Norris v. Loyd
| Decision Date | 24 June 1918 |
| Docket Number | 31865 |
| Citation | 168 N.W. 557,183 Iowa 1056 |
| Parties | ELIZABETH NORRIS et al., Appellees, v. WILLIAM LOYD, Appellee, et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Monona District Court.--GEORGE JEPSON, Judge.
SUIT in partition of lands owned, at the time of his death, by George E. Loyd. All the parties save one are the widow and devisees under the will of Loyd. The other party is Charles Hicks, who intervened in the action, claiming to be the illegitimate son of the testator, and to be duly recognized by the testator as such. Hicks proved an adjudication in the state of California of his paternity, and due acknowledgment thereof. He was not however, a devisee under the will. The trial court confirmed the title of the property pursuant to the terms of the will and awarded it to the devisees therein and to the widow. The intervening defendant has appealed.
Affirmed.
George H. Clark and E. A. Burgess, for appellant.
S. A Frick, Miles W. Newby, and M. F. Harrington, for appellees.
The property in question consists of 800 acres of land in Monona County. The devisees, parties hereto, are the twelve legitimate children of the testator, George E. Loyd. At the time of his death, and for a few years prior thereto, Loyd was a resident of California. The original probate of his will and the administration of his personal estate were there had. The question of the paternity of Hicks and of the due acknowledgement thereof was litigated in California, in a proceeding wherein the widow and all the legitimate heirs were parties. The finding of fact in that proceeding was that George E. Loyd was the father of Hicks, and that he had duly acknowledged the paternity in writing. The same adjudication held, as a conclusion of law, that Hicks was entitled to take two thirty-ninths of the estate of George E. Loyd, "wherever situated." This conclusion of law was predicated upon a California statute, which purports to protect the children of a testator against omissions in his will. Under such statute, if a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, such child has the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate. No provision was made for Hicks in the will of the testator.
The will of the testator directed the executors to sell the Iowa land in question, and to divide the proceeds among his twelve children, naming them. Shortly after the death of the testator, the widow and the twelve children, being all sui juris, elected and mutually agreed to take and hold the land in question as land. They so notified the executors, who assented thereto. Their election was also filed in the district court of Monona County and presented to that court for approval, and was approved. Later, this action of partition was brought. No controversy is presented, as between the widow and the twelve devisees. The only controversy is between this family group, on the one hand, and Charles Hicks, on the other. The contention of Hicks may be stated in two general propositions:
(1) That the adjudication in California was binding upon all the parties thereto everywhere; and that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States requires that it be recognized by the courts of this state in the devolution of this title.
(2) That the provision of the will which directed the executors to sell this real estate was an equitable conversion thereof; that it thereby became personalty, and attached to the testator at his domicile, and came within the jurisdiction of the California courts; that the devisees had no power to work a reconversion into land without the consent of all parties in interest, including himself.
The contention for the devisees may also be stated in two general propositions:
(1) That, though the will worked an equitable conversion of the land into personalty, the election of all the devisees before actual conversion, worked a reconversion into land, and terminated the power of the executors to convey the title; that the question of conversion of the land concerns no one except a devisee, or one claiming under a devisee; that Hicks took nothing under the will, but claimed in hostility thereto; that, under Iowa law, the devise of the real estate was valid, even as against an heir.
(2) That there was no jurisdiction in the California court to adjudicate the question of title to real estate in Iowa.
These general propositions have some ramifications of detail. After Hicks obtained an adjudication of his paternity, he brought a proceeding against the executors to compel them to sell the land in question, and to bring the proceeds before the California court. As an alternative, he asked the removal of the executors. In this proceeding, he was again successful, in the nisi prius court. This adjudication was also in force and effect, pending, however, on appeal to the Supreme Court of California, at the time of the trial of the present suit in the district court of Monona County. This status continued until after the first arguments were filed in this court. The arguments, therefore, have been built, to some extent, upon the effect of that adjudication. Later, however, the Supreme Court of California handed down a reversing opinion on that appeal, and the contentions of the appellant herein, based on that adjudication, have necessarily fallen with it. In the consideration of the case, it will simplify the discussion if we consider first what the rights of the parties would be as to this land under our law, disregarding, for the moment, the California adjudication, but assuming the fact of paternity and acknowledgment thereof to be as found by the California court. We can then turn our attention upon the qualifying effect, if any, of such alleged adjudication.
I. The testator disposed of the property in question by his will. This is so whether the will worked an equitable conversion or not. Under our law, he had a right to so dispose of it, to the exclusion of any legitimate child. He had the same right to dispose of it to the exclusion of a duly acknowledged illegitimate child. Lepper v. Knox, 179 Iowa 419, 161 N.W. 454. The land having been properly disposed of by will, Hicks acquired no interest in it, either as heir of the testator or as devisee under his will. While the will stands, the only persons interested in the land are the widow and the devisees, and such as may claim under them.
Assuming that the will, in the first instance, worked an equitable conversion of the land into personalty; did the land thereby lose its situs, and did the title thereto escape its subjection to Iowa law? The will provided that the executors should sell the property, with the approval of the district court of Monona County. An equitable conversion is a legal fiction, and is simply anticipatory of an actual conversion. There could be no actual conversion without a transfer of the title, and there could be no legal transfer of the title, except in pursuance of Iowa law. The doctrine of equitable conversion by will is not usually, if ever, applied in hostility to the devisee. It is well settled by authority that, though a will work an equitable conversion of land, the beneficiaries of the devise may, at any time before actual conversion, work a reconversion into land, by so electing and agreeing among themselves. That question was before this court in Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa 59, 91 N.W. 836, and again in Atlee v. Bullard, 123 Iowa 274, 279, 98 N.W. 889. In the latter case, it was said:
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A few excerpts from other jurisdictions will indicate the uniformity of authority upon this question. In Griffith v. Witten, 252 Mo. 627, 646 (161 S.W. 708), it is said:
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