Norred v. Dispain, 44104
| Decision Date | 14 January 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 44104,44104,1 |
| Parties | Havard NORRED, Chief of Police v. Billy J. DISPAIN |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Stark & Stark, Homer M. Stark, Lawrenceville, for appellant.
Owens & Porter, E. L. Owens, Norcross, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
1. Assuming, without deciding, that in a trover case where the plaintiff has elected to take a verdict for the property and its hire, such verdict for hire in the absence of a verdict for the property is unauthorized; yet, 'verdicts shall have a reasonable intendment, and shall receive a reasonable construction, and shall not be avoided unless from necessity' (Code § 110-105) and may be properly construed in view of the pleadings, evidence, and the charge to the jury (Bridges v. Donalson, 165 Ga. 228, 140 S.E. 497.) In the present case, the trial judge charged the jury: 'The evidence is uncontradicted that the car has been returned to Mr. Dispain, and at a pre-trial hearing had before this case came on the trial docket the court confined the issues as being the right to title and right of possession of the property involved, that is, who had the title and who was entitled to the possession of the automobile, and at that time the plaintiff elected that if he should be authorized to recover that he would take a judgment for the property and its hire from the date of August 2nd, 1967, until February the 5th, 1968.
'Now, you are not necessarily concerned with the judgment for the property because the plaintiff now has the property, but the only issue that would be left here, if you find that he is entitled to recover anything, would be the hire of this vehicle from these dates: August 2nd, 1967 to February 5th, 1968. * * *
'Our law also provides, Lady and Gentlemen of the Jury, that in supporting an action in trover, that is an action to recover possession of personal property, a person may prove either title in himself at the time when the suit was filed, or he can show prior possession in himself at the time when the suit was filed, or he can show a right of possession in himself at the time the suit was filed, so you look to the evidence in this case and determine whether or not Mr. Dispain brings himself within either of these provisions of law with respect to his right to bring this suit to recover this automobile and recover hire for it.
'If you should find in favor of the plaintiff, determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence in this case for you to determine what amount, if any, he would be entitled to for hire of his automobile during the time that the possession must have been wrongfully withheld.
'If you should then believe that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, the form of your verdict would be: 'We, the jury, find for the plaintiff so many dollars as hire,' and that would be sufficient.
'On the other hand, if you believe that the defendant was in lawful possession of this car and had reason to retain its possession and did not arbitrarily refuse its return or possession to the plaintiff; that he was otherwise entitled to retain it under the provisions of law that the court has given you, you would be authorized to return a verdict for the defendant.
'In that event the form of your verdict would be: 'We, the jury, find for the defendant. " The jury returned a verdict 'for the...
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...retained his property without due process of law." Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Norred v. Dispain, 119 Ga.App. 29, 166 S.E.2d 38 (1969) (trover action may be brought against police chief for seizure and retention of automobile)). Because plaintiff Lindsey ......
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Cooper v. Ricketts
...duties, but in fact illegally and not for a public purpose, a trover action against such official is a proper remedy. Norred v. Dispain, 119 Ga.App. 29, 166 S.E.2d 38. 'While a suit cannot be maintained against the State without its consent, and this inhibition cannot be evaded by making an......
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Byrd v. Stewart, 86-8202
...(1982). This statutory provision covers the unauthorized seizure of personal property by police officers. Cf. Norred v. Dispain, 119 Ga.App. 29, 166 S.E.2d 38 (1969) (trover action may be brought against Chief of Police for seizure of personalty). The state therefore has provided an adequat......