Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 42298,42298
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: NORRIS v. ATLANTA & WEST POINT RAILROAD CO.

Page 835

333 S.E.2d 835

254 Ga. 684

NORRIS v. ATLANTA & WEST POINT RAILROAD CO.

No. 42298.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 5, 1985.

L. Lin Wood, Jr., John O. Moore, Wood, Moore & Grant, Atlanta, Thomas F. Brown, II, Burdine & Brown, Decatur, for William F. Norris, et al.

Willis Haugen, A. Mitchell Powell, Jr., Sanders, Mottolla, Haugen & Goodson, Newnan, for Atlanta & West Point R. Co.

Alton D. Kitchings, Savannah, Manley F. Brown, Macon, David N. Rainwater, Cordele, (amicus).

CLARKE, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the "doctrine of binding precedent" should be recognized in Georgia. We conclude that it should not.

Norris, an employee of Signal Delivery Service, Inc. (SDSI) drove a delivery truck on the tracks of the railroad. The truck was hit by a train. As the train braked and hit the truck, a crew member was injured. The crew member sued SDSI in the Superior Court of Fulton County, alleging that his back injury was caused by the negligence of SDSI's employee Norris. SDSI defended on the theory that the injury was caused by failure of the railroad to provide a safe crossing and by the crew member's own negligence. The jury awarded a verdict of $20,000 to the crew member.

The present suit was filed in the Superior Court of Coweta County by Norris and his wife against the railroad for injuries to Norris and Mrs. Norris' loss of consortium. The railroad moved for summary judgment, relying on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the Norrises were precluded from suing the railroad under the "doctrine of binding precedent" because the issue of Norris' negligence had been fully litigated. Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co., 174 Ga.App. 389, 330 S.E.2d 151 (1985).

OCGA § 9-12-40 provides that "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside." OCGA § 9-12-42 provides that "For a former judgment to be a bar to subsequent action, the merits of the case must have been adjudicated." These code sections together set out the basic principles of res judicata in Georgia. For res judicata to act as a bar of a subsequent action, the original and subsequent action must bear certain identical characteristics. The two actions must be between identical parties or their privies, and the cause of action in each suit must be identical. Collateral estoppel, like res judicata, requires identity of parties or privity. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does not require identity of the claim but only precludes readjudication of an issue already adjudicated between the parties or their privies in a prior action. Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390, 197 S.E. 833 (1938).

As Judge Carley pointed out in his dissent, Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co., supra, 174 Ga.App. at 396, 330 S.E.2d 151, the matter of res judicata or collateral estoppel is complicated in master-servant cases by the principle of derivative liability. Although under certain circumstances the master or, more rarely, the servant, may claim the benefit of a prior adjudication in favor of the other, McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 293 S.E.2d 331 (1982); Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 212 S.E.2d 842 (1975), the master or servant who has never had a day in court cannot be barred by a prior adjudication against the other. "[A]n agency or master-servant relationship [does not] ipso facto [constitute] privity for purposes of res judicata or estoppel by judgment." Davis v. Bryant, 117 Ga.App. 811, 812, 162 S.E.2d 249 (1968). In the present case Mr. and Mrs. Norris are not in privity with SDSI. Therefore they cannot be barred from litigating their action against the railroad by res judicata or collateral estoppel even though the issue of Norris' negligence was present in the Fulton County action.

The Court of Appeals based its holding that the Norrises are barred not on res judicata or collateral estoppel but, rather, on the "doctrine of binding precedent." This precept, first enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 103 Ga.App. 783, 120 S.E.2d 628 (1961), was explained in Lowe Engineers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 164 Ga.App. 255, 259, 297 S.E.2d 41 (1982), as follows: "Succinctly stated, that doctrine provides where the issue of liability has previously been adjudicated with negative results for a party contending for the same rights in subsequent litigation, the former judgment, although not res judicata, estoppel by judgment nor collateral estoppel as to the present action...