After falling at her workplace, Carole Norman filed this premises liability suit against the building's owner, Lend Lease Real Estate Investments, Inc., and the property manager, Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.¹ Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Jones Lang's motion for summary judgment, and, in Case No. A05A2097, Norman appeals. The trial court, however, denied Lend Lease's motion for summary judgment, and, in Case No. A05A2218, Lend Lease appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Jones Lang, but reverse the court's denial of summary judgment to Lend Lease.

"Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In evaluating whether summary judgment is proper, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." (Citation omitted.) Trans-Vaughn Dev. Corp. v. Cummings, 273 Ga.App. 505, 615 S.E.2d 579 (2005). "Our review of the trial court's summary judgment ruling is de novo." (Citation omitted.) Id. at 507, 615 S.E.2d 579.

So viewed, the record shows that Norman started working for her employer, Executrain, in December 1999. Executrain leased the entire fourth floor of a building owned by Lend Lease and managed by Jones Lang.² According to Norman, from December 1999 through the day of her fall two months later, the ceiling lights in her office did not work. Instead, Norman claims she used a desk lamp to light her office. On Monday, February 7, 2000, Norman arrived at work at approximately 6:45 a.m., when it was still dark outside. As Norman walked into her office, which she described as "totally dark," she tripped and fell over one or more boxes on the floor in her office.³ According to Norman the boxes were not there when she left work at the end of the business day on Friday afternoon, February 4, 2000. No one witnessed Norman's fall. The record also shows that, approximately two hours after she fell, Norman e-mailed her employer, stating as follows: "This morning at 6:30ish, I tripped over a box in our office that is holding some lights to be installed on our work stations. I fell on my right side and right knee. I have removed this box from the walk path so no one will trip over it. So far I am just very sore."

Norman sued Lend Lease, Jones Lang, and the other defendants, alleging that one or more of the defendants came into her office over the weekend (between Friday evening and Monday morning) to install or repair the ceiling lights and that they negligently left the boxes in the middle of the floor of her office. Norman also subsequently argued that, even if the defendants did not leave the boxes in her office, they were negligent in failing to repair the ceiling lights, which caused her office to be dark and, therefore, contributed to her fall.

Both Lend Lease and Jones Lang denied that they or their agents had been doing any repairs in Norman's office in the days prior to Norman's fall, that they had placed the boxes in Norman's office, or that they were aware that the boxes were on the floor before she fell. Further, Jones Lang specifically denied that it was aware of any problems with the ceiling lights prior to Norman's fall⁴ and denied that anyone representing Norman or Executrain had ever requested that it repair the ceiling light fixtures or replace the fixtures' light bulbs either before or after Norman's fall. Moreover, to the extent that the boxes may have contained lights to be installed in the employee work stations, as Norman's e-mail suggests, a Jones Lang manager testified that his company was not responsible for providing or maintaining the light fixtures on Executrain's work stations, nor had Executrain ever requested that it do so. This was confirmed by an officer of Executrain, who testified that, as far as he knew, his company purchased and maintained lights for its employee work stations and the building manager "had nothing to do" with maintaining the work station lights.

Both Lend Lease and Jones Lang filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Jones Lang's motion after finding that Norman could not prove Jones Lang's superior knowledge of the hazards that caused her fall, and Norman appeals this decision in Case No. A05A2097. The court denied Lend Lease's motion, however, and the company appeals in Case No. A05A2218.

Before addressing the parties' specific contentions on appeal, we note that, in order for Norman to recover from either Jones Lang or Lend Lease in this premises liability case, she must show that their knowledge of the hazard that caused her injuries was superior to her own. Baldwin County Hosp. Auth. v. Martinez, 204 Ga. App. 840, 842, 420 S.E.2d 760 (1992). In other words, she must present some evidence demonstrating that (1) the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and (2) she lacked knowledge of the hazard despite her exercise of ordinary care and that her lack of knowledge was due to conditions within the defendants' control. Trans-Vaughn Dev. Corp. v. Cummings, 273 Ga.App. at 507-508, 615 S.E.2d 579. This is because a landowner (or one managing the property on his behalf) is not an insurer of the safety of invitees. Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors, 220 Ga.App. 889, 892, 470 S.E.2d 689 (1996).

Falling and injuring one's self proves nothing. Such happenings are commonplace wherever humans go. [Therefore,] if [an] invitee knows of the condition or hazard [that caused the injury,] there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn the invitee and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of this knowledge assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Baldwin County Hosp. Auth. v. Martinez, 204 Ga.App. at 842, 420 S.E.2d 760. Because a plaintiff cannot recover in a premises liability suit unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if there is no evidence that it had superior knowledge or the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than that of the defendant. Id.

Case No. A05A2097

1. Norman challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Jones Lang, the building manager. Specifically, Norman contends the trial court "either overlooked or failed to appreciate the fact that [she] was unaware of the boxes of large overhead fluorescent lights left on the floor of the entry to her office, the specific hazard that precipitated her fall." (Emphasis in original.) Norman has misconstrued the trial court's order, however. In granting summary judgment to Jones Lang, the trial court did not find that Norman knew the boxes were on the floor before she fell, but instead found as a matter of law that Norman's knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than Jones Lang's.

The record supports the court's conclusion, because there is no evidence that either Jones Lang or Norman knew the boxes were on the floor before Norman fell. In her complaint, Norman acknowledged that she does not know who placed the boxes on the floor. Further, Jones Lang specifically denied that it placed the boxes on the floor or that its employees or agents had been working in Norman's office in the days before Norman fell.

Even so, Norman argues on appeal that the boxes contained fluorescent lights to be installed in the ceiling fixtures and, since Jones Lang was responsible for repairing the ceiling lights, "[c]ommon sense dictates" that Jones Lang had left the boxes in her office "because it had finally undertaken to replace or repair the overhead lights." She cites to no competent evidence to support this contention, however. The only evidence Norman presented to show that the boxes contained lights to be installed in the ceiling was her statement in an affidavit that it was her "understanding" that the boxes contained such lights. This statement is clearly not based upon her personal knowledge. See Hodges v. Putzel Elec. Contractors, 260 Ga. App. 590, 595(3), 580 S.E.2d 243 (2003) (an affidavit must be based upon personal knowledge, and an affiant's statement that he is "aware" of a fact or that his statement is based upon his "belief" or "understanding" indicates that the affiant has no personal knowledge of the fact; such statement may be nothing more than the affiant's opinion given without any demonstrated basis of knowledge). Therefore, the statement has no probative value. Further, the affidavit statement, made more than three years after her fall, directly conflicts with the e-mail she sent to her employer two hours after the fall, in which she said she fell over a box containing "lights to be installed on our work stations," as well as her complaint, which said she tripped over light fixtures in the middle of her office floor. Norman has offered no explanations for these discrepancies. Moreover, no one witnessed Norman's fall, she has not presented any other witnesses who had actual knowledge about the...