Norris v. Norris

• Decision Date: 27 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-669.,79-669.
• Citation: 419 A.2d 982
• Parties: Leo Brison NORRIS, Jr., Appellant, v. Alice Friend NORRIS, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

419 A.2d 982

Leo Brison NORRIS, Jr., Appellant, v. Alice Friend NORRIS, Appellee.

No. 79-669.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 3, 1980.

Decided August 27, 1980.

George J. Goldsborough, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Robert B. Norris, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Leonard Z. Bulman, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GALLAGHER, NEBEKER and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge:

This appeal in a divorce case involves an antenuptial contract as a defense to an award of alimony to the wife. The trial court, applying Florida law, struck down the agreement because it was entered into without full disclosure of the husband's assets and in circumstances that were unduly coercive to the wife. We agree with the trial court's conclusion and find no other abuse of discretion in the award of alimony.

In October 1975, while the parties were vacationing at Mr. Norris' second home in Florida prior to their marriage, appellee suggested that an antenuptial agreement would be appropriate in their circumstances. She was in her early 40's and he in his late 50's. Both parties had children by previous marriages.

Mr. Norris had his attorney prepare a contract, which stated in pertinent part

Should said marriage relationship be terminated by death or legal proceedings, his and her property shall be free from any claim by the other on account of dower, curtesy, inheritance, widow allowance, homestead, alimony, or other statutory right, the same as if the said marriage had never been celebrated.

The contract specified that it would be construed under Florida law.

Appellee was upset by the terms of the agreement. She consulted her own attorney, who advised her not to sign unless certain changes were made. Appellant refused to make the changes, and discussion was dropped. Then on December 15, 1975, approximately an hour before the marriage, she executed the agreement in its original form upon Mr. Norris' demand.

After a stormy marriage, the parties separated in March 1978. Mrs. Norris sued for divorce and alimony, and Mr. Norris interposed the antenuptial contract as a defense. Discovery revealed that Mr. Norris had assets of approximately $450,000. Appellee had few assets. She would have received $200 a month alimony from a previous husband for several more years, but this amount had terminated on her remarriage to Mr. Norris. Although untrained in any profession, she had worked intermittently during the marriage and after the separation.

The trial judge granted a divorce on the ground of voluntary separation for six months and awarded Mrs. Norris attorney's fees of $2,000 and alimony comprising a lump sum payment of $11,000 and 18 monthly payments of $400. He refused to enforce the antenuptial contract concluding that, under Florida law, the contract was not fair and reasonable, and the husband failed to meet his burden of disclosure. The trial judge also questioned whether Mrs. Norris had voluntarily signed the agreement. As an additional premise for invalidating the agreement, the court looked at the public policy of the District of Columbia, as articulated in Burtoff v. Burtoff, Super.Ct.D.C., Civil No. S-36-77, D-3441-77, 105 Wash.D.L.Rep. 1917 (Oct. 25, 1977). That trial court decision was recently affirmed, D.C.App., 418 A.2d 1085 (1980) (antenuptial agreements not automatically void as against public policy, but will be carefully scrutinized for their fairness, disclosure, and voluntariness).

The validity of the antenuptial contract must be decided under Florida law, as provided in the contract itself and stipulated by the parties to this action. The general rule is that parties to a contract may specify the law they wish to govern, as part of their freedom to contract, as long as there is some reasonable relationship with the state specified. See 11 Williston on Contracts § 1292A, at 15-16 (3d ed. 1968); Barzda v. Quality Courts Motel, Inc., 386 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1967) (contract stated Florida law should govern). The Norrises had sufficient contacts with Florida to meet this requirement. In the absence of any overriding interest by the marital domicile in applying its own law, the general rule should be applied to antenuptial agreements. See Ross v. Ross, 233 App.Div. 626, 253 N.Y.S. 871, 880 (1931) (trial court determined that law of Quebec should be applied to invalidate a trust benefitting wife because the parties had stipulated in antenuptial contract that Quebec law would govern their future dealings; reversed on ground that reference to Quebec law in antenuptial agreement was not contractual, but merely descriptive of status of parties at time contract was executed). Since there is no conflict between District of Columbia law and Florida law, see Burtoff v. Burtoff, supra, we apply Florida law.

The Florida case of Posner v. Posner, 283 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), established that an antenuptial agreement regarding al'Oony is binding if made under proper conditions, these being the same conditions that had been laid out earlier in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (antenuptial agreement waiving widow's rights in husband's estate). The test begins with scrutiny of the fairness of the contract. If the

provision made for the wife is, upon the face of the agreement, disproportionate to the means of the husband the burden . . . is cast upon the executor to show that the wife, at the time she executed the agreement, had or reasonably ought to have had full knowledge of the husband's property. [Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).]

In this case, the trial court found the agreement was not fair, because it made no provision for the wife, who was worse off after the marriage than before, in that she gave up monthly support at the time she entered the marriage. Accordingly, under Florida case law, appellant had the burden of proving that appellee had full knowledge of the extent of his wealth. See Posner v. Posner, 257 So.2d 530, 534-37 (Fla. 1972) (husband who did not fully disclose his income failed to meet his burden).

Appellant had the further burden of proving that the wife entered the agreement freely and voluntarily. Some factors involved in this assessment are the parties' respective experience in worldly affairs, Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, supra at 21, and their representation by independent counsel. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So.2d 1111 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1976); Plant v. Plant, 320 Sold 455 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975) (fact that husband sprang agreement on wife on day before wedding one factor used to set aside agreement). The Lutgert court voided an antenuptial contract executed at the husband's insistence the day before the marriage during the final...