Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 31607

• Decision Date: 29 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 31607,31607
• Citation: 143 So.2d 17
• Parties: Josephine DEL VECCHIO, Petitioner, v. Samuel DEL VECCHIO, as Executor of the Estate of Domenico Del Vecchio, Deceased, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 17

143 So.2d 17

Josephine DEL VECCHIO, Petitioner, v. Samuel DEL VECCHIO, as Executor of the Estate of Domenico Del Vecchio, Deceased, Respondent.

No. 31607.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 29, 1962.

Fuller Warren, Miami, for petitioner.

Patton & Kanner and William H. Morrow, Jr., Miami, for respondent.

CALDWELL, Justice.

This case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari based upon an alleged direct conflict between the decision of the District Court of Appeal ¹ and the decision of this Court in the case of Weeks v. Weeks. ² The two decisions are in direct conflict on the same point of law, and this court has jurisdiction under Section 4(2), Article V, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.

The cause was instituted in the circuit court by the petitioner against the respondent, as executor of the estate of petitioner's deceased husband, to have set aside an antenuptial agreement entered into between her and her deceased husband in 1946.

The petitioner, then employed in a restaurant as a waitress and cashier, and the deceased first met in 1939 when she was living in the District of Columbia, in a rented house owned by him. The friendship between the petitioner and the deceased was more than casual for some years prior to the death of the deceased's former wife in 1945, after which they were married and lived together until his death in May, 1958. At the time of the marriage the deceased was 68 years of age and the petitioner was 35. She had assets valued at approximately $8,000 and the deceased was a man of considerable means who owned, together with his son, a chain of hardware stores in Washington, D. C.

It appears the son was the moving party in promoting the antenuptial agreement, the reason being his desire to protect his interest in the hardware business. By the terms of the agreement the petitioner released all interest in property located in Washington, District of Columbia, of which the prospective husband was then seized and, in return, the deceased agreed to convey to the petitioner, as a tenant by the entirety, a home in Washington, D. C.

It does not appear that, prior to the execution of the agreement, full disclosure was made to the petitioner of the nature and extent of the prospective husband's property, nor that she had independent advice as to her legal rights. It does appear that the petitioner was conversant with the fact that the deceased and his son were proprietors of a hardware business in the city and that he owned other property.

The chancellor found that, at the time of the marriage, decedent was worth about a half-million dollars and that no full and fair disclosure was made to the petitioner of the extent of the decedent's holding. The antenuptial agreement was held to be invalid and set aside.

On appeal the decree of the chancellor was reversed, the district court holding '* * * the establishment of the mere failure to disclose, where the facts and circumstances indicate that the individual knew or should have known of the other's financial status, would not, in the absence of other factors, render the antenuptial agreement void.' It was held that, since the petitioner 'knew or should have known that he was a man of considerable substance' the agreement was valid notwithstanding the fact that no disclosure was made of the husband's assets prior to the execution of the agreement.

The Weeks case, supra, cited with approval the Murdock case ³ which, in essential part, held the rule to be:

'The rule in this state is well settled that a man and woman who contemplate marriage may by an antenuptial contract, if there is full knowledge on the part of the intended wife of all that materially affects the agreement, settle their property rights in each other's estates. Yet it is held, if it appear that the provision made for the intended wife is disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, a presumption is raised in her favor that the execution of the agreement was brought about by a designed concealment of the amount of his property by the intended husband, and that the husband, or persons claiming through him, in order to sustain the agreement, have cast upon them the burden of proof to show that the intended wife, at the time she executed the agreement, had full knowledge of the nature, character, and value of the intended husband's property, or that the circumstances were such that she reasonably ought to have had such knowledge.'

The district court did not follow the Weeks case in the case at bar and a conflict resulted, giving this Court jurisdiction. Where, as in this case, the provision made for the wife is, upon the face of the agreement, disproportionate to the means of the husband the burden, under the Weeks rule, is cast upon the executor to show that the wife, at the time she executed the agreement, had or reasonably ought to have had full knowledge of the husband's property.

The subject of antenuptial...