Salary of Juvenile Director, Matter of

• Decision Date: 24 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 44028,44028
• Parties: In the Matter of the SALARY OF the JUVENILE DIRECTOR.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 232

87 Wn.2d 232

552 P.2d 163

In the Matter of the SALARY OF the JUVENILE DIRECTOR.

No. 44028.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 24, 1976.

Philip Borst, Pros. Atty., Wilbur, for appellant.

Hamblen, Gilbert & Brooke, P.S., Wm. F. Nielsen, Spokane, for respondent.

UTTER, Associate Justice.

The Lincoln County Board of Commissioners appeals from a writ of mandate issued by the Superior Court directing them to increase the salary of the Lincoln County Director of Juvenile Services. The matter was heard by a Superior Court Judge from a nearby county as an order directing appellants to show cause why the writ should not issue. In its appeal the Board questions whether, in the circumstances of this case, the respondent Superior Court properly exercised its inherent power to determine the salary of the Director. Finding that respondent has failed to meet its burden of proof, we reverse the entry of the writ of mandate.

The salary of the Director of Juvenile Services for Lincoln County is provided by a state program known as the 'Juvenile Subsidy Program.' Under this program, the county is responsible for the nonsalary expenses of the Director's office. The county pays the Director's salary, but is fully reimbursed by the state. The Director receives the benefit of all pay raises given state employees, as distinguished from county employees.

When the Director was hired in 1973, his initial salary was established by agreement between the state, county, Superior Court and the Director. In the year following his hiring and prior to trial, his salary was increased from $9,600 to $10,560. This increase in the Director's compensation equivalent to the raise given state employees in the Director's salary range for 1974, exceeded the $75 per month received by Lincoln County employees for that year. The Lincoln County Superior Court budget for 1975, submitted to the Board of Commissioners, proposed to increase the salary of the Director to $12,000. This increase of approximately $125 per month, would have been the sole responsibility of the county and not reimbursed by the state. The Board rejected the court's request. Other employees of the county received a $75 per month increase during 1975. The Director, although not receiving a pay increase from the Board, was to receive salary increases for state employees in 1975, if any. Following the Board's action, the Superior Court for Lincoln County in January 1975 ordered '(t)hat the County Auditor proceed to set up the Juvenile Director's salary so that it reflects a monthly payment of $125.00 per month . . . to be paid out of the County Treasury in addition to the present State Subsidy salary received by' the Director. The Board notified the court that it intended to resist the order and a show cause hearing was set by the court.

At the hearing, the Superior Court Judge for Lincoln County testified he arrived at the proposed salary of $12,000 by examining the salaries of other juvenile officers in other counties in Washington. In addition, the chairman of the salary and job classification committee of the Washington Association of Juvenile Court Directors testified that directors in counties of comparable size to Lincoln County should receive a $12,500 minimum starting salary. Relying on this determination, the Superior Court Judge stated that he believed $12,000 was fair and reasonable compensation for the position. No showing was made that other qualified employees could not be obtained at the salary established by the county commissioners. In 1974, when the Director was hired, 13 applicants sought the position. There was also no evidence of the extent to which the functioning of the Superior Court would be impaired if the Director's salary were not increased.

In his oral opinion, the trial judge stated that inasmuch as the Superior Court had the authority to appoint its juvenile probation officer, this authority included the right to reach agreement with that employee on the salary to be paid. He then concluded that if the Board refused to pay the salary agreed upon, if reasonable, the Superior Court was deprived of its statutory authority to appoint its Juvenile Director. Formal findings of fact entered later by the trial court found the proposed salary reasonable. The trial judge stated in Conclusion of Law 3:

To allow the Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County, Washington, to control Court employees by means of regulating salaries amounts to an unreasonable control over the judicial branch of government by the legislative branch of government. RCW 13.04.040 which appears to direct or authorize the Board of County Commissioners to fix the salary of the probation officer amounts to control which is an unconstitutional violation of the inherent powers of the judicial branch of the government delegated exclusively to the Courts of this State by Article IV, Section 1, of the Washington State Constitution and further is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

I. Statutory Basis for the Superior Court's Order

Counsel for respondent Superior Court, relying on Norman v. Van Elsberg, 262 Or. 286, 497 P.2d 204 (1972), argues the burden of proof is on appellants, the county commissioners, to show the salary increase is unreasonable before it can deny the salary request of the Superior Court. Upholding the right of the court to establish salaries without preliminary approval of the legislative branch of government, the court in Norman rested its decision on a particular state statute. That statute provided for the appointment of juvenile counselors at a salary designated by the judge and 'approved' by the local legislative body. There, as in numerous other cases construing very similar statutory provisions, approval was held to impose upon the legislative body the burden of showing that the judge's action in setting the salary was unreasonable, Norman v. Van Elsberg, supra, at 291, 497 P.2d 204, or arbitrary and capricious, See Birdsall v. Pima County, 106 Ariz. 266, 475 P.2d 250 (1970); Mann v. County of Maricopa, 104 Ariz. 561, 456 P.2d 931 (1969); Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz. 94, 183 P.2d 880 (1947); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963); Bass v. County of Saline, 171 Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860 (1960); Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Civ.App.1971); But see Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So.2d 830 (1974).

Our statute governing the appointment and compensation of juvenile court officers differs significantly from the provisions construed in Norman v. Van Elsberg, supra, and the cases cited above. RCW 13.04.040 authorizes the Superior Court to 'designate one or more persons of good character to serve as probation counselors during the pleasure of the court.' However, the section also clearly states '(t)he probation counselors and persons appointed to have charge of detention facilities shall each receive compensation which Shall be fixed by the board of county commissioners . . .' (Italics ours.) There is no suggestion in this statute that the Board is relegated to reviewing salary levels previously established by the Superior Court. The Board fixes the compensation in the first instance. Thus, there is no ambiguity and no basis to claim judicial power to fix salaries inferred from its authority to appoint. ¹

II. Constitutional Basis for the Superior Court's Order

The validity of respondent's action, then, must rest on the proposition, adopted by the trial court, that the act of setting salaries for court personnel in the circumstances of this case is a proper exercise of inherent judicial power and that contrary action by the legislative branch violates the principle of separation of powers. This action by the trial court, in effect, allocates public resources to the court system beyond those designated by the legislative or executive branches. The order thus emphasizes the awkward position of courts in the governmental budgeting process. No authority rests in the judiciary to appropriate funds, as a legislative body does, nor to exercise the power of the veto as a bargaining device, as may the executive. In most states, its only means of direct participation in the budgeting process is by intervention, in the form of litigation, to compel the payment of funds for the court system. The wisdom of such judicial intervention has been the source of vigorous debate both in cases and commentary. ²

Any inquiry into the propriety of court action to compel funding of its own functions must begin with an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrines of separation of powers, checks and balances, and inherent judicial power. The constitutions of the nation and the states are imbued with these and other principles of government developed during the revolutionary era. Prominent in the political thought of two centuries ago, these three interrelated, yet distinct, doctrines are major constituents of our governmental framework. At least 26 distinct provisions of the federal constitution are founded on the separation of powers principle, 'about half of which are to accomplish functional separation; the other half being defensive checks, balances and weapons for departmental self preservation.' Brand, Montesquieu and the Separation of Powers, 12 Ore.L.Rev. 175, 177 (1933).

The Development of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

Although a concept with a long history, the first modern expression of the doctrine of separation of governmental powers occurred in eighteenth century England and France. See Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 Law & Contemp.Prob. 108 (1970); Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 Mich.L.Rev. 393 (1922). John Locke, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke and Baron de Montesquieu were influential proponents of their individual versions of the doctrine. Its essence was described by Montesquieu:

All would be lost if the same man or the same...