Norris v. State
| Decision Date | 10 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 35A02-0001-CR-45.,35A02-0001-CR-45. |
| Citation | 732 N.E.2d 186 |
| Parties | Robert NORRIS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
P. Robert Dawalt, Jr., Marion, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Priscilla J. Fossum, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Robert Norris appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Norris' motion to suppress.
On May 18, 1999, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Indiana State Police Trooper Anthony Casto apparently called in the license plate number of an Oldsmobile which was being driven on U.S. 224. When he received information that the plate was registered to a Chevrolet, Trooper Casto stopped the Oldsmobile because he believed that it was being driven with a false license plate. There were three men in the car — driver Greg O'Banion, front-seat passenger Chad O'Banion, and back-seat passenger Robert Norris.
Greg accompanied Trooper Casto to Casto's vehicle and explained that he had just purchased the Oldsmobile and had transferred the license plate from his prior vehicle — the Chevrolet — to the Oldsmobile. Trooper Casto verified Greg's story and issued him a warning. As Greg was returning to his vehicle, Trooper Casto asked Greg if he could search the Oldsmobile. Greg gave the trooper consent to search the vehicle.
The trooper asked the two other men to exit the vehicle while he searched it. Trooper Casto began his search with a backpack that was on the backseat of the Oldsmobile next to where Norris had been sitting. The trooper did not attempt to determine which of the men owned the backpack. When he opened the backpack, the trooper found a handgun.
Norris, the owner of the backpack, was charged with possession of a handgun without a license. He filed a motion to suppress the gun as the "fruit of an illegal search." (R. 36). At the hearing on the motion, Trooper Casto testified that he did not have probable cause for the search and that there was no contraband in plain view. According to Trooper Casto, if Greg had declined his request to search the vehicle, the trooper "would have let them go." (R. 75). The trial court found that the "search was made pursuant to consent" and denied the motion. (R. 108). Thereafter, the court convicted Norris of possession of a handgun without a license.
Norris argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the handgun. The gravamen of his argument is that Greg's consent to search the Oldsmobile did not include consent to search Norris' backpack. We agree.
Review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.1997). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ind.Ct. App.1999). " `The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes and their belongings.' " Id. (citing People v. James, 163 Ill.2d 302, 206 Ill.Dec. 190, 645 N.E.2d 195, 197-98 (1994) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979))).
For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d at 1237. Because it is undoubtedly reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so, a consensual search is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1239. Even in the absence of probable cause or exigent circumstances, a party may validly consent to a warrantless search. Id.
A valid consent to a search may be given by either the person whose property is to be searched or by a third party who has common authority over or a sufficient relationship to the premises to be searched. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2796, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). Our supreme court has explained common authority as follows:
Common authority is not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent rests on the mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that each of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his or her own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The determination whether a valid consent to a search has been given must be judged against an objective standard— would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search " `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' "' that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188,110 S.Ct. at 2801,111 L.Ed.2d at 161 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). If the facts and circumstances are such that it would be objectively reasonable to conclude that the person who consented did not have authority to do so, then the police officers' subsequent search would be invalid. 497 U.S. at 188-89,110 S.Ct. at 2801,111 L.Ed.2d at 161. The State bears the burden of proving that the officers were objectively reasonable in their belief that the person who gave consent to the search had the authority to do so. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181,110 S.Ct. at 2797,111 L.Ed.2d at 156.
Here, the State contends that the "search of [Norris' backpack] was proper because it was objectively reasonable for Casto to believe that he could search a [backpack] that was lying on the backseat of the driver's vehicle." State's Brief, p. 5. In support of its contention, the State directs us to Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), wherein a police officer stopped Jimeno's vehicle for a traffic offense. The officer asked to search Jimeno's vehicle for narcotics, and Jimeno consented to the search. During the search, the officer saw a folded, brown bag on the floor of the vehicle. The officer opened the bag and found cocaine.
The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car." 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d at 303. The Court noted that parameters of a search are usually defined by the purpose of the search and reasoned that "it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search [Jimeno's] car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id. On this basis, the Court found that the consent to search "extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag lying on the car's floor." Id.
However, we find that the facts in Jimeno are readily distinguishable from those before us. Jimeno was the driver of the vehicle. In his capacity as driver, he had the authority to consent to the search of the car because he had possession and control of it. Although there was a passenger in the car, there was no argument that the bag belonged to the passenger rather than Jimeno. Therefore, Jimeno also had the authority to permit the police to search the bag. The issue was whether Jimeno, having the authority to consent to a search of both the vehicle and the paper bag, intended his consent to search the vehicle to also encompass a search of the bag.
Here, however, Greg did not own Norris' backpack. Further, there is no suggestion that Greg had common possession or control of it. Because Greg did not own or share control of the backpack, the precise issue addressed in Jimeno is not before us. Rather, the issue before us is whether Greg's consent to search his vehicle included consent to search the backpack of one of his passengers.
We addressed a similar issue in Friedel, 714 N.E.2d at 1231. There, an Indiana State Police trooper stopped the vehicle in which Susan Friedel was a passenger. The male driver consented to a search of the vehicle and the passengers exited it. A Steuben County Sheriff's Department deputy discovered a purse in the back seat of the vehicle next to where Friedel had been sitting, opened it and found marijuana and amphetamines. Friedel was charged with possession of these substances. The trial court granted her motion to suppress the drugs and the State appealed.
In determining that the search of Friedel's purse was unreasonable and unconstitutional, this court stated as follows:
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