Norman v. Van Elsberg

• Decision Date: 17 May 1972
• Citation: 262 Or. 286,497 P.2d 204
• Parties: Judge James A. NORMAN and Judge John C. Warden, being all of the Circuit Court Judges for Coos County, Petitioners, v. Lonnie VAN ELSBERG Commissioner, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 204

497 P.2d 204

262 Or. 286

Judge James A. NORMAN and Judge John C. Warden, being all of

the Circuit Court Judges for Coos County, Petitioners, v. Lonnie VAN ELSBERG Commissioner, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted March 1, 1972.

Decided May 17, 1972.

John Foss, Coos Bay, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the petition were McKeown, Newhouse & Johansen and Paul L. Roess, Coos Bay.

Peter S. Herman, Senior Counsel, Salem, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and Jacob B. Tanzer, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, DENECKE, HOLMAN, TONGUE and BRYSON, JJ.

O'CONNELL, Chief Justice.

This is a proceeding filed pursuant to ORS 27.010--27.030 permitting a controversy to be submitted without action or suit. ¹

The question presented is whether the Board of County Commissioners of Coos County has the authority to decrease admittedly reasonable salaries of juvenile department personnel fixed by the judges of the juvenile court.

The trial court held that the board did not have such authority. The Court of Appeals reversed. We allowed plaintiffs' petition for review.

The facts are set out in detail in the opinion of the Court of Appeals (93 Adv.Sh. 625, 489 P.2d 394); we shall briefly summarize them. The relevant statute is ORS 419.604(1), which reads:

'Subject to subsection (2) of this section, the judge or judges of the juvenile court in any county having a population less than 300,000 shall appoint or designate one or more persons of good moral character as counselors of the juvenile department of the county, to serve at the pleasure of and at a salary designated by the appointing judge and approved by the budget-making body of the county.'

Plaintiffs, as judges of the juvenile court, designated the salaries of counselors of the juvenile department and submitted the salary schedule to the Coos County budget committee. The budget committee prepared their own salary schedule for the juvenile department personnel, reducing the total amount submitted by plaintiffs. The Board of County Commissioners approved the schedule submitted by the budget committee. Plaintiffs, on their own motion, ordered the board to pay the salaries designated by them.

It is stipulated that neither the salaries set by plaintiffs or by defendants is arbitrary or unreasonable, or to put it positively, it is agreed that the salaries in both plaintiffs' and defendants' schedules are reasonable.

The trial court held that the juvenile court had the inherent power to fix reasonable salaries for the juvenile personnel, this being necessary to the discharge of the juvenile court's function as a court.

The Court of Appeals held that 'there is nothing in the statement of controversy from which it can be concluded that the salaries set by the board adversely affected the discharge of the functions imposed by the constitution upon the judicial branch, or those imposed by the legislature upon the Circuit Court of Coos County under ORS 419.604 and 419.608.' 489 P.2d at 403.

We address ourselves first to the interpretation of ORS 419.604(1). The statute authorizes the judges of the juvenile court to fix the salaries of the juvenile counselors, but also provides that the salary must be approved by the budget-making body of the county. What is meant by the word 'approved' in this context? It could be interpreted to mean that the budget-making body of the county was intended to have the final authority to designate the juvenile counselors' salaries. On the other hand, the statute could be construed to vest in the budget-making body of the county the power to disapprove the salary schedule fixed by the judges only if salaries were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeals rejected the latter construction and held that the county board has the power to readjust the salary schedule submitted to it by the juvenile court. ²

There are difficulties in so construing the statute. If the legislature intended to vest in the budget committee, and ultimately the county board, the discretion to fix reasonable salaries for juvenile department personnel, it is difficult to explain why the juvenile court judges were expressly given the authority to designate salaries for such personnel in the first instance. At most, the salary schedule designated by the judges would serve only as a suggestion to the board, but this would be accomplished even without mention in the statute because the judges' recommendation would be evident from the request submitted to the board for funds.

We think that it is more reasonable to construe ORS 419.604(1) to mean that the juvenile court judges were to have the authority to fix the salaries subject to the scrutiny of the budget-making body of the county only for the purpose of rejecting the proposed salaries if they were found to be unreasonable.

The legislature would have good reason to adopt such a policy. The county budget committees and boards of county commissioners in Oregon are, for the most part, made up of members who are not fully acquainted with the problems of judicial administration and the character of services needed to properly discharge the duties of the courts.

The trial judges of the juvenile court, on the other hand, have first-hand knowledge of the needs of the juvenile department, including the kind of talent necessary to carry out an effective juvenile...